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Summary 
1. Summary 
As part of the Single Market Review, this report analyses the likely effects of the single market 
and the Community Support Framework (CSF) on the countries of the EU periphery: Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland. To this end, macroeconometric models of these economies were 
constructed which were then subjected to 'shocks' designed to capture the essential elements 
of the single market and CSF programmes. This procedure allows us to distinguish between 
developments which would have occurred in these economies in the absence of these 
programmes, and developments that are instead due to the programmes. 
The original Cecchini study was based on economic models of four of the large EU economies 
plus Belgium and the Netherlands, and the EU-wide results were then derived by grossing up 
the results for these six economies. This presents an inaccurate picture of likely developments 
in the periphery, however, since developmental processes in the periphery are quite different 
from those pertaining to the core; for example, the periphery economies are price-takers in the 
markets for their exports to a much greater extent than are the large core economies. Also, one 
of the major factors determining periphery development is the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from the core. Although many of the 'shocks' that we apply to our economic 
models are taken from the Cecchini Report, therefore, we would not expect our results to 
simply replicate the Cecchini results since the developmental processes modelled are quite 
different. 
The structure of our macroeconomic models is described in Chapter 5 of this report (see in 
particular Figure 5.1). Manufacturing output, which consists of both tradable and non-
(internationally-)tradable components, is determined by a combination of cost-competit-
iveness and aggregate-demand factors. The greater the tradable component, the larger the 
impact on output of world demand relative to domestic demand. Ireland is the most open of 
the four economies in this regard, and Spain the least open. Given the level of output 
determined in this way, manufacturing-sector employment and investment are determined in a 
cost-minimization process by relative factor prices. Since output of the services sector is 
typically far less internationally tradable than is manufacturing output, the services sector in 
each economy is driven largely by conventional Keynesian aggregate-demand processes. 
To allow for unemployment we present a wage-bargaining model of the labour market. Wage 
demands are influenced by inflation, productivity growth, unemployment, and the tax wedge. 
These various influences differ in strength across the different countries. Not surprisingly, 
given its very high current level of unemployment, the impact of unemployment on wage 
bargaining is found to be lowest in Spain. 
Having given this brief description of the economic models, we now describe the 'shocks' 
entailed in our analysis of the effects of the single market programme. We make no effort to 
determine the extent to which the programme has actually been put into effect; rather we 
assume that the programme as set out in the Cecchini Report is phased in over a 10-year 
period, 1987-97. To the extent that elements of the programme remain to be introduced after 
that date, the effects we identify will take place later than at the dates shown in our tables of 
results. 
For the small-open-economies under discussion, the effects of the single market can be 
classified at a theoretical level as static, dynamic, locational and growth-dependent. In our 
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analysis, however, the dynamic effects can be subsumed under the static and locational 
categories. The static effects are those that arise as various sectors expand and others contract 
in each country in the wake of EU market integration. To determine which sectors expand and 
which contract, we make use of a detailed study of the competitiveness of industrial sectors in 
each EU country carried out by the European Commission (European Commission, 1990b). 
The successful sectors expand through capturing increased foreign market share and the 
unsuccessful sectors decline through losing home market share. Our analysis suggests that this 
static shock is positive for Ireland, marginally negative for Portugal, moderately negative for 
Spain and strongly negative for Greece. The reason for this is that Ireland and Portugal are 
found to have the largest shares of employment and output in the sectors in which these 
individual countries are expected to benefit from the single market, relative to those in the 
country-specific sectors that are expected to be adversely affected. 
For both Spain and Portugal, however, these adverse static shocks are more than compensated 
for by beneficial locational effects; by this is meant the increased FDI inflows that these 
economies have experienced in recent years. These increased inflows can be ascribed either to 
EU entry or to the single market programme; to the extent that the latter is responsible, the net 
static plus locational effects for Ireland, Spain and Portugal are all positive. The 'growth-
dependent' effects arise since, with further trade liberalization increasing the proportion of 
internationally tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods, the peripheral economies will be 
more strongly affected by growth in the EU core than is the case at present. 
The overall effects of the single market, then, are sensitive to whether we ascribe the increased 
FDI inflows into Spain and Portugal to the SEM or not. If we deem that they are not due to the 
SEM, then the single market has almost insignificant effects on Greek and Spanish GDP by 
the year 2010; Irish GDP is over 9% higher than it would otherwise have been, however, while 
Portuguese GDP is 7.5% higher. This strong showing for Portugal, in the face of a negative 
static shock, is due primarily to the growth-dependent effects; as Portugal becomes much more 
open, its response to increases in core-country GDP is correspondingly stronger. 
If the increased FDI flows are instead ascribed to the SEM, then the positive effects on Spain 
and Portugal are very much stronger. In this case the SEM raises Portuguese GDP by almost 
11.5% by the year 2010; Spanish and Irish GDP are raised by 9%, though the effect on Greek 
GDP remains insignificant. Note that for the first three countries these effects are roughly 
twice the size of the average GDP effects estimated by Cecchini. Greece remains an outlier for 
two reasons: first, because so many of its indigenous industries are deemed uncompetitive by 
the European Commission study referred to earlier (which makes the static shock strongly 
negative), and second, because inflows of FDI remain low. Our feeling, however, is that the 
low FDI inflows are a consequence of the current unsettled nature of Greek macroeconomic 
policy and so, if these problems could be overcome, the Greek position in our analysis would 
appear much more favourable. 
Of course, one of the main reasons for the introduction of the Community Support 
Framework, consisting of the Delors I (1989-93) and Delors II (1994-99) packages, was the 
fear that gains to core countries from the single market would dominate the gains to the 
periphery. Our study presents a separate analysis of the impacts of the CSF on the EU 
periphery countries. These programmes have effects on both the demand side of the economy 
(in the sense of increasing aggregate spending) and on the supply side (in the sense of 
increasing the productive capacity of the economy). The mechanisms underlying the first set 
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of effects, being Keynesian in nature, are far less complex than those underlying the supply-
side effects. 
There are three main channels through which the supply-side effects operate: the CSF 
improves the physical infrastructure of the economy, raises the level of human capital (through 
enhancing the skills and education of the labour force), and directly assists the private sector 
by subsidizing investment. The latter channel is relatively straightforward; modelling the 
impact of the first two channels on private sector costs, however, brings us into relatively 
uncharted territory. We attempt to capture the first two effects through incorporating 
externality mechanisms into the models. Thus, public investment in infrastructure and human 
capital bring spillover benefits to private industry. There is little consensus, however, on the 
size of these spillover benefits, so we report results for high, medium and zero estimates of the 
size of the spillover effects. Clearly, the long-term effects of the CSF also depend critically on 
whether the programmes end in 1999 or whether they can be assumed to continue indefinitely. 
Again, we report results for both scenarios. 
Appropriately enough, since Greece is found to benefit least substantially from the single 
market, we find that it, along with Portugal, benefits most substantially from the CSF. The 
benefits to Ireland and Spain are very much less. The relative size of these effects is due 
primarily to the relative size of the CSF funds allocated to each economy. For example, 
although Ireland does well in per capita terms from the CSF allocations, its relatively large 
GDP per head means that the CSF allocations as a ratio of GDP are smaller than the 
equivalent ratios for Greece and Portugal (see Table 9.1). 
The general flavour of our results on the CSF (in isolation from any single market shocks) may 
be gleaned from the following. For the case where there are no beneficial spillover effects for 
the private sector, but where CSF funding continues indefinitely, Greek GDP in the year 2010 
is almost 6% above what it would otherwise be; Portuguese GDP is 7% higher, while the 
figures for Ireland and Spain are only 1% higher. For the case where financing is withdrawn 
after 1999 on the other hand, but where there are relatively strong spillover effects, Portuguese 
GDP is over 2% higher, but Irish, Greek and Spanish GDP are all less than 1% above what 
they would otherwise be. This suggests that the long-run supply-side effects, to the extent to 
which we have captured them correctly through the externality mechanisms, are very much 
weaker than the Keynesian demand-side effects. 
To arrive at a definitive answer to the question of the combined effects of the single market 
and the CSF programmes requires choosing amongst a range of scenarios: for example, are the 
increased FDI flows into Spain and Portugal to be attributed to the SEM? Is the CSF funding 
temporary or permanent? Are the economic mechanisms that generate long-run supply 
responses to CSF programmes strong or weak? In the light of the most recent research, we do 
not yet have definitive answers to these difficult questions. 
To take the worst case scenario, suppose that the FDI effects are unrelated to the SEM, the 
CSF funding ends after the year 1999 and the CSF investments contribute nothing to long-
term growth (i.e. the so-called externality effects are zero). Here, the SEM effects come from 
Table 8.1(a); the CSF effects come from Table 9.6. Under this worst case scenario, these are 
actually zero. Thus, the combined effects on GDP of the SEM and the CSF are effectively zero 
for Greece and Spain by the year 2010, and are 7.5% and 9% for Portugal and Ireland, 
respectively. The interpretation is as follows. Greece experiences strong adverse effects on its 
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manufacturing sector, but these are offset by the benefits derived from an increased openness 
to EU growth. Spain suffers smaller adverse restructuring in its manufacturing sector, but 
remains relatively less open. Portugal suffers only a small adverse restructuring effect, and this 
is dominated by the benefits of increased openness. Ireland, on the other hand, benefits 
directly both from manufacturing restructuring and from greater openness. 
The most positive effect on the cohesion objective arises when FDI effects are assumed to 
derive from the SEM, the CSF funding is maintained unchanged after the year 1999, and the 
CSF investments are assumed to contribute to long-term growth. Here, the SEM effects come 
from Table 8.1(b); the CSF effects come from Table 9.4. Greece experiences an increase of 
7.5% to its GDP by the year 2010, the lowest of the four countries. Almost all of this effect is 
associated with the permanent CSF expenditure, i.e. it is Keynesian in origin. Both Ireland and 
Spain experience similar impacts in the range 11% to 12.6%, where almost three quarters 
comes from the SEM and only one quarter from the CSF. Finally, Portugal experiences the 
strongest impact, amounting to 23%, split equally between the contributions of the SEM and 
the CSF. The effect of the CSF is so strong in this case: first, since the CSF funds represent a 
high proportion of GDP, and second, because the Portuguese investment multiplier is so large 
(see Chapter 4). 
Introduction 
2. Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to present the results of a study of the macroeconomic effects of 
the single market on the four 'cohesion' countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) using 
adaptations of the HERMIN econometric models for each of these countries as previously 
described in Bradley, Herce and Modesto (1995b). The study was originally structured as a 
four-stage programme of research as follows: 
(a) exploration of likely single market impacts on the cohesion countries by means of 
adaptation and application of the original Catinat-Italianer 'parametric' methodology for 
use with the HERMIN model;' 
(b) definition of an appropriate counterfactual simulation to describe the likely evolution of 
the four cohesion economies in the absence of the single market initiatives and in the 
absence of the accompanying investment oriented EU initiatives such as the Community 
Support Frameworks (CSFs) and the cohesion funds; 
(c) use of the four HERMIN models for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, suitably 
adapted, to carry out simulations of the single market initiatives and the CSFs, where 
impacts would be measured in terms of deviations from the counterfactual derived in (b) 
above; 
(d) investigation of 'developmental' issues that go beyond the Catinat-Italianer methodology 
to explore how the single market initiatives are likely to induce structural change as the 
cohesion countries are obliged to open up and adapt to greater exposure to the external 
EU and wider world economies. 
In this report the results of the project to date are described and the present work is set in a 
context that permits these results to be compared with existing published single market 
research on the cohesion countries and wider research on the core countries. 
Chapter 3 provides some brief background information on macroeconomic structures in the 
EU periphery, with a particular focus both on intra-periphery comparisons and on comparisons 
between the core and the periphery. This material has relevance in order both to arrive at 
qualitative views on the manner in which the periphery is likely to react to the single market 
developments and to set the context for the HERMIN modelling framework that has been used 
to carry out numerical simulations. 
Chapter 4 reviews the research that is already available on the impacts of the single market and 
the CSF on the four 'cohesion' countries. In addition, since the wider impacts of the single 
market on the rest of the EU are certain to have important consequences for the periphery, in a 
situation where the periphery is likely to function in a post-recursive way relative to the much 
larger and more developed core, the likely top-down macroeconomic impacts of the single 
market on the core are briefly reviewed. 
1 The Catinat-Italianer methodology was based largely on exogenous shocks to the HERMES and INTERLINK models 
that lowered prices and costs and boosted external demand in the context of a given relatively stable model structure. 
For details of the 'parametric' methodology, see Catinai and Italianer, 1988. 
2 In what follows we will sometimes use the term 'periphery' to refer to the four economies being analysed: Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The more exact term 'cohesion' countries will also be used. 
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It must be kept in mind that this project was carried out in a context where the peripheral 
Member States were not analysed separately as part of the original research project on the 
economics of 1992 (Cecchini, 1988; Emerson et al, 1988). In that project, a simple 'grossing 
up' process was used to extend the detailed macroeconometric results from seven core 
economies to the total of the 12 Member States.3 Since the GDP of the remaining six 
economies represented only 11.7% of the total in the year 1985, the overall effect on the EU, 
as estimated in the 1988 studies, is unlikely to be very sensitive to the method used to 'gross 
up' the results for the periphery. However, the strong assumption that the impacts on the 
individual peripheral economies (and the cohesion subset in particular) are likely to be the 
same as for the more developed core economies needs to be examined more closely than was 
the case in the Cecchini/Emerson 1988 study. The bulk of the report is devoted to this task. 
Prior to developing the methodology for analysis of the SEM and the CSF, in Chapter 5 we 
describe the key features of the HERMIN macroeconometric modelling framework being used 
in this project to define a no-single-market and no-CSF counterfactual (or antimonde) as well 
as to carry out the simulations of the impacts of the single market and CSF initiatives. Since 
the HERMIN models have been extensively modified for use in this project, the earlier model 
descriptions presented in Bradley, Herce and Modesto (1995b) need to be updated. Some of 
the technical details on the model are outlined in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 6, we develop our empirical methodology for studying the impact of the single 
market on the periphery. In addition to applying variations of the Catinat-Italianer 
methodology used in the 1988 studies for the 'core' Member States, we develop approaches 
that attempt to take into account the reality that the periphery is less developed than the core 
and that the onset of the single market is likely to induce major structural changes to the 
economies of the periphery. 
Since the arrival of the single market has been accompanied by major increases in structural 
funds for the periphery, through the Community Support Framework (CSF) and the cohesion 
funds, Chapter 7 briefly describes the methodology used to address how the HERMIN models 
can be used to explore the way in which these Community structural initiatives are likely to 
influence the peripheral economies. 
Chapter 8 presents simulation results for the single market shocks for each of the four 
HERMIN country models. Since many of the effects depend on parameters whose magnitudes 
are difficult to specify econometrically, and on mechanisms whose association with the single 
market might be disputed (e.g. the influence on foreign direct investment inflows into the 
periphery), we also report some sensitivity analysis to search for effects that are crucially 
important to the simulation results. 
Chapter 9 presents simulation results for the CSF shocks for each of the four HERMIN 
country models. As in the previous case of the SEM shocks, many of the effects depend on 
parameters whose magnitudes are difficult to specify econometrically (e.g. the magnitude of 
externality elasticities), so we also report some sensitivity analysis to search for effects that are 
crucially important to the simulation results. 
3 The seven countries included in the 1988 studies were Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. Although the remaining five 'peripheral' countries were excluded from the macroeconometric 
analysis, some were included in the microeconomic survey-type studies. 
Introduction 
Chapter 10 provides a detailed evaluation and discussion of the simulation results of the SEM 
and CSF shocks from different points of view. First, the single market and CSF impacts are 
examined for each of the four models separately. Second, the four cohesion country results are 
compared and contrasted with a view to examining how their different levels of openness and 
their different internal structure are likely to influence their response to single market and CSF 
initiatives. Finally, the impacts on the cohesion countries are compared with the likely impact 
of the single market on the core countries, as quantified in the original Emerson 1988 study 
and updates, in order to judge whether or not the cohesion objective can be attained over a 
reasonable time horizon. 
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3. The cohesion countries: background economic issues4 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the similarities in economic structure that 
characterize the peripheral EU countries - Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain - and to 
analyse the structural changes that have taken place in these countries since they joined the 
EU. 
We begin by looking at the convergence experience of the periphery (i.e. the extent to which 
these regions have caught up to the core in terms of GDP per capita). Although some 
convergence has occurred, these countries remain the poorest in the Union and it is not 
surprising therefore that they share many characteristics. Some of these are more apparent than 
others; the relative importance of agriculture and the underdevelopment of physical 
infrastructure in the periphery, for example. Less obvious, however, are features such as the 
extent of unemployment and underemployment, the relative share of producer and consumer 
services, and the relative lack of increasing-returns-to-scale segments of manufacturing 
industry. 
3.1. The convergence experience of the EU periphery 
The term 'EU periphery' is used to denote those countries all or most regions of which have 
Objective 1' status. These regions, with 75% or less of the EU average GDP per capita, 
comprise the western and southern seaboards of the Union. 
Have the relatively poor regions been converging on the richer regions, in terms of GDP per 
capita, or not? The conventional wisdom in economic growth theory is that regions should 
converge over time. The world data (depicted in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for example), 
however, shows divergence rather than convergence. These authors and many others argue, 
however, that when the stock of human capital is controlled for, conditional convergence 
appears. 
Walsh (1993) and O'Grada and O'Rourke (1994) control for this, though, and still find Ireland 
to be a slow-growth outlier in terms of European convergence. Prados et al. (1993) report 
similar findings for the whole European periphery. Many of these findings, however, depend 
strongly on the time period of the sample. Table 3.1 takes a broad look at the convergence 
experience and indicates fairly rapid convergence in recent years. 
Using Barro and Sala-i-Martin's average convergence speed (2% p.a.), each country except 
Greece is found to have performed somewhat better than expected (in terms of GDP per head) 
since its accession to the EU.5 This may be partly attributable to the CSF programmes, though 
there is some empirical evidence that trade integration promotes convergence (Ben-David, 
1993). 
If living standards are more accurately measured by private consumption per capita, however, 
as shown in Table 3.2, relative living standards are found to have fallen in all four peripheral 
This chapter draws on material contained in Barry, Bradley and Duggan (1996). 
Note that there is controversy in Ireland over the accuracy of recent GDP figures, many economists holding that they 
are overestimated due to the transfer pricing behaviour of multinational companies. 
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Member States between 1973 and 1991. (Ireland, on this measure, lies much closer to the 
lower levels of Portugal and Greece than to the relatively high level of Spain.) The 
convergence experience is not therefore unambiguous. It becomes of great interest to look at 
the structural differences between core and periphery, and to ask whether the two groups of 
regions have been becoming more similar in these respects or not. 
Table 3.1. Relative GDP (GNP) per capita in purchasing power parity terms 
(EUR12=100) 
Ireland 
Spain 
Greece 
Portugal 
1960 
61 (62) 
60 
39 
39 
1973 
59 (59) 
79 
57 
56 
1980 
64 (62) 
74 
58 
55 
1985 
65 (58) 
71 
51 
51 
1990 
71 (62) 
75 
47 
56 
1993 
77(69) 
76 
49 
61 
Source: European Commission Annual Report (1994). 
Table 3.2. Economic indicators in the periphery 
Greece Ireland | Portugal Spain EU 
Unemployment rate (%) 
1960 
1973 
1993 
n.a. 
2.0 
7.8 
4.7 
6.2 
18.4 
1.9 
2.6 
5.2 
2.4 
2.6 
21.2 
2.5 
2.6 
10.4 
Private consumption/capita 
1973 
1991 
57 
54 
67 
62 
65 
58 
80 
76 
100 
100 
Source: European Economy'No. 55 and Eurostat National Accounts (1970-91). 
3.2. Structural similarities between peripheral regions 
The European Commission's (1990) 'One Market, One Money' report points out that the EU 
periphery is characterized by higher unemployment than prevails in the EU core. This is a 
statistical artefact, however, since Spain, the country with the highest unemployment rate, is 
also by far the largest peripheral economy. However, all the peripheral countries can be seen to 
suffer from either unemployment or underemployment (which does not show up in the 
standard data). In what follows, we focus on a number of shared characteristics that are likely 
to increase the burdens of adjustment on peripheral labour markets, factors such as the relative 
importance of agriculture, the difficulties of adjusting to free trade, and the relative 
underdevelopment of financial markets and of physical infrastructure in the periphery. We 
then move on to analyse other structural similarities between peripheral countries: relative 
proportions of producer and consumer services, and the share of increasing returns sectors 
within manufacturing. 
3.2.1. Unemployment and underemployment 
Table 3.2 illustrates that two of the peripheral countries, Ireland and Spain, have very high 
unemployment rates, while Greece and Portugal have rates below the EU average. The less 
Consumption is measured according to its own specific purchasing power parity (from Eurostat National Accounts 
1970-91). 
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well developed nature of the social welfare systems in Greece and Portugal, however, and the 
large proportion of the labour force engaged in agriculture in these countries suggest a 
substantial degree of underemployment. 
This is further borne out by the fact that Portugal and Spain have exceptionally low 
productivity levels in agriculture - only about one third of the already low national level in 
each case. The professional status of employment also points to agricultural underemployment 
in Greece and Spain, where 38% and 19%, respectively, of total agricultural employment is 
classified as unpaid family workers. While the proportion of unpaid family workers in 
Portugal and Ireland is much lower (less than 10% in each case), in both these countries there 
are still many small holders with no prospect of long-term viability. Furthermore, in Greece 
the exceptionally high proportion of non-agricultural employment classified as employer/self-
employed (27%) or unpaid family workers (5%, with 11% of females so classified) also 
suggests underemployment. 
Ireland, Spain and Greece also have exceptionally high dependency rates. In Ireland in 1991, 
there were 21 dependants for every 10 workers, in Spain 20 and in Greece 17, as compared 
with an EU average of 14. This is due not only to unemployment, but also to the very low 
labour force participation rates in these countries. This in turn points to a relatively high 
incidence of discouraged workers. 
3.2.2. Agricultural orientation 
As the One Market, One Money report (European Commission, 1990) notes, Objective 1 
regions have a relatively high share of employment in the declining agricultural sector. Of the 
four countries, Greece has the largest proportion of employees in agriculture (22.2% of total 
employment in 1991). This compares with 17.4% in Portugal, 14.0% in Ireland and 10.9% in 
Spain (Eurostat, 1993). 
This factor adds to the number of workers who must be absorbed into the urban labour force, 
or else, as in Portugal and Greece, provides a refuge in the form of underemployment for those 
who, in a more developed welfare system, would add to the unemployment rolls. 
3.2.3. Underdevelopment of infrastructure and capital markets 
Two further characteristics of peripheral regions appear likely to hinder the development of 
employment opportunities. One is the underdeveloped state of financial markets. Larre and 
Torres (1991), in a study of Spain, Portugal and Greece, make the following points, many of 
which apply to Ireland as well: 
In the mid-1980s financial markets were still in their infancy, with ... little or no 
competition between banks and financial institutions; narrow capital markets; a limited 
range of savings instruments and a preponderance of public debt securities; credit controls 
(Greece and Portugal) and administratively fixed interest rates; compulsory portfolio 
requirements for banks, and a high proportion of subsidized credit. 
This theme is echoed in One Market, One Money (1990), which reports that the high cost of 
credit and poor availability of risk capital are among the major factors that firms in peripheral 
regions identify as growth inhibiting. 
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The same report also notes that firms identify infrastructural deficiencies in the areas of 
education and training, transport and communications, and the supply and cost of energy, as 
more important impediments than geographic factors such as the proximity of suppliers and of 
customers. The available data on the stock of infrastructure in peripheral regions provides 
supporting evidence. Table 3.3 below, adapted from Biehl (1986), reports relative 
infrastructural levels for an aggregate of transportation, telecommunications, energy and 
education. It reveals that Ireland, Spain and Portugal fell further behind the EU average 
between 1979 and 1985, while Italy and Greece converged slightly. 
Table 3.3. Relative infrastructural levels in EU countries 
Italy 
Spain 
Ireland 
Greece 
Portugal 
EU 
1979-80 
81.7 
77.7 
71.1 
54.5 
n.a. 
100.0 
1985-86 
85.4 
74.3 
67.1 
56.0 
38.7 
100.0 
Source: Biehl (1986). 
3.2.4. Difficulties of adjustment to free trade 
Progressive trade liberalization within Europe is likely to entail substantial industrial 
disruption in the periphery, while sectoral restructuring within core EU countries, which have 
fairly similar factor endowments, is more likely to take place through the development of 
market niches rather than through the wholesale disappearance of existing industries. Evidence 
in this regard is provided by Neven (1990) who shows that Greece and Portugal have less 
intra-industry trade than the other EU countries; Ireland, Spain and Italy have intermediate 
levels, while Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium are characterized by 
intense intra-industry trade. Adjustment problems are therefore likely to be greater in the 
periphery. 
As Krugman (1987) notes with respect to the southern periphery's accession to the EU: 
The trade expansion produced by EC enlargement is simply not likely to be as painless as 
the trade expansion produced by the formation of the Community and earlier enlargement. 
There will certainly be income distribution problems created by the changes, and also quite 
possibly some real costs in terms of unemployment. 
A massive shake-out of jobs in Irish and Spanish 'traditional' industry occurred as trade 
liberalization progressed. The low productivity sectors in Greece and Portugal are also likely 
to face intense pressures in the next decade. 
Further confirmation of the structural changes likely to be in store for Greece and Portugal is 
provided by the size structure of enterprises in peripheral regions, shown in Table 3.4. The 
National Economic and Social Council (1989) documents how the average size of 
establishments in Ireland declined in the wake of free trade as indigenous firms in increasing-
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returns sectors were wiped out. Something similar may have happened in Spain.7 Portugal may 
therefore be thought to resemble the pre-free-trade Irish position, while the fact that nearly 
three fifths of Greek non-agricultural employment is concentrated in micro-enterprises with 
less than 10 employees probably does not augur well for their ability to compete 
internationally. 
Table 3.4. Non-agriculture employment shares by enterprise size, 1988 
Micro (0-9) 
Small (10-99) 
Medium (100-499) 
Large (500+) 
Greece 
59 
21 
11 
9 
Ireland 
34 
30 
18 
17 
Portugal 
36 
27 
17 
20 
Spain 
36 
30 
17 
17 
EU 
30 
25 
16 
30 
Source: First Annual Report of the European Observatory for SMEs (1993). 
3.2.5. The structure of the services sector 
The economic geographers Keeble, Offord and Walker (1988) noted that the structure of the 
services sector differed significantly between core and periphery, with the core being relatively 
more specialized in producer services.8 
Table 3.5 below shows the ratio of employment in producer relative to consumer services. It 
shows, as Keeble et al. suggested, that there is a substantial difference between the relative 
proportions accounted for by producer and consumer services in the core vis-à-vis the 
periphery. 
It is clear that the core-periphery distinction is significant and long-lasting. Ireland, however, 
seems to have extricated itself from its peripheral position, particularly between 1978 and 
1983, while Greece appears as the periphery outlier, with a ratio of producer to consumer 
services more like that of the core. The latter is easily explained, however, by the fact that 
Greece, containing as it does a large number of islands, possesses an unusually large transport, 
communications and storage sector which is part of producer services. Keeble et al. (1988) 
suggest that Ireland's core-like characteristics appear to be evidence of successful industrial 
policies. 
Why does the core appear to be relatively specialized in producer services? Hansen (1990) 
argues that: 
in an increasingly information-oriented economy, producer services play a pivotal role in 
the ... expanding division of labour, which in turn creates productivity increases throughout 
the economy. Regions that have a high density of producer services are thus likely to have 
higher per capita incomes than other regions. 
On the basis of Ireland's adjustment, we would regard small initial firm size in increasing-returns sectors as a 
competitive disadvantage, rather than as representing an opportunity for the exploitation of further scale economies in 
an integrated market, as in Neven (1990). 
Producer services are defined in the NACE and ISIC classifications as categories 7 (Transport and Communications) 
and 8 (Banking and Financial Services), while consumer services are categories 6 (Distribution, Hotels and Catering) 
and 9 (Community, Social and Personal Services). 
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Table 3.5. Ratio of employment in 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Netherlands 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Greece 
1968 
.299 
.342 
.343 
.522 
.241 
.40 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
producer versus consumer services 
1978 
.33 
.316 
.351 
.308 
.251 
.267 
.259 
.294 
.457 
1983 
.327 
.318 
.344 
.359 
.354 
.262 
.24 
.289 
.378 
1987 
.332 
.314 
.343 
.362 
.332 
.267 
.225 
.269 
.345 
Source: Duggan (1995). 
Causation can equally plausibly run in the opposite direction. The fact that 'core regions 
almost always contain above-average concentrations of highly qualified workers' can be 
related to studies by Beyers et al. (1986) and Wier (1992) which showed that the producer 
services sector is dominated by professional and technical employees, while consumer services 
are typically labour-intensive low-productivity low-wage jobs. Whichever direction of 
causation is more important, it is clear that a high ratio of producer to consumer services jobs 
is beneficial. 
3.2.6. Increasing returns to scale in manufacturing sectors 
Equivalently, it is beneficial for a region to have a high share of the manufacturing sectors that 
exhibit increasing returns to scale (1RS). As Heffernan and Sinclair (1990) note, average 
productivity in the regions that capture these sectors rises relative to that prevailing elsewhere. 
One of the potential difficulties that the periphery faced in adjusting to EU membership was 
the possibility that as trade barriers fell these industries would be attracted more to the core 
because of economies of agglomeration. Indeed, as Barry (1994) showed, this process did 
result in the decline of Irish indigenous industry in 1RS sectors.9 However, the influx of 
multinational companies in precisely these sectors more than dominated this decline, so the 
share of Irish employment in 1RS sectors has increased substantially. 
Table 3.6. Developments in 1RS industries 
Indigenous employment 
Share of total manufacturing 
Multinational employment 
Share of total manufacturing 
1973 
25,209 
12.46% 
32,735 
16.18% 
1980 
27,440 
11.86% 
50,114 
21.67% 
1993 
22,565 
11.64% 
59.055 
30.46% 
Source: IDA Employment Survey. 
Summing multinational and indigenous employment, we find the share of 1RS sectors in total 
manufacturing employment has risen from 29% in 1973 to 42% by 1993. While this is still 
small relative to the equivalent share in the core EU countries (see Table 3.7 below), it has 
been increasing over time rather than decreasing. 
The 1RS sectors are identified by O'Malley (1992) on the basis of Pratten's (1988) study of engineering economies of 
scale. 
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Table 3.7. Employment in 1RS sectors as a % of total manufacturing employment 
Germany 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Italy 
Ireland 
Spain 
Portugal 
Greece 
1968 
55 
42 
50 
42 
49 
21 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1979 
60 
55 
62 
57 
54 
35 
38 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1983 
65 
55 
54 
55 
56 
40 
39 
28 
36 
1989 
63 
51 
54 
53 
55 
45 
37 
25 
35 
Source: Eurostat: Structure and Activity of Industry, various years. 
Once again, we see a very clear core-periphery pattern emerging, with the periphery less 
specialized in 1RS sectors. Unfortunately, the paucity of data precludes an analysis of how this 
situation has changed over the course of the 1980s. 
If the Irish experience is anything to go by, however, we can say that the periphery is likely to 
be capturing an increasing share of 1RS industries. The data on foreign direct investment in 
manufacturing (from the OECD, 1993) reveal that while the Irish share of foreign direct 
investment (as a proportion of GNP) was twice as large as Spain's and three times as large as 
Portugal's in the early 1980s, the Portuguese and Irish shares had been equalized by the early 
1990s, and the Spanish share was now twice as large as these. Only the Greek share remained 
low, and stagnant. 
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4. Macroeconomic impact of the SEM and the CSF: 
a review of research 
This chapter reviews the quantitative studies that have assessed both the impact of the SEM 
and the CSF on the peripheral countries of the EU. The analysis of the Irish case is probably 
the most comprehensively documented and it is presented in greater detail than the other 
country studies. Having reviewed the Irish case, available Spanish, Portuguese and Greek 
studies are then described, beginning with a review of the SEM literature followed by a review 
of the CSF literature. 
4.1. Quantifying the impact of the SEM 
The studies that quantify the impact of 1992 through empirical research have been extremely 
useful and have greatly enhanced the analysis. For example, the special issue of European 
Economy/Social Europe (European Commission, 1990), devoted to a study of the impact of 
the single market by industrial sector, is used extensively in the methodology to quantify the 
magnitude of the switch in manufacturing sectors from non-tradable to tradable goods due to 
the SEM (see Chapter 6). The review of SEM studies treats the four countries individually, 
wherever possible dividing the analysis into aggregate and sectoral studies. 
4.1.1. Ireland: aggregate studies 
O'Sullivan (1989) 
In one of the first empirical studies that applied the Cecchini-type analysis to Ireland, 
O'Sullivan suggested that Ireland stands to gain overall in the long run but that there would be 
considerable costs to bear in the short run (i.e. 1990-94). His analysis, carried out in 1989 
using an early four-sector version of the Irish HERMES model (Bradley et al, 1989), 
examined impacts to the year 1994. He suggested that the improved external environment, 
falling interest rates and the speeding up of technical progress would be the main influences of 
the SEM on Ireland. His results are less optimistic than those of the Cecchini Report, 1988, 
and he predicted that the benefits for Ireland would accrue mainly to the industrial sector. 
Overall, O'Sullivan predicted that GNP would increase by 1.7% by the year 1994, industrial 
output by 2.8%, investment by 6.2% (due to increasing capacity and falling interest rates), 
employment by 6,000, with price and wage levels falling by approximately 1%. 
Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney (1992)'° 
This study was the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of the impact of the SEM on 
Ireland using the ESRI HERMES model of the Irish economy." The impact was analysed 
under two general headings: the changes in the trading environment and the changes that 
occur within Ireland as a result of 1992. The average effects of 1992 as analysed by the 1988 
Cecchini Report (i.e. a 4.5% increase in GDP by 1998, a 6.1% reduction in price levels, a 1% 
10 This study also quantifies the impact of the CSF on Ireland. 
" Full documentation of the HERMES-Ireland model is given in HERMES-Ireland: A Model of the Irish Economy: 
Structure and Performance. J. Bradley et a!., 1989, The Economic and Social Research Institute, and further details of a 
later version are given in Bradley and Fitz Gerald (1991). 
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improvement in the external balance and a 2.2% improvement in the budgetary balance) are 
taken as given exogenous shocks to Ireland's trading environment. The ESRI study imposed 
both these shocks and the changes occurring within Ireland as exogenous shocks to the 
HERMES model, and compared their results to those in the Cecchini Report under the 
following headings: 
(a) the relaxation of border controls; 
(b) the opening up of public procurement; 
(c) the liberalization of financial services; 
(d) the 'supply effects' (such as lower production costs and higher productivity gains). 
These forecasts are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Macroeconomic consequences for Ireland, effects of 1992 to the year 1998 
Changes (as %) relative to 
benchmark? 
Border controls 
Public procurement 
Financial services 
'Supply effects' 
Overall effect 
Cecchini average" 
GNP 
0.2 
1.1 
1.1 
2.0 
4.5 
4.5 
Consumer 
prices 
-0.9 
+0.3 
-1.0 
-1.6 
-3.1 
-6.1 
Employment 
COOOs) 
340 
7.780 
8,480 
15,870 
33,660 
1,840,000 
Budgetary 
balance 
0.04 
0.29 
0.24 
0.42 
1.00 
2.2 
External 
balance 
-0.01 
0.13 
-0.10 
-0.08 
-0.01 
1.0 
1 The benchmark represents a probable evolution of the Irish economy in the absence of 1992. 
2 Cecchini Report for EUR-12, medium term (six years). 
Source: Tables 3.1-3.5, pp. 32^12. Bradley et al. (1992). 
A stylized projection for the Irish economy to the year 2000 was used as a baseline for the 
analysis. Counterfactual experiments were then carried out, considering, in turn, the 
contribution to the growth of the economy from each of the four headings outlined above. The 
results were compared to the baseline to determine the separate impact of the SEM. 
Bradley et al imposed a cut in public sector employment by 300 in 1993 and a reduction in 
costs by 1% over 6 years (same as the Cecchini analysis) to assess the impact of the abolition 
of border controls. In the medium term the simulated effects on Ireland are not as pronounced 
as those predicted by Cecchini, 1988, for all of the EC: prices fall by 0.9% compared to a 1% 
fall in the latter. This is because the increase in labour supply prevents the growth in the 
economy from tightening the labour market. There is no crowding-out of the growth stimulus 
arising from higher wage rates. The wage equation in the HERMES Ireland model displays 
both hysteresis and the downward inflexibility of Irish nominal wages. This explains why the 
price reduction is not as large as that predicted by Cecchini. 
Due to the openness of the Irish economy before 1992, the report suggested that the opening 
up of public procurement has little impact on prices, but may lead to Irish firms reaping the 
benefits of an increase in external demand. Their model predicted that employment will rise by 
nearly 8,000 in the medium term as a result of the opening up of public procurement. 
In the Cecchini analysis, the liberalization of financial services is predicted to equalize interest 
rates as capital is free to locate wherever the rate of return is highest; the Cecchini model 
forecasts a 0.5% reduction in the interest rates. The report predicted that the large size of the 
Irish national debt would restrict the scope for a fall in interest. However, the increased 
efficiency of the financial sector would lead to a reduction of 1,000 jobs over a five-year 
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period and a price reduction of 0.5%. The results from the HERMES Ireland model due to 
liberalization of financial markets were not as strong as those in the Cecchini Report. In the 
medium term, Irish prices were predicted to fall by 1.0% (-1.4% according to Cecchini) and 
GNP to rise by 1.05% (1.5% according to Cecchini). 
As in the Cecchini Report, the impact of the 'supply-side effects' (i.e. firms facing lower 
production costs and higher labour productivity) on the overall forecast dominated all other 
policy categories in the ESRI study. This shock was implemented by simulating a reduction in 
ex ante domestic unit costs of production over a six-year period. The simulation resulted in a 
2.0% increase in GNP (similar to the 2.1% increase in the Cecchini Report), but a smaller 
price reduction of 1.4% than the EC-wide reduction of 2.3% found by Cecchini. 
The ESRI forecast of the total effect of 1992 on the Irish macroeconomy compares favourably 
to the Cecchini predictions except in the context of prices. Cecchini found a 6.1% reduction in 
consumer prices by the year 1998 while the ESRI study suggested that prices would fall by 
only 3.1%. The ESRI prediction of the impact on GNP is almost identical to that of Cecchini, 
as is also the prediction of a sustained increase in the total numbers employed.12 
4.1.2. Ireland: sectoral studies 
Most of the sectoral studies review historical trends and do not quantify the impact of 1992 on 
the sectors in question. This criticism is true of all the papers in the publication The Single 
European Market and the Irish Economy (Foley and Mulreany, 1990), some of which are 
reviewed below. 
Foley (1990) 
Foley was pessimistic about the impact of the SEM on Irish indigenous industry. He predicted 
that benefits from the reduction in transport costs would be outweighed by the removal of 
barriers, which increases competition from foreigners on the domestic market. Foley claimed 
that unless firms who concentrate on the domestic market became exporters, they would not 
gain from the SEM. Foley's assertions about the demise of indigenous industry were not based 
on empirical analysis, nor did he quantify the impact of 1992 on indigenous industry at a 
disaggregated level. 
Jacobson and Andreosso (1990) 
A similar pessimistic view was held by Jacobson and Andreosso (1990) who reviewed 
Ireland's ability to attract foreign direct investment once barriers were abolished. They 
foresaw adverse economic consequences for Ireland in this regard due both to increased 
competition from EC partners and to the erosion of artificial country-specific advantages (such 
as low corporate taxes and government assistance). Future flows of FDI into Ireland would be 
uncertain, according to the authors. 
12 The simulation results reported in Chapter 7 are based on a smaller HERMIN model, but can be compared to the earlier 
ESRI HERMES-based analysis. The fact that the HERMIN models are available for all four cohesion countries serves 
to offset the loss of sectoral detail due to HERMIN's four sectors. 
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The two aforementioned papers and those by Keegan and Hennessy (1990) reviewing the 
building and construction sector and Ferris (1990) analysing transport costs, all concluded that 
the benefits to Ireland would be outweighed by the loss incurred due to the SEM. However, 
the lack of formal empirical analysis in any of these studies weakens the strength of their 
conclusions. 
Dur kan and Reynolds-Feighan (1992) 
In a micro-study of transport costs, Durkan and Reynolds-Feighan (1992) found transport 
costs faced by Irish firms to be high compared to other EC countries. There were also regional 
differences in cost within Ireland, where regions suffer competitive disadvantages within 
Ireland as well as externally. The study predicted that this would have serious implications not 
only for export trade but also for domestic markets. The authors found that transport costs 
accounted for a little over 4% of the value of sales of manufactured goods. They predicted that 
internal Irish transport costs would be reduced in the medium term once the EC proposal for 
VAT harmonization was implemented, since this was one factor highlighted by firms as 
keeping transport costs high. Although the investment in better Irish infrastructure was a major 
component in the effort to reduce transport costs, the study suggested a need for proportionally 
higher investment in road infrastructure in Ireland than elsewhere in Europe, if any significant 
reduction in Irish transport costs was to be realized. 
N ESC (1989) 
The National Economic and Social Council (1989) survey included a very comprehensive 
historical analysis of the Irish economy, but no empirical analysis. The NESC concluded that 
Irish industry would benefit from price reductions and increased competitiveness but that the 
indirect effects of the SEM, such as economies of scale, would have an ambiguous effect. 
Their general conclusion was that 'the long run benefits of the SEM are likely to be unevenly 
distributed - with the greatest benefit accruing to regions in which industries with economies 
of scale and highly innovative sectors are most prevalent. Ireland is not such a region' 
(p. 526). They predicted that the convergence of income disparities would not necessarily 
follow from the SEM. This overall conclusion differs from the more optimistic conclusions of 
O'Malley (1990 and 1992). 
O'Malley (1990, 1992) 
O'Malley quantified those disaggregated manufacturing sectors most likely to be affected by 
1992, based on the approach by Buigues et al (1990) in a European Economy/Social Europe 
special edition assessing the impact of the single market by industrial sector. O'Malley 
concluded that Ireland was in a relatively favourable position to face the SEM and benefit 
overall from freer trade. The findings from the O'Malley (1990) study are used extensively in 
our subsequent methodology, allowing us to take into account the structural changes to the 
economy that trade liberalization might bring, by quantifying the magnitude of the switch from 
non-tradable to tradable (see Chapter 6). 
O'Malley (1990) picked out 39 'sensitive' sectors (three-digit NACE code sectors) accounting 
for 46.7% of total manufacturing employment. The 'sensitive' sectors were those 
manufacturing sectors most likely to be affected either positively ('strong sectors') or 
adversely ('weak sectors') by the abolition of non-tariff barriers within the EC. O'Malley 
assessed their competitiveness using a range of indicators such as the intra- and extra-EC 
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import/export ratio (1985-87) and the percentage change in that ratio over the 1980-87 period. 
About 28% of manufacturing employment was in the relatively strong sensitive sectors (16 
sectors) as compared to 19% in potentially vulnerable sectors (24 sectors). He drew attention 
to the dualistic structure that existed within these 39 sectors. Firstly, high-technology, mostly 
foreign owned, companies (accounting for 56% of the sensitive sector employment, higher 
than the 42.8% share in total manufacturing employment) accounted for almost 70% of the 
strong sectors. The fact that foreign firms produced mainly for the export market strengthened 
their concentration in the strong sectors. Secondly, the traditional manufacturing indigenous 
firms were less export-oriented and had a poorer record in international competition. The 
suggestion that the foreign-owned companies might not expand in Ireland due to the new 
opportunities of the single market was rejected by O'Malley. As the multinational firms 
produce mainly for the export market, the removal of non-tariff barriers would seldom create a 
new motivation to close Irish plants. The net benefits to Irish industry were positive according 
to O'Malley, but he pointed out that companies would need to inform themselves about 
international developments in order to gain any real advantages from these opportunities. 
O'Malley (1992) also reviewed the relative importance of economies of scale for the 
individual sensitive sectors and considered the implications for foreign and Irish owned firms 
separately. He found that Irish indigenous industry was relatively highly concentrated in 
sectors where economies of scale were less important, and were unlikely to gain much from 
attaining greater benefits from economies of scale. The bulk of foreign owned industry 
(accounting for 23% of total manufacturing employment) was in sectors with substantial 
economies of scale and was likely to be significantly affected by the removal of non-tariff 
barriers. O'Malley predicted that these firms would benefit from both the single market and 
the ability to take greater advantage of economies of scale. On balance, O'Malley suggested 
that industry in Ireland would benefit proportionally less from economies of scale than the EC 
average, but argued that the overall benefits, though limited, would still be positive. 
4.1.3. Spain: aggregate studies 
The two main aggregate studies of the Spanish economy outlined below quantify the impact of 
the SEM on the Spanish economy. 
Collado et al (1992) 
The first study by Collado et al (1992) is similar to that by Bradley et al (1992) reviewed 
above, and followed a methodology close to that of the Cecchini Report, comparing their 
results for the Spanish economy to those reported by Catinai and Italianer (1988). The authors 
used the MIDE model" in their analysis. This is a dynamic macro-sectoral econometric model, 
based on the 1980 input-output table, which considers 43 separate activity branches, 
complemented with information from Eurostat National Accounts data. 
The model consists of three blocks: production, income prices and accounting identities. The 
first block determines the final demand, the intermediate consumption, and the production, 
productivity and employment in each of the 43 activity branches at constant prices, being the 
MIDE are the Spanish initials for a Macroeconomic Intersectoral Model of Spain built at the Fundación Tomillo, a 
private organization that offers economic research [see Collado (1992, Appendix 1) for a detailed account of the model 
structure]. 
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sum of final demands equal to GDP. The income-prices block determines sectoral value added 
at current prices (i.e. wages, profits, taxes and price index for each branch); the sum of sectoral 
value added gives nominal GDP. The final block, through macroeconomic identities and 
behavioural equations, converts the nominal GDP into disposable income, and distributes it 
among households, firms and the government. The model is closed by the production block 
and the income-prices block. 
Collado et al. (1992) considered the macroeconomic effects of the SEM under four headings, 
similar to that of the Cecchini Report (1988): 
(a) the abolition of border controls; 
(b) the opening up of public procurement; 
(c) the liberalization of financial services; 
(d) 'supply effects' due to increased competition. 
In addition, they consider the effects of the fiscal harmonization of indirect taxes. 
Regarding the removal of customs barriers within the EEC, they simulated a reduction of 
8,000 jobs and a cut in the export and import prices according to the average cost reduction by 
product categories provided in Catinai and Italianer (1988). Given that the competitiveness of 
the bulk of industries where public purchases are concentrated is relatively poor, the authors 
evaluated the impact of the opening up of public procurement using the higher values of those 
reported in Catinai and Italianer (1988). Regarding the effect of financial liberalization, they 
examined the effects of a reduction in the price of financial services due to greater competition 
by a gradual reduction to 21% (the mean of the Cecchini Report estimates for Spain) in the 
1993-2000 period. They evaluated the effects of a reduction in the cost of production due to 
increased competition and economies of scale similar to that in Catinai and Italianer (1988) 
and Pratten (1988). Finally, the effects of the harmonization of indirect taxes were evaluated, 
leading to VAT rates of 14% and 20% in 1996, and a harmonization of the excise taxes (10% 
increase of excise rates on alcoholic beverages between 1994 and 1995, and 20% increase in 
tobacco). 
They predicted that the aggregate potential consequences of the completion of the single 
market for Spain in the medium term (by 1998) would be as follows: a 1.1% increase in GDP 
over the baseline (mainly due to a 1.3% increase in exports and a 1.17% increase in 
consumption); a reduction of approximately 2% in prices; a 0.87% deterioration in the trade 
balance; a 1.17% improvement in the public deficit; and an increase in employment by 
217,400 jobs (reducing the unemployment rate by 1.36%). These Spanish forecasts are not as 
optimistic as those predicted by the Cecchini Report for the EC core Member States or those 
suggested for Ireland in the Bradley et al (1992) ESRI study. 
Polo and Sancho (199S) 
The authors used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to forecast the consequences 
of the SEM for Spain. Their static, single-country CGE model included four types of agents: 
producers (12), consumers (8), the public sector and two foreign sectors (the EEC and the rest 
of the world), as well as 36 goods and three production factors (two types of labour and 
capital). 
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The authors considered the macroeconomic effects of the elimination of barriers to trade, the 
financial liberalization and the fiscal harmonization of indirect taxes. Regarding the first 
effect, they simulated both the elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions (through a 
total elimination of tariffs on EEC imports and a 25% increase in the elasticities of 
substitution between domestic products and imports - the latter to capture the greater openness 
of the Spanish economy), and the removal of administrative barriers and standards (proxied by 
a 2% cut of import prices and a 1.7% reduction in production costs as estimated in the 1988 
Cecchini Report). Regarding the effects of financial liberalization, they examined the effects 
of a reduction in the price of financial services due to greater competition (simulating a 21 % 
cut, as in Collado, 1992). For the evaluation of the harmonization of indirect taxes, they 
studied both the effects of harmonization of VAT rates leading to 6%, 14% and 20% rates and 
the effects of harmonization of the excise taxes (20% increase of excise rates on alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco and mineral oil). 
Their estimations suggested that the global effect of these shocks would lead to substantial 
gains in production (6.35%), employment (a reduction of 2.79% in the unemployment rate), 
government revenues (leading to an improvement of 0.61% in the public deficit/GDP ratio), 
and consumers' welfare (4.51% in the short run and 5.41% in the long run). The deterioration 
of the trade deficit with the EEC (30% fall in the export/import ratio) was found to be the most 
negative effect of integration. 
This study suggested greater benefits for the Spanish economy due to the SEM than Collado et 
al (1992). CGE models are a very useful tool in modelling the effects of policy changes such 
as tax harmonization across a disaggregated level of sectors, by considering the changes in the 
relative prices throughout the economy rather than through aggregate mechanisms. In the 
context of modelling economic growth and structural adjustment, static CGE models are 
exposed to criticism. A static equilibrium solution, as in the case above, is put forward as a 
long run equilibrium towards which the economy moves, but how rapidly the economy adjusts 
is left rather vague. 
4.1.4. Spain: sectoral studies 
Most of the sectoral studies of the Spanish economy forecast positive returns from the SEM. 
However, the magnitude of the effect differs across the studies. 
Gonzalez-Romero (1989) 
The analysis contained in this paper is based on a study of business perceptions of the 
prospects opened up by the completion of the SEM. It concludes that manufacturing 
production will increase by 8.7% (greater than the 5% expected for the EEC as a whole), due 
to a 4.9% increase in productivity and a 3.8% increase in employment. However, the effects 
vary within the manufacturing sector. Those with strong, medium and weak demand will 
experience an increase in production of 10%, 7.8% and 8.9% respectively, while employment 
in those same sectors will increase by 5.2%, 3.1% and 4.7% respectively. This prediction is 
quite optimistic and suggests that the SEM would significantly boost the Spanish 
manufacturing sector. 
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De la Oliva and Or gaz (1989) 
De la Oliva and Orgaz (1989) also predicted a positive effect on Spanish manufacturing as a 
consequence of the completion of the single market, but a relatively smaller impact on Spain 
than on the EEC as a whole. They reached this conclusion since the 40 industrial sectors that 
are likely to be positively affected represent 34.3% of total industrial value added in Spain 
(versus 48.9% in the EEC), and are more sensitive to import penetration. 
Martin (1990) 
Martin studied the 40 sensitive manufacturing sectors in Spain that were identified by the 
European Commission to be substantially affected by the creation of the SEM. This paper was 
part of the European Economy/Social Europe special issue (1990) and follows the same 
structure as O'Malley's (1990) study of Irish manufacturing. The paper concluded that these 
40 sensitive sectors are more exposed to external competition than the remaining sectors of 
Spanish manufacturing, due to their lower export/import ratio and smaller share of domestic 
production in apparent consumption. Moreover, it also found that Spanish firms seemed to 
perform relatively more strongly in products which were characterized by weak demand, 
relatively low capital/labour ratios, low R&D content and less scope for scale economies. As 
with the O'Malley study, we use Martin's classification in our own simulations, to be reported 
in Chapter 8 below, in order to quantify the magnitude of the switch from non-tradables to 
tradables for the Spanish manufacturing sectors. 
Viñalset al (1990) 
The authors analysed the economic performance inside the EEC to evaluate the likely 
evolution of trade flows, output and employment following the completion of the SEM, 
concentrating on the transitional period.14 This study analysed Spain's integration with the EC 
in a historical context, but it does not quantify the effects of the SEM on the Spanish economy. 
It characterized the Spanish economy before integration as having a relatively less open 
current account and more open capital account, a rigid labour market, and a solvent financial 
system, leading them to conclude that the adjustment costs from the 'EEC cum 1992' shock 
may be larger in goods and labour markets than in financial markets. 
Their study of the Spain-EEC inter- and intra-industry trade suggests that a significant effect 
on Spain's industrial structure is expected to exploit both its comparative advantage and scale 
and scope economies. Viñals et al. use a CGE model similar to that used by Smith and 
Venables (1988) to assess empirically the distributional and efficiency adjustment costs to the 
new structure, finding that this relocation of production was likely to be across sectors rather 
than within sectors, involving a fair amount of inter-sectoral capital and labour flows. 
Moreover, given the rigidities in the labour and capital markets, such costs were expected to 
be quite important if no appropriate economic measures are implemented. 
Viñals (1992) offers a more detailed discussion of these topics, as well as the sectoral studies carried out to evaluate the 
likely impact of the growing openness of the Spanish economy. 
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Collado (1995) 
In a later paper, Collado (1995) studied the convergence between the occupational structures 
of Spain and the EC, concluding that although convergence has occurred at the aggregate 
level, the gap has widened in several sectors of the Spanish economy. Sectoral convergence is 
associated with reductions in comparative advantage and relatively lower levels of foreign 
investment. However, he does not quantify the effects of convergence in this paper. 
4.1.5. Portugal : aggregate studies 
Unlike the Bradley et al (1992) and the Collado et al (1992) quantitative studies, no such 
similar aggregate study, to our knowledge, has been carried out for the Portuguese economy 
assessing the impact of the SEM, based on formal empirical macroeconometric or CGE 
models. 
De Macedo (1990) 
De Macedo assessed the impact of the SEM on Portugal but does not quantify his conclusions 
using formal empirical models. He predicted that the size, inefficiency and uncompetitive 
nature of the Portuguese public sector was an obstacle to integration within the EC. The public 
sector has been described as 'frozen' until 1989, due to political policies of central planning, 
and has only recently been reformed (de Macedo, 1990: 336-42). De Macedo found that the 
manufacturing sector was concentrated in weak-demand sectors such as textiles and leather 
goods, with growth in employment and investment occurring in these sectors. He concluded 
that in order to remain competitive, the manufacturing sector would have to undergo 
restructuring and invest in differentiated products to benefit from export growth. 
4.1.6. Portugal: sectoral studies 
Gonçalves (1990) 
This paper, in the European Economy special issue, identified 47 Portuguese sensitive 
manufacturing sectors likely to be affected by the SEM. These sectors are used later in Chapter 
7 in the HERMIN-based methodology in a similar manner to those of Martin (1990) and 
O'Malley (1990), outlined above. The sensitive sectors account for 60% of value added and 
70% of employment in industry, where the majority (37 sectors) are in weak demand sectors. 
Gonçalves' overall assessment was negative, predicting that these weak demand sectors would 
be likely to suffer competitiveness loss due to the SEM unless technological co-operation 
agreements can be concluded or efficient foreign companies were to set up in Portugal. 
4.1.7. Greece: aggregate studies 
Capros, Karadeloglou and Mentzas (1990) 
This study used the GEM-NTUA four-sector model developed by the National Technical 
University of Athens to examine the effects of 1992 on the Greek economy, using a 
methodology similar to the Cecchini Report (1988). The GEM-NTUA model represents the 
behaviour of four economic agents: households, firms, the government and foreigners. It also 
has four sectors of production: agriculture, manufacturing (including mining), energy utilities 
and services (public and private). 
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Of particular interest are the multiplier properties of the model. For example, the impact 
public investment multiplier (defined as AGDP/AIG, where IG refers to public investment), is 
1.18, and declines to a value of 0.7 in the long run. Similarly, the model is very sensitive to 
changes in the external growth rate. The main use of the model has been in the study of 
energy-environment interactions, in association with the MIDAS model of energy supply and 
demand. 
The findings of this study were quite pessimistic. For example, the positive effects of 1992 
were found to be significantly lower than for the core EU members or, indeed, for Ireland. 
GDP was shown to increase by 2.4% as a result of all of the 1992 measures, compared with 
the core economies' increase of 4.5%. In addition, the fall in prices is less (1.5% compared to 
6.4%). Hence, the study suggested that the SEM measures would exacerbate the disparity 
between Greece and the core economies. The poor showing for 1992 seemed to be 
concentrated in the negative effects of public procurement liberalization (due to the existence 
of a significant protectionist environment for some Greek firms producing exclusively for the 
public sector), and the rather modest supply-side effects. On balance, the study is difficult to 
evaluate, since very little detail is presented. 
4.1.8. Greece: sectoral studies 
Mar das and Varsakelis (1990) 
The authors identified 45 sensitive sectors as being likely to be affected by the SEM, in a 
paper contained in the European Economy/Social Europe (1990) special issue. As with 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal, this analysis is used in our own later quantification of the 
structural shift from non-traded to traded behaviour due to the impact of the SEM. The 45 
sensitive sectors accounted for 57% of value added and 62% of employment in Greek 
industry. As with Portugal, the authors found that the majority of the sectors (37) were 
vulnerable to the SEM process and likely to be negatively affected. They pointed out that 
highly labour intensive sectors, such as textiles, clothing and footwear, were relatively more 
protected in Greece than was the case for the EC average. The eight sectors that experienced 
strong trade performance belonged mainly to the clothing/footwear industries. Being weak 
demand sectors, the authors questioned whether these sectors would respond well to the 
challenge of increased competition. In general, this paper suggested that Greece would suffer 
adversely from the SEM. 
Katseli (1990) 
Katseli claimed that trade liberalization had reduced the existing intra-industry specialization 
in manufacturing in Greece. She predicted that inter-industry specialization would arise out of 
the removal of barriers to entry in Greece, and that employment would fall in the short run. In 
the long run, Katseli suggested that trade liberalization would lead to competitive gains, 
increased efficiency and eventually a restructuring of industry. However, neither the short run 
nor the long run results are quantified in the paper using formal empirical models. The author 
suggested policy changes necessary for adjustment to freer trade: the active promotion of 
entrepeneurship; that government policy should integrate structural adjustment policies 
(increased efficiency in industry) with macroeconomic policies (controlling the external 
balance) in order to add credibility to the government's commitment to the single market. 
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Sarris (1990) 
Sarris developed a two-sector model of the Greek economy, one sector exhibiting fixed prices, 
the other flexible prices. He made this distinction as opposed to the general traded (large-
scale) sector, non-traded (small-scale) sector since a sizeable proportion of Greek exports are 
composed of agricultural products, textiles and garments, and hence subject to fixed prices. 
The model shows that 'the maintenance of high public spending and deficits imply a healthy 
level of GDP but at the expense of an appreciating currency in real terms'. Yet, if the structure 
of the economy does not change in line with freer trade, GDP will not necessarily rise in the 
short term. This is due to the low Phillips curve effect, where unemployment in some sectors 
induced by increased competition does not lead to reduced wages and increased employment 
in others. The author predicted that the opposite effects will occur with financial liberalization. 
4.1.9. Southern peripheral countries of the EU: aggregate studies 
Larre and Torres (1991) 
This paper analysed the convergence of the southern peripheral countries in Europe to the 
OECD and European average. It suggested that Portugal and Spain have converged due to 
increased foreign investment and the structural changes that have occurred in their economy, 
which in turn has lead to increased investment and the deregulation of the labour market as 
well as the removal of barriers to trade. Greece has not experienced such convergence, due to 
a slower removal of the impediments to freer trade. This paper does not specifically deal with 
the impact of the single market on the above-mentioned countries, but the focus of the 
analysis, on such issues as structural adjustment and FDI, gives an insight into the mechanisms 
of convergence as were experienced by the southern peripheral countries. 
Neven (1990) 
This paper was optimistic about the likely southern peripheral country gains from the SEM. It 
predicted that Greece and Portugal (and, to a lesser extent, Spain) would benefit greatly due to 
their strong comparative advantage in the (labour intensive) clothing and footwear sectors, 
with half the labour costs of their northern neighbours. He uses firm size as an indication of 
the extent to which scale economies are exploited. From our point of view, Neven appears 
overly optimistic in that he suggests that the relative smallness of firms in the southern 
periphery industrial sectors, characterized by economies of scale, will allow them to expand 
under liberalized trade. As the NESC (1989) report on the Irish experience indicates, however, 
the small indigenous firms in these sectors in Ireland were wiped out because they were too 
small to compete. 
4.2. Quantify ing the impact of the CSF 1989-93 
The first reformed programme of structural intervention, the CSF or Delors I package, covered 
the five years from 1989 to 1993. The analysis of the Irish CSF 1989-93 is probably the most 
comprehensively documented of the four cohesion countries. The Greek CSF 1989-93 has 
been the subject of three studies, but the level of detailed documentation of results and 
methodology is quite limited. Although the Portuguese CSF 1989-93 has not been analysed 
using a conventional macroeconometric model, it has been studied using an experimental 
optimal growth model which could potentially yield some new insights over and above the 
more conventional analysis based on macroeconometric models. No formal macro-model-
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based quantifications for the Spanish CSF 1989-93 were available to the authors of this 
report.15 
4.2.1. Ireland: CSF 1989-93 
The Irish CSF 1989-93 was structured as a series of operational programmes, set in the 
context of a comprehensive framework for tackling the structural problems of the Irish 
economy. Each programme concentrated on a priority - a particular sector or structural 
problem - and specified objectives to tackle the problem or the challenges faced by the sector. 
For the purposes of more logical economic analysis, they were re-classified under six more 
economically relevant headings: 
(a) Human resources 
The single biggest category, accounting for 42% of expenditure. Spent on different 
training schemes and on the improvement of the educational system. 
(b) Physical infrastructure 
Accounting for 27% of expenditure, the bulk spent on upgrading port facilities and road 
infrastructure. 
(c) Farm income support 
Accounting for 10% of expenditure, designed to boost agricultural incomes, such as 
compensatory (headage) payments. 
(d) Grants to industry 
To reduce the cost of setting up new installations or expanding existing plants. 
(e) Agricultural investment 
Accounting for 8% of expenditure, to increase productive potential in forestry and farm 
improvement schemes. 
(f) Aid to marketing and research and development 
To promote the marketing potential of existing firms and increase the level of 
expenditure on R&D.16 
The ESRI17 carried out the analysis in terms of the six-way classification described above, and 
then analysed all the programmes together and assessed the impact of the CSF when taken as a 
whole. Because of the arbitrariness and uncertainty about the pure supply-side effects of the 
CSF, they were separated out so that the sensitivity of the conclusions to alternative 
assumptions concerning the long-term response of the economy to the CSF could be 
examined. 
15 A study of the short run demand effects of the CSF 1989-93 has been carried out by Beutel, 1993, using input-output 
models for the four Objective 1 countries, for the Mezzogiorno region of Italy and for Northern Ireland. 
16 Source: Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney (1992). 
17 The study was carried out by Bradley. Fitz Gerald and Kearney (1992). They also assessed the impact of the SEM on 
Ireland, which is discussed in greater detail above in our review of the impact of the SEM on Ireland. 
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Because of the particular interest in the long-term impact on potential growth, the analysis was 
not ended in 1993 but was continued out to the year 2000. While the first CSF only ran until 
1993, the simplifying assumption was made that it remained unchanged in real terms in all its 
details after 1993.18 
This review focuses on the total impact of the CSF, and the reader is referred to Bradley, Fitz 
Gerald and Kearney (1992) for more detail. The study suggested that the medium-term 
contribution to growth was likely to be about 2.7% of GNP. The effects on GNP per capita 
were somewhat smaller, due to the impact of increased inward migration flows into the Irish 
labour market. The creation of around 30,000 additional jobs by the year 2000 substantially 
reduces net emigration and increases the population. As a result, by the year 2000, GNP per 
capita was projected to be only 0.8% above the benchmark no-CSF scenario. 
The CSF policies were found to be very 'supply-side friendly', in that the international and 
public sector finance balances improved unambiguously, wage rates eventually returned to 
their no-CSF levels after a period of demand-led inflation during the implementation phases, 
unemployment was down, in particular the long-term component, emigration was reduced, and 
the debt/GNP ratio was improved by about 6 percentage points. 
The single most important area of expenditure under the CSF is the range of programmes 
under the broad human resources heading. These programmes are designed to improve the 
human capital of the Irish labour force and to increase labour market participation by marginal 
groups. The ESRI study showed that, if successful, these policies could raise GNP 
significantly in the short to medium term, with even greater long-term effects. However, 
considerable uncertainty remained about the precise quantification of the supply-side effects of 
these measures. 
A particularly important aspect of the CSF programme was the extent to which it induces a 
long-run positive supply-side stimulus to the economy, since these effects represent the 
permanent value of the CSF as distinct from the transitory demand shock which accompanies 
implementation. As in the Emerson-Cecchini report, the exploration of these supply-side 
effects could, at best, be tentative since the techniques involved are at the frontier of 
economics. The ESRI study posited long-run supply effects under all the headings with the 
exception of the agricultural income transfers. They were found to be particularly important 
under two headings: human resources and infrastructure. The supply-side effects grew steadily 
over time. On these assumptions, by the end of the first CSF plan in 1993, they would add 
about 0.75% to the volume of GNP. However, by the end of the decade, the supply-side 
stimulus would have more than doubled and the level of GNP would have increased by 
almost 2%. 
4.2.2. Spain: CSF 1989-93 
There does not appear to have been any analysis of the impact of the Spanish CSF 1989-93 
based on formal models of any sort. The one Spanish model in the public domain (MOISEES) 
is a single sector model based on neo-Keynesian disequilibrium switching regimes. Hence, the 
It should be noted that the Greek work to be reported on below does not extend the period of analysis much beyond the 
terminal date of CSF 1989-93. Since one does not know much about the long-term properties of the Greek models 
involved, perhaps it is just as well to keep the time horizon short, and stay in the 'Keynesian' demand regime. 
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size of its multipliers is extremely sensitive to the initial state of the economy. Consequently, 
it is not possible to use the multipliers tabulated for MOISEES as guidelines for CSF analysis 
(Molinasero/., 1990). 
4.2.3. Portugal: CSF 1989-93 
There has been no published or accessible unpublished analysis of the Portuguese CSF based 
on a conventional macroeconometric model. However, a study by Gaspar and Pereira (1991) 
was based on an innovative small-scale one-sector model of endogenous growth that was 
parameterized and calibrated using Portuguese data for 1986. The object ofthat study was 
twofold: to analyse the effects of financial integration of the Portuguese economy with the rest 
of the EC, and to analyse the impact of unilateral public capital transfers, such as the CSF.19 
Since CSF transfers are subject to the complementarity principle (which requires that national 
governments contribute funds proportional to EU funding), and the additionality principle 
(which attempts to prevent the recipient countries from decreasing their own financial 
allocations in other areas), the net impact of the EU CSF funding on the domestic budget is 
ambiguous. The model developed by Gaspar and Pereira builds on the work of Barro (1990) 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990). Basically, public capital is assumed to play the role of an 
externality, i.e. a source of increasing returns. 
The growth model was used to analyse the effects of the EC CSF funding in the usual way. A 
baseline scenario was constructed from 1989 to beyond the year 2010, with no increase in the 
CSF funding above the 1988 baseline. For the period 1989-93, the actual increases in the EC 
CSF funding were inserted. Beyond 1993, they were assumed to grow at a rate of 3% per 
annum. The difference in the two simulations was taken as a measure of the impact of the CSF 
funding, since in both simulations the composition and magnitude of the domestic funding 
were kept unchanged. 
In addition, the model was used to analyse the effects of Portuguese financial integration with 
the rest of the EC, mainly in terms of a gradually narrowing domestic-foreign interest rate 
differential as a result of increasingly free capital mobility. This is, in part, the impact of a 
combination of the financial deregulation of 1992, combined with Portugal's membership of 
the EMS/EMU process. 
The impact of the CSF on the growth of GDP was found to be stable and permanent, at around 
0.4%, reaching 0.6% in the long run. Hence, with the particular evolution of the CSF funding 
in the simulation experiment, the long-run level of Portuguese GDP is increased by over 7% 
relative to a non-CSF baseline. 
The impact of the CSF funding on the optimal public sector deficit was relatively small. 
Public deficits show a slight deterioration in the short run. Public investment increased by 
1.5% of GDP, while public consumption decreased by 1.2%. The relatively high cost of 
international funds, in the complete absence of financial integration, together with the 
additionality and complementarity provisions, caused public investment under CSF policies to 
crowd out public consumption essentially on a one-to-one basis. 
Essentially the same model framework was extended to include Greece and Ireland in Pereira. 1992. 
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The most surprising result is that the inflow of CSF public transfers causes an increase in the 
optimal amount of foreign financing, less outflow in the absence of financial integration. The 
authors suggested that the traditional Keynesian result may not generalize to the context of an 
optimal intertemporal growth model of a capital importing economy. Also, in the absence of 
financial integration, no substantial optimal re-allocation of structural funds for consumption 
activities occurred, due to the relatively high cost of funds. 
Finally, a comprehensive series of sensitivity analyses were carried out, where all the assumed 
parameters of the model were varied. The authors suggested that the model could be 
generalized to include human capital (which was ignored in the first version), to consider 
international flows of labour as well as of capital within the EC, and to disaggregate the one-
sector formulation into a traded/non-traded two-sector formulation. The Portuguese model 
provides an intriguing and novel application of optimal growth theory in the presence of 
externalities that generate increasing returns. However, the work remains very experimental in 
nature and sheds only limited empirical light on the impact of CSF 1989-93 on the Portuguese 
economy. 
4.2.4. Greece: CSF 1989-93 
The Greek CSF 1989-93 has been the subject of three unpublished studies that make explicit 
use of macroeconometric models. The first, by Capros and Karadeloglou (1989), used the 
GEM-NTUA four-sector model, described in Capros et al. (1988). The second, carried out by 
researchers at the Bank of Greece, used a small one-sector model (Lolos and Zonzilos, 1992). 
The third, by Bourguignon et al (1992), uses a modified CGE approach. We review briefly 
these three studies and comment on their reliability and the robustness of their conclusions. 
Capros and Karadeloglou (1989) 
The model developed by the National Technical University of Athens (GEM-NTUA) is 
documented in Capros et al (1988). This model has already been referred to above in the 
review of Greek SEM studies. 
In the analysis of the Greek CSF 1989-93, a baseline scenario was constructed for the period 
1989-95, using forecast exogenous variables, where the EC funding injections for the CSF 
followed pre-1989 trends. The CSF policy scenario was based on the same exogenous 
assumptions, except that the EC funding of the CSF reflected the actual transfers to Greece. 
These funds were introduced in constant drachmas, and endogenously inflated inside the 
model, where the ECU-drachma exchange rate was assumed to be unaffected by the CSF. The 
actual timing of the expenditures over the period 1989-93 were taken from the Greek CSF 
documentation (European Commission, 1990a), and it was assumed that the funding was to be 
continued in real terms beyond the terminal year 1993. 
The broad pattern of results was very like those in the Irish case (ignoring the specifically Irish 
open labour market and endogenous migration mechanism). In the medium term, by the year 
1995, GDP increased by 1.85% over the benchmark case, with the main expenditure increase 
coming in investment (public and private). However, employment only increased by 0.51%. 
Prices were relatively unchanged, public sector borrowing as a percentage of GDP improved, 
as also did the balance of payments. 
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It is significant that the increase due to the CSF (at 1.85%) was less than the gap between the 
effects of 1992 on the Greek economy and the developed core economies (at 2.08%). Hence, 
according to this study, the relative position of the Greek economy would deteriorate under the 
combined 1992 and CSF effects. Also, the study showed that exports never increased above 
the non-CSF baseline. Indeed, they remained systematically below the baseline, reaching 
almost 1% less by the year 1995. Correspondingly, imports were up, so the balance of trade 
(not separately identified in the Greek documentation) must have deteriorated. Hence, the 
improvement in the balance of payments must be due entirely to the capital inflows from the 
EU CSF aid. 
On balance, this study is somewhat difficult to evaluate, since very little detail of methodology 
or simulations is presented. The effects look like purely Keynesian ones, although the 
deterioration in the balance of trade would either point to a suboptimal use of the CSF funds 
by Greek policy-makers, or simply to an inadequate incorporation of the CSF policies into the 
model instruments and equations. 
Lolos and Zonzilos (1992) 
The study by Lolos and Zonzilos (1992) specified and estimated an aggregate dynamic 
econometric model of the Keynesian type. A special characteristic of the model is that it uses 
advanced error correction mechanisms and co-integration techniques for estimation. No 
documented testing of the model is given, however, nor are any multipliers extracted for 
examination. However, its Keynesian specification seems to be fairly standard. 
The study used the same temporal distribution as the previous study by Capros and 
Karadeloglou (1989) described above. Three main channels of CSF influence are identified as: 
(a) public investment in infrastructure (about 50% of the total); 
(b) investment in training and skill formation (about 25% of the total); 
(c) restructuring of productive capacity and improvement in competitiveness, through 
various forms of financial assistance. 
The manner in which the impact of the CSF was examined is as follows. First, an initial 
simulation was carried out, which included all CSF funding, both domestic and EC. This was 
called the base run, or the CSF scenario. Then a modified run was made, reducing the 
magnitude of the exogenous variables related to the CSF implementation to the extent that 
they were funded by EC transfers. The impact of the CSF was defined as the difference 
between the base run and the modified run. 
The study found that Greek GDP was boosted by slightly over 2% by 1993, equivalent to an 
increase in the growth rate of about 0.5% per annum. This is quite a significant result, given 
that the average annual growth rate in Greece over the previous decade was only 1%. Private 
non-residential investment was raised by 2.5%, but there was some crowding out by the public 
sector. The unemployment rate was lowered by 1%. 
These results are broadly in line with the previous study, where it must be remembered that 
Lolos and Zonzilos are analysing the impact of the total EC CSF transfers (i.e. relative to a 
zero base line), while Capros and Karadeloglou used a 3% growth of CSF funding as their 
baseline. Given that the CSF funding was roughly doubled, compared to the level in 1988, one 
Macroeconomic impact of the SEM and the CSF: a review of research 33 
would expect the Lolos and Zonzilos impact on GDP (at 2.06% by 1993) to be approximately 
twice the impact as defined by Capros and Karadeloglou (at 1.55%). 
It must be said that, as with the previous study, the Lolos and Zonzilos analysis is very limited, 
since it used a model that focused only on the demand-side impact of the CSF. In such a 
model-based framework, a cessation of the CSF funding would reverse almost all the previous 
beneficial impact unless hysteresis effects were present, which would serve to prevent the 
economy from returning to its initial position, once the CSF funding ended. There appears to 
have been no Greek study of CSF 1989-93 that examined possible long-term supply-side 
effects. 
Bourguignon et al. (1992) 
Probably the most interesting study of the Greek CSF 1989-93 is that prepared by 
Bourguignon et al. (1992), using a hybrid Keynesian-CGE modelling approach. The study 
adapted a modelling framework originally built for the OECD Development Centre and the 
World Bank to evaluate the likely impact of structural adjustment policies in developing 
countries (Bourguignon, Branson and de Melo, 1993). 
The version of the model used for the assessment of the Greek CSF combined a standard CGE 
model with a wide variety of macroeconomic closures. The Greek economy was disaggregated 
into nine sectors and five socio-economic groups. Agents were assumed to operate in four 
markets (goods and services, labour, money and foreign exchange). In the goods market, 
adjustment was either Keynesian (a non-competitive mark-up pricing rule with quantity 
adjustments or changes in capacity utilization), or classical (competitive Walrasian price 
adjustment). 
The macroeconomic closure chosen for Greece was at the frontier between Keynesian and 
classical: some sectors (agriculture, commerce) were held to be close to full employment, 
while there was held to be underemployment of capacity in others (energy). In the former, any 
expansion would be met by price increases, resource reallocation and imports; in the latter, 
any contraction would be met by a fall in capacity utilization and employment. 
The analysis was performed using three simulations. The first, a base run, included all the 
policy initiatives in CSF 1989-93. The second eliminated all the supply-side phenomena 
assumed to be associated with the CSF programme, i.e. all the effects which were assumed to 
modify exogenously the production potential of the economy. This was called the 
CSF-demand simulation, since only demand effects are left. The third simulation eliminated 
all expenditures explicitly linked to the CSF programme, in infrastructure, training, etc., as 
well as the current transfers from abroad and the corresponding entries into the government 
accounts. This was called the no-CSF scenario. 
The analysis was carried out for two different regimes or macro closure rules. The first (case 1 
in Table 4.2) was the normal Keynesian or underemployment rule. The second (case 2 in 
Table 4.2) was a classical rule, and assumed the Greek economy was at full employment. 
In the Keynesian rule, the simulations suggested that the CSF could raise Greek GDP by 1.3% 
in 1992 and 1993, and by a little less in the previous years. However, more than half the effect 
was essentially coming from the demand side of the programme and would cease as soon as 
the programme comes to an end, ignoring possible hysteresis effects. Supply-side effects, 
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which last even after the end of the CSF, were more moderate in case 1, contributing only 
approximately 0.5% of the GDP increase in 1992 and 1993. 
Case 2 explored the other extreme, the full employment case. This simulation showed the 
sensitivity of the results with respect to the macroeconomic closure rules used. In this case, the 
demand-side effects were zero. Any additional demand simply crowded out existing demand, 
leaving total output unchanged, except for some reallocation across sectors. 
Table 4.2. CSF 1989-93 (Greece): Keynesian and classical regimes 
Case 1: Keynesian framework 
Real GDP 
Supply 
Demand 
Total 
1989 
0.19 
0.48 
0.68 
Case 2: Classical (or full employ 
Real GDP 
Supply 
Demand 
Total 
1989 
0.16 
0.03 
0.19 
1990 
0.29 
0.68 
0.97 
1991 
0.47 
0.76 
1.23 
ment) framework 
1990 
0.46 
-0.04 
0.42 
1991 
0.9 
-0.1 
0.8 
1992 
0.47 
0.84 
1.3 
1992 
1.43 
-0.11 
1.32 
1993 
0.46 
0.84 
1.3 
1993 
1.97 
-0.12 
1.86 
1994 
0.55 
-0.46 
0.09 
1994 
2.6 
-0.04 
2.56 
1995 
0.54 
-0.46 
0.09 
1995 
3.2 
-0.03 
3.17 
Source: Bourguignon et al. (1992). 
The comparison between the two cases also gives an order of magnitude of the loss in the 
efficiency of the CSF due to the macro environment in which it takes place. If the CSF were 
implemented in a full employment economy, it would raise growth by 3% more than it would 
probably do in reality. 
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5. Macroeconometric modelling of the cohesion countries: 
HERMIN 
This chapter provides a summary overview of the structure and properties of the four 
HERMIN models of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, focusing on similarities and 
differences between the structures of the various peripheral countries. The summary is brief, 
since more detailed descriptions of earlier versions of three of the models are available 
elsewhere (Bradley, Herce and Modesto, 1995b).20 
Each national HERMIN model consists of three broad subcomponents: a supply side, an 
absorption side and an income distribution side. Obviously, the models function as integrated 
systems of equations, with interrelationships between all their subcomponents. However, for 
expositional purposes, the HERMIN modelling framework is described in terms of the above 
three subcomponents, which are schematically illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. 
Conventional Keynesian mechanisms are at the core of the HERMIN model. Thus, the 
absorption and income distribution subcomponents (shown in Figure 5.1) generate the 
standard income-expenditure mechanisms of the model. However, the model also has 
neoclassical features, mainly associated with the supply subcomponent (illustrated in Figure 
5.1). Thus, output in manufacturing is not simply driven by demand. It is also influenced by 
price and cost competitiveness, where firms seek out minimum cost locations for production 
(Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988). In addition, factor demands in manufacturing and market 
services are derived using a CES production function, where the capital/labour ratio is 
sensitive to relative factor prices. The incorporation of a structural Phillips curve mechanism 
in the wage bargaining mechanism introduces further relative price effects. Finally, in the Irish 
model, labour migration is sensitive to relative labour market conditions in Ireland and the 
UK. 
The HERMIN models are econometric in that the key behavioural equations are estimated 
using annual time series. However, a very simple approach to econometric estimation has been 
taken with all four models. The behavioural equations are estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS), with correction for first order auto-correlation where needed. Some experimentation 
with instrumental variables techniques (IV) has been carried out. However, since we use 
annual time series data, covering only the period 1977-90 in the Portuguese case, more 
sophisticated techniques may be of limited value. 
In most cases, we have taken little account of the non-stationarity that one would expect to 
find in most economic variables. However, it is well known that if our behavioural equations 
were in fact co-integrating relationships, then the simultaneity bias in OLS would disappear 
asymptotically. With improved and extended data series, it may be possible to address issues 
of non-stationarity and the dynamic specification of the equations using co-integration analysis 
and its associated error-correction model, combining the latter flexibility in dynamic 
specification with desirable long-run properties. 
The HERMIN model for Greece was newly constructed by the project co-ordinator in conjunction with the Greek 
consultant and is described for the first time in this section. 
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Figure 5.1. The HERMIN model schematic 
Supply aspects 
Manufacturing sector 
Output =f\( World Demand, Domestic Demand, Competitiveness, t) 
Employment = JΊ( Output, Relative Factor Prices, t) 
Investment =f( Output, Relative Factor Prices, t) 
Capital Stock = Investment + (Ι-δ) Capital Stocky 
Output Price = f (World Price * Exchange Rate, Unit Labour Costs) 
Wage Rate = fr(Output Price, Tax Wedge, Unemployment, Productivity) 
Competitiveness = National/World Relative Production Cost and Prices 
Service sector 
Output =fi( Weighted Domestic Demand, World Demand) 
Employment =fl( Output, Relative Factor Prices, t) 
Investment =f ( Output, Relative Factor Prices, t) 
Capital Stock = Investment + (l-8)Capital Stockt.\ 
Output Price = Mark-Up on Labour Costs 
Wage Inflation = Manufacturing Sector Wage Inflation 
Demographics and labour supply 
Population Growth = f\\(Natural Growth, Migration) - (Ireland) 
Migration = f2( National/EU Labour Market Conditions ) - (Ireland) 
Labour Supply = f ^(Population, Replacement Ratio, Unemployment ) 
Unemployment = Labour Supply - Labour Demand 
Absorption aspects 
Consumption = f ^( Personal Disposable Income ) 
Net Trade Surplus = Output - Domestic Demand 
Income distribution 
Income = Output 
Personal Disposable Income = Income + Transfers - Direct Taxes 
Balance of Payments = Net Trade Surplus + Net Factor Income fi-om Abroad 
Public Sector Borrowing = Public Expenditure - Tax Rate * Tax Base 
Public Sector Debt = ( 1 + Interest Rate ) Debt,.¡ + Borrowing 
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Key exogenous variables 
External: World output and prices; EU core labour market conditions; exchange rates; interest 
rates. 
Domestic: Public expenditure; tax rates. 
The national HERMIN models were estimated using the TSP 4.3 econometric software. The 
models were simulated using the SIMPC software developed by Henk Don (Don, 1993). 
SIMPC uses a TSP-like model equation language and TSP-compatible data inputs. In addition, 
it is very user friendly, permits conventional and model-consistent expectations, has excellent 
graphic output, and is very fast. All four models have been developed with a common 
structure and notation.21 
5.1. The supply block of HERMIN 
Basically this block concerns the determination of output, factor inputs, output prices and 
factor prices for the four-way sectoral disaggregation of GDP into manufacturing (T), market 
services (N), agriculture (A) and government (G). 
5.1.1. Manufacturing sector 
Manufacturing output (OT) 
A standard form of manufacturing output equation (OT) is specified for each of the four 
models. This takes the form 
log(Or) = ax + a2 log(OW) + a3 \og(ULCT I POT) 
+a4 log(FDOT) + a5 \og(POT I PWORLD) + a6t 
where OW is 'world' manufacturing output, ULCT is unit labour costs, POT is the output 
price, FDOT is a measure of domestic demand weighted by manufacturing output content 
(derived from the 1-0 table), and PWORLD is the world manufacturing price. 
In estimation the Irish and Spanish models appear as polar opposites. The small size and 
extreme openness of the Irish economy, and the dominant position occupied by branch plants 
of foreign-owned multinational firms, dictate a particular approach to manufacturing output 
determination, with consequences for the behaviour of manufactured exports. Domestic 
demand is found to play a relatively small part in the long-run decisions of Irish manufacturing 
firms, and output prices are almost completely determined abroad. Irish manufacturing output 
is driven primarily by world demand and cost competitiveness. 
In the Spanish HERMIN model, on the other hand, manufactured output responds strongly to 
changes in both domestic demand and world demand conditions. Spanish prices are also more 
strongly affected by domestic costs, in contrast to the strong degree of externally determined 
pricing behaviour found for Irish manufacturing. 
Annotated listings of all four HERMIN models are available in a separate document (Bradley and McCartan. 1996). 
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Table 5.1 shows the estimated and imposed coefficients in the manufactured output equation 
for all four models. For reasons explained later in Chapter 6, we impose certain restrictions on 
the relative size of the coefficients a2 and a\ (i.e. on the relative strengths of the world and 
domestic demand variables). 
Table 5.1. Coefficients on the OT equation 
a­> 
a3 
34 
a5 
36 
Greece 
0.25* 
­0.25* 
0.50* 
­0.25* 
0.0096 
* Denotes imposed coefficient. 
Source: Own estimations. 
Ireland 
0.51 
­0.31 
0.26 
­0.34 
0.036 
Portugal 
0.37 
­0.25* 
0.74 
­0.25* 
­0.001 
Spain 
0.18 
­0.20* 
0.54 
­0.20* 
0.0095 
Factor demands in manufacturing (LT, IT) 
Since the Cobb­Douglas production function is too restrictive, we use the CES form of the 
added value production function and impose it on both the manufacturing (T) and market 
service (N) sectors: 
Q=Jfe £xp(v)£}P +(i­^)^xp(v)^}P]' 
In this equation, Q, L and K are added value, employment and capital stock, respectively, A is 
a scale parameter, ρ is related to the constant elasticity of substitution, δ is a factor intensity 
parameter, and λι, Åk are the rates of technical progress embodied in labour and capital 
respectively. 
In both the manufacturing and market service sectors, factor demands are derived on the basis 
of cost minimization subject to given output, yielding a joint factor demand equation system 
of the form:22 
(f c \ 
K = gl Q-vv wJ 
L = g2\\Q-
VV Ws 
Here, vv and c are the cost of labour and capital, respectively. Simple autoregressive 
expectational lags can be imposed by making actual factor demands a function of lagged 
values of the driving variables. 
The above simple scheme, using a putty­putty model of the capital stock (i.e. malleable ex 
ante and ex post), proved difficult to estimate in practice. This is not surprising in light of the 
A profit maximization approach, used in an earlier version of the Portuguese model, leads to essentially the same 
empirical formulation of factor demands, although it has different implications for output determination. In all models 
we have standardized on the cost minimization approach. 
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derived nature of the capital stock data. Hence, a switch was made to a marginal, or putty-clay, 
system where investment, the new vintage of capital stock, is driven by output and relative 
factor prices, and the capital stock is assumed to be malleable ex ante but not ex post. In the 
absence of data on vintage output and labour inputs, the corresponding marginal output and 
employment are crudely proxied by the total levels of these variables. Alternatively, we can 
focus an the long-term formulation of the equation, when the ratio of capital to output is 
proportional to the ratio of investment to output: 
I ={S+g)K 
Q 0 + g ) ß 
where g is the growth in output and £is the depreciation rate. Hence, the modified joint factor 
demand system can be written in the form: 
V wJ 
Í 
L = h, 
V VI' 
where the capital stock is now generated by a perpetual inventory formula, 
Kt = it-(\-ô)KtA 
Although the central factor demand systems in the manufacturing and market service sectors 
are functionally identical, together with their ancillary identities, they will have different 
estimated parameter values and other crucial differences. For example, in the Irish case a 
fraction of manufacturing sector profits is repatriated through the balance of payments, 
mirroring the known behaviour of multinational firms that dominate the Irish manufacturing 
sector. This profit repatriation mechanism is not yet included in the Greek, Portuguese and 
Spanish models, where the role of multinationals as a share of total manufacturing activity is 
considerably smaller. No such mechanism is included in the market service sector, where 
distributed profits simply go directly into private income. 
Focusing first on production functions, we summarize below the elasticities of substitution 
between capital and labour in the manufacturing sector. The main finding (shown in Table 5.2) 
that comes through is the fact that the Irish elasticity is much smaller than those for Portugal 
and Spain.23 
The smaller elasticity for Ireland can be understood as follows. In a traditional and/or 
relatively closed economy, the substitution of capital for labour as a result of shifting relative 
factor prices normally takes place within the economy. However, in an economy dominated by 
multinationals, this substitution will often involve a shift in production capacity to other 
countries (i.e. capital will not replace labour in the Irish factory but will instead seek out lower 
costs elsewhere). Due to difficulties with the Greek estimation, we have imposed the 
The volume of output is held constant in determining the values of these elasticities. 
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Portuguese elasticity of substitution, but estimated the other CES parameters freely from the 
data. 
Table 5.2. Elasticities of substitution in manufacturing 
Ireland 
034 
Portugal (and Greece) 
0.88 
sector production functions 
Spain 
0.77 
Source: Own estimations. 
A note on the role that the production function plays in the model is necessary. 
Macroeconometric models can feature production functions of the form: 
Q= f(K,L) 
without output being determined by this relationship. We have seen above that manufacturing 
output is determined in HERMIN by a mixture of world and domestic demand, together with 
price and cost competitiveness terms. Having determined output in this way, the role of the 
CES production function is to constrain the determination of factor demands in the process of 
cost minimization that is assumed. Hence, given Q (determined however), and given 
(exogenous) relative factor prices, the factor inputs, L and K, are determined by the CES 
constraint. Hence, the production function operates in the model as a technology constraint 
and is only indirectly involved in the determination of output. In later chapters, we will see 
that it is partially through these interrelated factor demands that the longer run efficiency 
enhancing effects of the SEM and the CSF are held to operate. 
The price of manufacturing output (POT) 
Output prices in the manufacturing sector are determined as a mixture of price taking 
(PWORLD) and a mark-up on unit labour costs (ULCT). 
log( POT) = ax+a2 log( PWORLD) + (1 - a2 ) logQJLCT) 
Ireland stands out as a more extreme case of price-taking, with an elasticity of 0.80 on 
PWORLD. Greece has a value of 0.70 and Portugal 0.62. Spain is lowest, with a value of 0.41. 
In every case, price homogeneity was imposed, ensuring that the mark-up elasticity was 1 
minus the price-taking elasticity. 
Average annual earnings in manufacturing (WT) 
The behaviour of the industrial sector tends to be dominant in the area of wage determination. 
Wage rates are modelled as the outcome of a bargaining process that takes place between well-
organized trade unions and employers, with the frequent intervention of the government. 
Formalized theory of wage bargaining points to four paramount explanatory variables (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman, 1990): 
(a) Output prices: the price that the producer can obtain for output clearly influences the 
price at which factor inputs, particularly labour, can be purchased profitably. 
(b) The tax wedge: this wedge is driven by total taxation between the wage denominated in 
output prices and the take home consumption wage actually enjoyed by workers. The 
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wedge effect arises because workers try to bargain in terms of a take home wage 
denominated in consumer prices and not in terms of gross pre­tax wages denominated in 
producer prices. 
(c) The rate of unemployment: the unemployment or Phillips curve effect basically states 
that the more people are unemployed in an economy, the lower will be the subsequent 
wage demands from those still employed or who seek jobs. In this formulation, for trade 
unions unemployment is inversely related to bargaining power. The converse applies to 
employers. 
(d) Labour productivity: the productivity effect comes from workers' efforts to maintain 
their share of added value, i.e. they want at least to enjoy some of the gains from higher 
output per worker. 
The form of manufacturing wage equation estimated for the Irish and Spanish models is as 
follows: 
\og(WT) = ax+a2 log( POT) + a3 log(WEDGE) + aA log( LPRT) + a$UR 
where WT and POT are the wage rate and output price, WEDGE is the tax wedge, combining 
all direct and indirect tax effects, LPRT is labour productivity and UR is the unemployment 
rate. This equation could also be written in rate­of­change form, and the issue of hysteresis 
explored through using the level and change in UR in the Phillips curve term. Wages in the 
Greek and Portuguese models are determined in a slightly simpler way and use the 
consumption deflator (incorporating only an indirect tax wedge), as follows: 
\og{WT) = αχ+α2 log( PC) + a^ log( LPRT) + afR 
In all cases, we imposed full price indexation, which was not rejected by the data in the case of 
Ireland and Portugal. In the case of Spain, we believed that anything less than full price 
indexation would complicate the interpretation of the long­run simulation analysis that is 
required for SEM and CSF investigations. While international studies show dramatic 
differences in the pass­through of productivity, they tend to show full indexation to prices in 
the long run (Drèze and Bean, 1990). We failed to estimate sensible equations for wage setting 
in Greek manufacturing and were forced to impose the following properties: full indexation to 
consumer prices; full pass­through of labour productivity; and a Phillips curve effect that is the 
same as in the case of Portugal. 
It is in the impact of unemployment on wage demands (the 'Phillips curve' effect) that the four 
wage equations differ most. The effects on the wage rate of a 1 % rise in the rate of unemploy­
ment are shown in Table 5.3. 
It is clear that wage bargaining in the manufacturing sector is least influenced by the level of 
unemployment in the Spanish case. The Phillips curve parameters are very similar in the cases 
of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. However, the labour supply is exogenous in the cases of 
Greece and Portugal. Hence, deviations of unemployment from a baseline can only be 
removed through changes in the demand for labour. For Ireland, on the other hand, the labour 
supply is highly elastic, due to the presence of an unemployment­sensitive migration 
mechanism in the Irish model. This will serve to drive any deviations of the Irish 
unemployment rate to zero in the medium term, as the British­Irish equilibrium is 
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re-established. Hence, the long-run effective role of the Phillips curve mechanism is very 
diminished in the Irish model. 
Table 5.3. Phillips curve effects1 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Greece 
Spain 
Manufacturing 
-0.021' 
-0.022 
-0.025 
-0.0054 
1 Percentage change in wages resulting from 1 percentage point rise in unemployment. 
Source: Own estimations. 
5.1.2. Market services 
Output in market services (ON) 
Once again, a standard form of the service sector output equation (ON) is specified for all four 
models. Initially this was in double log form: 
log(OJV) = αλ+α2 log(IH+ IBC) + a, log(FDON) + a4 \og(OW) + a5t 
where IH is housing investment, IBC is other building and construction investment, FDON is 
a measure of domestic demand weighted of services output content and OW is world 
manufacturing. We separate out the building and construction investment from the other 
components of domestic demand since this element has a large weight in determining output 
in the service sector (remember, building and construction activity is included in the market 
services sector (N)). 
Given the heterogeneous nature of output in market services, the above equation and its linear 
form proved difficult to estimate. However, this equation plays a crucial role in generating 
Keynesian multiplier effects. In particular, the impact of changes in investment in building and 
construction is central to the analysis of the effects of CSF infrastructural investments, since 
building and construction activities are part of the market services sector. Since it is known 
that activities such as road building have a high market service output content, it is necessary 
to have reasonable values for the coefficient a%. It is easier to constrain this coefficient in a 
linear form of the ON equation, and this is the form incorporated into the model, i.e.: 
ON = ax +a2(IH+IBC) + a}FDON+a4OW + a5t 
Estimation yielded the following results: 
Table 5.4. Coefficients on the ON equation 
a i 
33 
a, 
a5 
Greece 
* Denotes imposed coefficient. 
Source: Own estimations. 
0.786 
0.837 
0.458 
2.62 
Ireland 
0.709 
0.591 
9.726 
123.1 
Portugal 
0.80* 
0.80* 
432.6 
884.1 
Spain 
0.80* 
0.917 
0.491 
0.00 
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Factor demands in market services (LN, IN) 
A CES production function is also used in the market service (or N-sector) for each model. 
We summarize below the elasticities of substitution between capital and labour in the market 
service sector. The main finding that comes through is the fact that the Irish elasticity is much 
smaller than those for Portugal and Spain.24 
Table 5.5. Elasticities of substitution in market services production functions 
Ireland 
0.20 
Greece and Portugal 
0.70 
Spain 
0.51 
Source: Own estimations. 
Market services output price (PON) 
Market services output prices (PON) are determined as a mark-up on unit labour costs 
(ULCN) is all four models. However, in Portugal, there is a small world price-taking element, 
with an elasticity less than 0.20. 
Average annual earnings in market services (WN) 
Visual inspection indicated that the sectoral wage inflation rates in manufacturing and market 
services were almost identical. So we invoke labour market homogeneity, as in the 
Scandinavian model of Lindbeck, 1979, and pass on the manufacturing-sector wage inflation 
to the market service and government sectors. This assumption seems to fit all countries 
reasonably well, even if it is a gross simplification of the real world situation. 
5.1.3. Agriculture 
The agricultural sector is treated exogenously in all four models. Basically, output (OA), 
employment (LA), and capital stock (KA) are modelled as time trends. Output prices are 
exogenously determined within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
5.1.4. Government sector: output and employment 
Public sector employment and investment are exogenous instruments. GDP arising in the 
public sector is set equal to the real and nominal wage bill, plus a real and nominal non-wage 
residual. Further details of taxation and expenditure are given below in the income distribution 
block, in Section 5.3. 
5.1.5. Labour supply 
Labour supply and migration 
In the case of Ireland, the supply of labour by households is modelled carefully in order to take 
into account the known open properties of the Irish labour market. Population of working age 
is driven by an exogenous 'natural' growth rate, modified by migration outflows and inflows. 
The participation rate is influenced by unemployment (the discouraged worker effect) and the 
replacement ratio (i.e. the fraction of average earnings replaced by social welfare transfers) 
The volume of output is held constant in determining the values of these elasticities. 
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(Newell and Symons, 1990). International migration is driven by relative expected earnings 
and employment probabilities between Ireland and Britain (Walsh, 1974). 
Unfortunately, estimation of the crucial migration relationship is not very robust, due to the 
poor quality of the inter-censal estimated data on new migration flows. However, the 
migration mechanism in the Irish model is quite unique among macroeconometric models in 
the EU, and, for example, no other European macromodel treats migration endogenously. The 
performance of the Irish labour market is crucially dependent on the migration outlet as a 
means of providing employment for excess Irish population in world (mainly British) labour 
markets. Later, when we analyse the economic benefits of training and other EC regional and 
social CSF policies that boost the demand for labour, we will see that the resulting net inflows 
of migrants can often bring about a radical change in outcome compared to the case of a 
closed labour market. 
With respect to labour supply, the Irish and Greek/Portuguese models are also polar extremes, 
with the labour supply exogenous in the Portuguese and Greek models and both endogenous 
and highly elastic (because of the migration links between Ireland and the UK) in the Irish 
case. The Spanish model permits some endogeneity to enter via discouraged worker effects in 
the male and female labour force participation decisions. Consequently, in the Portuguese and 
Greek models there is a one-to-one relationship between employment and unemployment: at 
the margin, a job created means one less unemployed person. Once again however, we argue 
that the Portuguese model may become more similar to the Irish case as the Portuguese labour 
market integrates with labour markets in the European core economies. Alternatively, the 
labour supply may be quite elastic due to internal migration (e.g. of the classic Harris-Todaro 
rural-urban kind). This obviously is an area where further research is needed, given the 
importance of the Phillips curve effects in all the model simulations. 
5.2. The absorption block of HERMIN 
5.2.1. Private consumption 
In the standard version of HERMIN, the determination of household consumption is quite 
simple and orthodox. Private consumption is related to real personal disposable income. In 
practice, consumers in the periphery are found to be mainly liquidity constrained, a fact that is 
not surprising in light of the less sophisticated financial sectors in these countries.25 
The estimation results for the simple liquidity constrained consumption functions were as 
follows: 
Table 5.6. Long-run marginal propensity to consume (MPC) 
MPC 
Greece 
0.790 
Ireland 
0.800 
Portugal 
0.826 
Spain 
0.882 
Source: Own estimations. 
25 At the suggestion of the academic panel, we experimented with hybrid liquidity constrained and permanent income 
models of consumption, using the Irish model as a test case. We found that the properties of the model were relatively 
invariant to the choice between a hybrid and a pure liquidity constrained function. Of course, if a forward looking 
model of wage income were used, the properties of the model would change radically (Bradley and Whelan. 1996). 
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5.2.2. Net trade surplus 
Drawing on the theory on regional and small open economy macromodels (reviewed in 
Appendix A), exports and imports are not modelled separately in the HERMIN models. 
Rather, the net trade surplus, in current and constant prices, is determined as a residual by 
subtracting domestic demand from output. Thus, in current prices, 
NTSV = GDPMV - (CONSV + GV + IV + DSV) 
and in constant prices, 
NTS = GDPM - (CONS + G + I + DS) 
where GDPM(V) denotes GDP at constant (current) market prices; CONS(V) is private 
consumption, G(V) is public consumption, I(V) is investment, and DS(V) are inventory 
changes. 
Hence, the HERMIN models can say nothing about the separate behaviour of exports and 
imports. Only the impact on the net trade surplus can be examined. 
5.3. The income distribution block of HERMIN 
With a view to subsequent policy analysis, HERMIN includes a moderate degree of 
institutional detail in the public sector along conventional lines. Within total public 
expenditure we distinguish public consumption (mainly wages of public sector employees), 
transfers (social welfare, subsidies, debt interest payments), and capital expenditure (public 
housing, infrastructure, investment grants to industry). Within public sector debt interest, in 
the Irish and Spanish cases, we distinguish interest payments to domestic residents from 
interest payments to foreigners, the latter representing a leakage out of GDP through the 
balance of payments. 
If we leave tax rates unchanged in simulated public expenditure increases, the stock of 
outstanding government bonds could rise without bound relative to GNP, as increased interest 
payments on new debt compound with previous debt. Hence, it would become difficult to 
evaluate the wider effects of different expenditure shocks if the final debt positions were very 
different. 
Obviously, one needs a method of altering public policy within the model in reaction to the 
economic consequences of given policy shock. Ifall the policy instruments are exogenous, this 
is not possible, although instruments can be changed on the basis of off-model calculations. 
The issues here have been clearly stated by Bryant and Zhang, 1994: 
Plausible models capable of analysing fiscal policy issues must be specified so that the government's 
budget constraint is satisfied, in any given year and across the whole sequence of years. That 
condition in turn means that the models must incorporate some form of 'intertemporal fiscal closure 
rule'. [This] is a reaction function for the behaviour of a key instrument variable under the control of 
the fiscal authority. 
We include a closure or policy feedback rule into HERMIN, the task of which is to ensure that 
the direct tax rate is manipulated in such a way as to keep the debt/GNP ratio close to an 
exogenous notional target debt/GNP ratio. The policy feedback rule presently used in the Irish 
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HERMIN model is based on the IMF world model, MULTIMOD (Masson et al, 1989), and 
takes the following form: 
Í, (GNDT ­ GNDT' ) \ [ (GNDT - GNDT% ) - (GNDT , ­ GNDT\ ) 1 *GTYPR=<*{ ^ )-ß{ GNPV } 
Here, GTYPR is the (fractional) direct tax rate, GNDT is the total national debt, GNDT* is the 
target value of GNDT, GNPV is nominal GNP, and the values of the parameters a and β are 
selected in the light of model simulations. The performance of the rule can be quite sensitive 
to the choice of the numerical values of α, β. 
There is effectively no monetary sector in HERMIN, so both the exchange rate and domestic 
interest rates are treated as exogenous. Thus, the nominal 'anchor' in each model is the world 
price in foreign currency. Furthermore, the financing of public sector borrowing is handled in 
a rudimentary fashion and public debt is simply the accumulated stock of the net flow of 
annual borrowing.26 For the Irish case, these assumptions are not as serious as they would be in 
a model of a larger, more closed, economy such as France, Germany, Italy or the United 
Kingdom. In fact, they accord very well with Ireland's pre­EMS and post­EMS history of 
financial integration (Bradley and Whelan, 1992). However, these assumptions are very 
questionable in the cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain and will require much further 
research. 
In effect, by treating exchange rates and interest rates as exogenous in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain we are positing a future process of EMU­type financial integration rather than modelling 
their actual past behaviour. While the projections of the Irish model are broadly consistent 
with this exogeneity assumption, it will be important to check the consistency in the case of 
the other three countries. In stylized base­line projections to the year 2010, over which the 
behaviour of the model shocks are explored, we assume a world inflation rate of 2.5% per 
annum and a world growth rate of 4% per annum, fixed exchange rates and low nominal 
interest rates. However, any permanent deviation of cost competitiveness from the baseline is 
not accommodated by an exchange rate depreciation.27 Rather, the full costs of adjustment fall 
on the labour market. 
5.4. How the models react to exogenous shocks 
In all four models, an attempt has been made to carry out comparable shocks to observe how 
each model reacts. We briefly review the responses of each model to a range of shocks that 
serve to illustrate certain mechanisms that are central to the subsequent analysis of the SEM 
and the CSF. These shocks originate from the year 1990, and are carried out against the 
background of a baseline antimonde projection that runs from 1987 to 2010. The baseline is 
not intended to be a formal forecast of the likely evolution of these four economies. Rather, it 
is a conjectural projection that has reasonably stable properties (i.e. stable public debt/GDP 
27 
In the Irish and Spanish cases, the domestic (local currency) debt is maintained as a given fraction of GNP. Residual 
financing is by means of foreign currency borrowing, all at exogenous interest rates and exchange rates. Debt financing 
in the cases of Greece and Portugal is assumed to be of domestic origin, also with exogenous interest rates. 
A simple link between the exchange rate and cost competitiveness could have been posited in the Portuguese and 
Spanish models but would have complicated the interpretation of the shocks. 
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ratio, stable or declining rate of unemployment, etc.). In effect, the models are reasonably 
linear in behaviour, so the magnitudes of partial derivatives with respect to exogenous 
variables are relatively invariant to the actual level of the baseline. 
Our choice of five test shocks is carefully designed to illustrate properties of the HERMIN 
model that will prove to be important in the SEM and CSF simulation exercises that follow. 
For example, the response of each model to a stimulus in world activity (specifically, to world 
manufacturing output, OW) is important when analysing the impact on the periphery of 
growth in the rest of the EU. The shock to public sector employment (LG) permits the 
evaluation of standard fiscal multipliers both in the case of debt financing and in the case of 
tax financing. The shock to public sector investment (IGV) permits the evaluation of 
Keynesian-type expenditure multipliers, where the specific response of the private sector to 
better quality infrastructure is ignored for the moment.28 The shock to social welfare income 
transfers explores the standard Keynesian impacts associated with Social Fund-type 
expenditures.29 Finally, the shock to the rate of personal income tax illustrates the way in 
which the policy feedback rule, described above, works in attempting to remove imbalances in 
the public sector borrowing requirement relative to a baseline. 
5.4.1. The impact of world manufacturing activity (OW) 
The results are shown in Table 5.7. The Irish results stand out in this table in that the 
manufacturing sector responds strongly to the world demand boost. This arises from the form 
of the manufacturing output equation, where there is a higher elasticity with respect to OW 
than is the case in the other three models. The least responsive models are the Greek and 
Spanish, where once again this merely reflects the characteristics of the country coefficients of 
the manufacturing output equation. Since domestic demand plays a greater role in the southern 
periphery models, the service sector responds relatively more strongly than in the Irish case to 
secondary effects of a rise in manufacturing output. In addition, the direct impact of changes in 
OW is greatest in the case of Greece (i.e. the elasticity of ON with respect to OW is largest), 
and smallest in the case of Ireland. 
Besides boosting GDP, the world demand shock improves the public finance situation: 
borrowing falls, as does the public debt level. In Table 5.7 we also show for the Irish and 
Spanish models the case where the policy rule is switched on in an effort to leave the debt 
unchanged at the end of the period. In the case of Ireland and Spain, we see that this produces 
a further boost to domestic output since direct tax rates can be cut.30 
Chapter 7 shows how the Keynesian multipliers effects can be enhanced through the incorporation of externality 
mechanisms that attempt to capture the complex réponse of the private sector to improved infrastructure. 
Once again, Chapter 7 explores how mechanisms can be used to enhance the Keynesian effects through externalities 
associated with transfers spent on education and training. 
A similar policy of fiscal relaxation was used in the Cecchini Report (Cecchini. 1988, pp. 99-102). 
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Table 5.7. World demand shock: 1% of 1989 figure1 
Year 1990 1991 1995 2000 2010 
Greece 
% dif. in OT 
% dif. in ON 
% dif. in GDPFC 
dif. in RDEBT 
0.26 
0.34 
0.21 
-0.23 
0.23 
0.40 
0.24 
-0.50 
0.25 
0.48 
0.29 
-0.85 
0.24 
0.52 
0.31 
-0.99 
0.24 
0.59 
0.37 
-1.20 
Ireland 
% dif. in OT 
% dif. in ON 
% dif. in GDPFC 
dif. in RDEBT 
0.49 
(0,50} 
0.23 
.... (0,23) 
0.26 
(0.26) 
-0.45 
(-0.44) 
0.46 
.(0,47). 
0.28 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.28) 
-0.67 
(-0.66) 
0.49 
(0.52) 
0.28 
.(0,3.1). 
0.30 
.(0,32) 
-0.76 
(-0.64) 
0.52 
(0.58) 
0.31 
.(0,3.5) 
0.33 
.(0,37) 
-0.96 
(-0.56) 
0.55 
(0.63) 
0.37 
(0.43) 
0.39 
(0.44) 
-1.44 
(-0.33) 
Portugal 
% dif. in OT 
% dif. in ON 
% dif. in GDPFC 
dif. in RDEBT 
0.37 
0.19 
0.18 
-0.16 
0.36 
0.25 
0.20 
-0.26 
0.42 
0.33 
0.25 
-0.36 
0.44 
0.40 
0.28 
-0.39 
0.48 
0.52 
0.34 
-0.32 
Spain 
% dif. in OT 
% dif. in ON 
% dif. in GDPFC 
dïf. in RDEBT 
0.22 
.(0,23) 
0.17 
.... (0.18) 
0.15 
... (0.16) 
-0.11 
(-0.11) 
0.25 
(0.27) 
0.22 
(0.23) 
0.19 
(0.20) 
-0.19 
(-0.18) 
0.24 
(0,34) 
0.22 
(0.29) 
0.19 
(0.25) 
-0.47 
(-0.29) 
0.25 
.(9,43) 
0.25 
(0.38) 
0.20 
(0.32) 
-0.84 
(-0.28) 
0.26 
(0.50) 
0.32 
(0.48) 
0.25 
(0.40) 
-1.68 
(-0.13) 
' All differences are from national baseline scenario. 
Legend 
OT Output in the traded sector (constant prices) 
ON Output in the non-traded sector (constant prices) 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (constant prices) 
RDEBT National debt as a percentage of GDP 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate simulations where the fiscal policy rule (to target RDEBT) was switched on 
(referto Section 5.3). 
5.4.2. The impact of an increase in government employment (LG) 
The results are shown in Table 5.8. In each case, public employment numbers have been 
permanently raised by 5% of their 1989 baseline value. Table 5.8 shows both the case where 
no attempt is made to finance the increased public expenditure by raising taxes and the case 
where the policy feedback rule is used to attempt to prevent deviations in the national debt to 
GDP ratio from its baseline values. 
We calculate a multiplier by taking the ratio of the rise in real GDP (relative to the baseline) to 
the increase in public consumption (in real terms, relative to the baseline). For all four models, 
the long-run fiscal multipliers are quite high in the policy unconstrained case, ranging from 
about 1.5 for Ireland to about 2 for Greece. In this case, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal it is 
seen that there is a serious deterioration in the fiscal position (i.e. a rise of about 10% in the 
debt/GDP ratio). 
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Table 5.8. Public sector employment shock: 5% of 1989 figure1 
Year 1990 1991 1995 2000 2010 
Greece 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
Ireland 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
Portugal 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
Spain 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
1.12 
.(1,5.1) 
-0.65 
(-0.37) 
1.32 
(1.88) 
-1.35 
(-0.97) 
1.72 
(LZ?) 
-0.10 
(1.06) 
1.79 
(0.48) 
3.34 
(3.75) 
1.96 
(-1.14) 
10.43 
(0.55) 
1.18 
.(!,!.0) 
-1.19 
(-1.27) 
1.41 
(1.24) 
-1.40 
(-1.65) 
1.40 
(0.86) 
1.56 
(0.06) 
1.43 
(0.46) 
4.72 
(0.57) 
1.50 
(0.08) 
9.90 
(-0.58) 
1.02 
(0.96) 
-0.06 
(-0.31) 
1.22 
.(.!,05) 
0.14 
(-0.21) 
1.55 
(0.94) 
2.72 
(2.11) 
1.64 
(0.68) 
5.97 
(2.61) 
1.91 
(0.75) 
11.44 
(2.76) 
1.27 
(Lu) 
-0.13 
(-0.20) 
1.66 
(1.39) 
-0.08 
(-0.32) 
1.51 
(0.85) 
0.67 
(-0.53) 
1.52 
.(0,5.0) 
1.73 
(-1.17) 
1.53 
(0.42) 
4.15 
(-2.26) 
1 All differences are from national baseline scenario. 
Legend 
The multiplier is calculated as dif(GDPE)/dif(G) where differences are taken relative to the no-shock 
gross domestic expenditure (at constant prices) and G is public consumption (at constant prices). 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate simulations where the fiscal policy rule (to target RDEBT) was 
to Section 5.3). 
baseline. GDPE is 
switched on (refer 
In the policy constrained case, shown in brackets in Table 5.8, the policy rule is endogenized 
to attempt to moderate the rise in the debt/GDP ratio over its baseline. The rule is not perfect, 
but it is reasonably successful in controlling deviations in the debt/GDP ratio. The fiscal 
multipliers are drastically reduced in the policy constrained (semi-balanced budget) case. The 
reduction is greatest in the case of Greece, where they become negative towards the end of the 
simulation period. In the case of Ireland, the multiplier falls eventually to zero, indicating that 
the balanced budget multiplier is zero in the medium to long term. 
5.4.3. The impact of an increase in public sector investment (IGV) 
The results are shown in Table 5.9. In this shock, we raise nominal public investment (an 
exogenous variable in all four models) by 1% of nominal GDP in the base year 1989, i.e. the 
year immediately preceding the shock. In the policy unconstrained case, the long-run 
multipliers are seen to be in the range 1.0 to 1.8, with Ireland at the lower end and Portugal at 
the higher end. For all four models, there is a serious deterioration in the long-run debt/GDP 
ratio, ranging from 9% in the case of Spain to about 14% in the case of Portugal. 
The results in brackets in Table 5.9 show the case where the policy feedback rule is switched 
on in an effort to prevent the rise in the debt/GDP ratio from its baseline. The results for 
Ireland indicate an approximately zero balanced budget multiplier. For Portugal and Spain, the 
multiplier is drastically reduced. In the case of Greece, the policy feedback rule does not 
appear to be working very well. 
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Table 5.9. Public investment shock 
Year 
Greece 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
Ireland 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
Portugal 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
Spain 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
1990 1991 1995 2000 2010 
0.98 
Ü..29) 
0.14 
(0.40) 
1.17 
.(1,67) 
0.28 
(0.64) 
1.45 
(.1,44) 
2.81 
(3.84) 
1.44 
(-0.01) 
6.45 
(6.59) 
1.46 
(-2.08) 
12.32 
(2.53) 
0.85 
(0,76) 
-0.58 
(-0.73) 
0.98 
(0.79) 
-0.31 
(-0.71) 
0.95 
(0.35) 
3.47 
(1.29) 
0.96 
(-0.12) 
6.84 
(1.25) 
0.98 
(-0.42) 
10.78 
(-1.09) 
0.91 
(0.85) 
-0.03 
(-0.16) 
1.12 
.(0,?5) 
0.40 
(0.05) 
1.41 
(0,78) 
4.01 
(1.58) 
1.50 
(0.44) 
8.23 
(1.49) 
1.76 
.(0,4.!) 
13.58 
(-0.10) 
1.23 
(1,0?) 
0.03 
(-0.14) 
1.52 
.(1,24) 
0.34 
(-0.19) 
1.37 
.(0,55) 
2.20 
(-0.37) 
1.37 
(-0.06) 
4.54 
(-1.46) 
1.37 
(-0.16) 
8.89 
(-3.07) 
' All differences are from national baseline scenario. 
Legend 
The multiplier is calculated as dif(GDPE)/dif(IG) where differences are taken relative to the no-shock baseline. GDPE is 
gross domestic expenditure (at constant prices) and IG is public investment (at constant prices). 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate simulations where the fiscal policy rule (to target RDEBT) was switched on (refer 
to Section 5.3). 
5.4.4. The impact of an increase in income transfers (GTRSW) 
The results are shown in Table 5.10. In this shock we have increased social welfare income 
transfers by an amount equivalent to 1% of nominal GDP in the base year 1989. In the policy 
unconstrained case, we see a pattern of multipliers ranging from 0.7 (in the case of Greece) to 
0.9 (in the case of Portugal and Spain), with a deterioration in the debt/GDP ratio in every case 
of about 12%. Switching in the policy feedback rule partially eliminates the build up of debt 
and drastically reduces the size of these multipliers. 
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Table 5.10. Income transfer shock 
Year 1990 1991 1995 2000 2010 
Greece 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
0.35 
(0,5.7) 
0.42 
(0.69) 
0.58 
(0.88) 
0.68 
(1.07) 
0.67 
(0,73). 
2.86 
(4.13) 
0.68 
(0.04) 
6.42 
(7.08) 
0.69 
(-0.83) 
13.82 
(3.36) 
Ireland 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
0.55 
(0.48) 
-0.02 
(-0.14) 
0.62 
(0.47) 
0.47 
(0.15) 
0.63 
£0,18). 
3.61 
(1.66) 
0.66 
(-0.11) 
7.32 
(1.83) 
0.73 
(-0.25) 
13.98 
(-0.16) 
Portugal 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
0.28 
(0.22) 
0.64 
(0.51) 
0.52 
.(P,37) 
1.12 
(0.78) 
0.64 
10,14). 
4.25 
(1.92) 
0.71 
(-0.21) 
7.74 
(1.35) 
0.92 
(-0.38) 
12.23 
(-0.89) 
Spain 
Multiplier 
dif. in RDEBT 
0.81 
(0.68) 
0.20 
(0.05) 
0.98 
.(P,72) 
0.61 
(0.13) 
0.90 
(0,!.3) 
2.72 
(0.08) 
0.91 
(-0.37) 
5.59 
(-1.17) 
0.93 
(-0.43) 
11.93 
(-3.86) 
' All differences are from national baseline scenario. 
Legend 
The multiplier is calculated as dif(GDPE)/dif(GTR) where differences are taken relative to the no-shock baseline. GDPE 
is gross domestic expenditure (at constant prices) and GTR are income transfers (at constant prices). 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate simulations where the fiscal policy rule (to target RDEBT) was switched on (refer 
to Section 5.3). 
5.4.5. The impact of an increase in the personal income tax rate (GTYPR) 
The results are shown in Table 5.11. This simulation is designed to illustrate the effects of 
raising the rate of direct income tax, the policy instrument that is used in the feedback rule to 
influence deviations of the public debt/GDP ratio from its baseline path. In these simulations, 
the personal income tax rate is first exogenized and then raised by an amount required to 
increase direct tax revenue by 1% of nominal GDP in the base year 1989. 
In all cases, the effect of the increased tax revenue is to cut the borrowing requirement and 
reduce the debt/GDP ratio by some 15% in the long run. The negative effects in the Greek, 
Irish and Portuguese models are rather similar causing a reduction of between 0.7% and 0.85% 
in GDP in the long run. The Spanish case is slightly different, in that the negative effects on 
GDP are larger. It appears that the very small Phillips curve coefficient is producing this result 
since the rise in Spanish unemployment is exerting too weak a downward pressure on wage 
bargaining. 
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Table 5.11. Direct tax rate shock: 1% of GDP in 19891 
Year 1990 | 1991 1995 2000 2010 
Greece 
% dif. in GDPE 
dif. in RDEBT 
-0.40 
-0.48 
-0.67 
-0.79 
-0.76 
-3.35 
-0.77 
-7.47 
-0.76 
-16.04 
Ireland 
% dif. in GDPE 
dif. in RDEBT 
-0.55 
-0.92 
-0.56 
-1.66 
-0.59 
-4.46 
-0.61 
-7.87 
-0.66 
-14.19 
Portugal 
% dif. in GDPE 
dif. in RDEBT 
-0.31 
-0.68 
-0.59 
-1.21 
-0.70 
-4.53 
-0.74 
-8.69 
-0.85 
-16.36 
Spain 
% dif. in GDPE 
dif. in RDEBT 
-0.95 
-0.98 
-1.01 
-2.16 
-1.18 
-5.26 
-1.15 
-9.09 
-1.13 
-16.88 
' All differences are from national baseline scenario. 
Legend 
GDPE Gross domestic expenditure 
RDEBT National debt as a percentage of GDP 
5.5. Overall perspective on the HERMIN models 
In the Irish case, the HERMIN model reflects an economy whose manufacturing sector reacts 
rather rapidly to movements in world demand, indicating the close supply-side links with 
foreign multinational activity. The somewhat limited role for domestic fiscal expansion is 
reflected in the fiscal multipliers, which are effectively zero in the balanced budget case when 
the national debt is capped. 
In the Greek and Portuguese cases, the HERMIN model reflects economies that are only 
partially exposed to international competition. Increases in world demand bring only limited 
increases in domestic production, reflecting the more traditional nature of their exports and the 
predominance of imports of finished goods. The fiscal multipliers also appear to be relatively 
large, though they probably characterize an era that has now passed, when Portugal and Greece 
were relatively insulated from world economic forces. We suspect that both these economies 
may become much more like the Irish case in future years. 
The Spanish results are interesting. Our prior assumption was that Spain would behave as a 
semi-closed economy, given its large size relative to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. This is 
partially borne out in the world output shock. However, the fiscal multipliers were found to be 
rather smaller than expected. The institutional rigidities of the labour market, captured in a 
stylized way by the very small Phillips curve parameter in the wage bargaining equation, 
appear to be responsible for this, but the matter clearly merits further research and 
investigation. 
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6. The single market impacts on the cohesion countries: 
methodology 
The terms of reference of this study require us to examine the impact of the SEM on the 
cohesion countries, conditional on the role of the CSF. Hence, two quite separate 
methodologies are required. The first must be designed to address the SEM impacts directly, 
and needs to focus mainly on the effects of trade liberalization. The second must be designed 
to address the CSF impacts, both short-run Keynesian and long-run supply-side effects. In this 
chapter, we describe our SEM methodology, which is essentially new to the study. In 
Chapter 7, we describe our CSF methodology, drawing on and extending previous work by 
Bradley et al. (1995a, 1995b). Simulations carried out using the HERMIN models for the 
SEM are presented in Chapter 8 and those for the CSF are presented in Chapter 9. The results 
are reviewed and interpreted in the concluding Chapter 10. 
6.1. Trade liberalization 
The employment effects of trade liberalization are ambiguous in the context of distorted labour 
markets, as are the effects on inflation and growth. In this chapter, we use the HERMIN 
macroeconometric modelling framework of the countries of the EU periphery (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) to try to quantify the various ways in which the SEM will influence these 
economies. For some aspects of the impact of the SEM, we use results derived from the Cecchini 
Report and from background studies to that report. However, in addition, we develop a 
methodology that allows us to take into account the structural changes to the economy that trade 
liberalization brings, changes that were not always included as part of the Cecchini analysis of 
the developed 'core' EU Member States. 
Just as it is well known that the impact of protectionism on employment is ambiguous when the 
labour market is distorted (Buffie, 1987; Grinols, 1991), so the effects of trade liberalization on 
employment can go in either direction when the labour market does not adjust flexibly. In the 
same way, it has been argued that since closed economies are more insulated from world shocks, 
trade liberalization may be growth reducing in periods of deficient world demand (see, for 
example, Diaz Alejandro, 1984). Thus, the demand-pull effects on growth of increased openness 
may be positive or negative depending on the ratio of world growth to domestic-demand growth. 
The price-level effects of increased openness will also be ambiguous, depending on the strength 
of world inflation relative to domestic cost developments. 
Recently, a further argument has been advanced by Krugman and Venables (1990) as to why the 
impact of trade liberalization on welfare might be ambiguous. Focusing on the interaction 
between trading costs and economies of scale in determining the impact of trade liberalization on 
the periphery, their work suggests two contrasting scenarios: 
(a) In the first scenario, as trade is liberalized, production shifts from the periphery to the 
core because of the importance of scale economies and the necessity of locating close to 
the larger market. 
(b) In the second scenario, the opposite occurs, as the competitiveness premium of the 
periphery (due to lower labour costs) attracts production from the core. 
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The pessimistic scenario is more likely when trading costs begin to decline from a high level, 
while the optimistic one is more likely when trading costs decline from an already relatively low 
level. Barry (1996) suggests that this model provides a rationale for Williamson's (1965) well-
known hypothesis that the process of trade and market integration generates divergence in its 
initial stages and later leads to convergence. In this chapter, we develop a methodology that takes 
us some way towards a quantification of these various ambiguous effects. 
In our description of the HERMIN macro-econometric models in Chapter 5, we model the 
peripheral countries as small open economies producing both traded and non-(internationally-) 
traded goods. The defining characteristics of the tradable components of manufacturing and 
services are that prices are determined exogenously by the law of one price, mediated through the 
exchange rate, and that all output produced can be sold abroad at these exogenous world prices. 
The Irish manufacturing sector can be used to illustrate some of the issues involved. In the case 
of the Irish economy, where foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in manufacturing, 
output levels are determined by the proportion of multinational direct investment that Ireland can 
capture or retain (Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988). This, in turn, is influenced by the Irish 
manufacturing sector's level of cost competitiveness. Hence, an increase in world demand raises 
Irish production of tradables for a given level of competitiveness by causing internationally 
trading companies to expand production at all their production sites, including the Irish site. 
Therefore, the responsiveness of Irish manufacturing output to world demand, for a given level 
of competitiveness, is central to defining the extent of tradables in Irish manufacturing. For non-
tradables, on the other hand, prices are a mark-up on unit labour costs, and output is driven by 
domestic demand. 
The structural change that we focus upon is the fact that, as trade liberalization proceeds, major 
subcomponents of the manufacturing and services sectors switch from being essentially non-
tradable to being internationally tradable. In the case of the SEM and the CSF programmes, this 
change would result from the dismantling of non-tariff barriers such as restrictive public 
procurement policies, or from, for example, a decline in transport costs. 
As these changes occur, the elasticities with respect to world influences in both the output and 
pricing equations will rise and those with respect to domestic factors will fall. The effects of 
incorporating these structural changes are that the country will now expand more rapidly when 
world demand increases, and will be less directly dependent on domestic demand growth. 
Inflation will also become even more linked to world inflation and will be less influenced by 
domestic cost conditions. The negative aspects of these developments are that world recessions 
will now impact more strongly on the periphery, and the power of domestic demand 
management tools in the periphery to counteract these effects will be diminished. These trade-
offs are implicit in Krugman, 1987. A priori, then, in line with theory, the effects on 
employment, inflation and growth are ambiguous. 
Our methodology contrasts with previous studies that took the economic structure as given and 
analysed the implications for individual countries of the world output and competitiveness 
changes that emerged from the Cecchini Report (Emerson et al, 1988, and for the case of Ireland 
and Spain, Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 1992, and Collado et al, 1992). Such work 
entailed shocking the exogenous price and world activity variables within models that were 
largely structurally invariant with respect to the SEM policy initiatives. 
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In computing the proportions of manufacturing that make the transition from being non-tradable 
to being tradable, we recognize that some sectors will be successful in this transition (in the 
sense that they will be competitive internationally, and so will expand) while other sectors will 
be unsuccessful, and will therefore contract. In categorizing such sectors, we draw on the special 
edition of the European Economy/Social Europe (European Commission, 1990) which classifies 
individual sectors in each country into those that are likely to be positively affected by the SEM 
and those that are likely to be adversely affected. This, in turn, helps us to compute the static 
(positive and negative) output shocks that the SEM entails for each of the countries under 
discussion. 
6.2. Classification of the effects of trade liberalization 
The effects of the SEM can be classified into four broad categories: static, locational, growth-
dependent and dynamic, and in this chapter we describe the main features and processes of each. 
However, in their practical implementation in the HERMIN econometric models, these four 
categories are not entirely separate, but become inter-related. Thus, for example, we will see that 
locational processes, mainly associated with foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, will serve to 
modify static gains to trade liberalization. Also, growth dependent effects will be seen to 
magnify the static gains from a structural shift towards greater openness. 
6.2.1. Static effects 
Traditional trade theory teaches that as trade liberalization proceeds, the economy restructures in 
line with its comparative advantage. Thus, at unchanged levels of world and domestic demand, 
some sectors expand and others contract as input costs and output prices change in response to 
liberalization. These standard static effects for a two-good economy are depicted in Figure 6.1. 
The two goods are denoted by D (to indicate that these sectors are to go into decline) and S 
(indicating that these are the successful sectors). The bow-shaped curve is the economy's 
production possibility frontier, depicting the various combinations of both goods that can be 
produced with full and efficient use of the economy's stocks of capital and labour. As the 
economy adjusts from the pre-trade (autarky) equilibrium at point 1 to the free-trade equilibrium 
at point 2, production of good D declines and production of good S increases. The welfare gain is 
illustrated by the fact that the trading economy can consume on the indifference curve IC2 which 
lies further from the origin than IQ. 
With undistorted markets the static gains represented by the expansion of the S sector (valued at 
world prices) outweigh the static losses associated with the contraction of the declining sector. 
However, with distorted markets (particularly, for present purposes, distorted labour markets) the 
net effect becomes ambiguous as not all the economy's resources can be shifted easily between 
sectors. The analysis is further complicated by the possibility of international capital mobility, 
since it is then less clear-cut whether all the economy's initial capital stock shifts from the D to 
the S sector. 
We are now faced with the difficulty of estimating the extent of the expansion of the S sector in 
response to trade liberalization. In the textbook case depicted in Figure 6.1, one could simply 
measure the stocks of capital and labour released by the projected decline of the D sector and, 
taking likely productivity gains into account, compute the expansion of the rest of the economy 
entailed by their reallocation to S. 
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Figure 6.1. Static effects of trade liberalization 
'·. World Price Ratio 
'*■··.. Autarky Price Rati 
Good D 
GoodS 
The estimates of the productivity gains entailed in the SEM are taken from the Cecchini Report 
(Emerson, 1988, pp. 251-264). The question remains as to how to compute the projected decline 
in the D sectors and the projected expansion in the S sectors in Figure 6.1 above. The answer is 
implicit in the assumptions we make about the increased export-orientation of the economy that 
arises as the SEM proceeds. For the S sectors, the export-output ratio rises through an increase in 
exports with no change in home-market sales, for a given level of domestic demand.31 For the D 
sectors, the increased export orientation occurs through a decline in home market sales as import 
penetration proceeds. This procedure allows us to compute the net static gain (or loss) to 
manufacturing that is operationalized as an exogenous shock to the macroeconometric models.32 
The manner in which this shock is implemented is described in detail below. 
6.2.2. Locational effects 
Trade liberalization generally affects the location decisions of multinational companies. If 
foreign direct investment inflows were previously oriented towards sales on the domestic market, 
then trade liberalization could result in reduced inflows. Given the almost complete export 
orientation of those multinational companies (MNCs) currently located in Ireland, however, we 
would not expect an outward flight in response to the SEM. Similarly, the FDI/GDP ratio has 
This ignores the possibility of intra-industry trade. This might not, however, affect the output results, since increased 
trade of this type would entail a reduction in home market sales alongside an even greater expansion in exports. 
In the diagram above depicting the static output effects, the net exogenous shock must clearly be positive: however, if 
the Krugman-Venables (1990) analysis is correct, the net static effect can be negative. We allow for the latter 
possibility. 
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increased dramatically for Portugal in recent years (Cabral, 1995), and most of this inflow is 
aimed at the external market (Simões, 1992). There has also been a substantial increase in the 
FDI inflow into Spain (Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994). Only the Greek share remained 
low, and relatively stagnant, at least until 1992." 
A major issue arises concerning the relationship between observed FDI inflows and the SEM. At 
one extreme, we could assume that all increases in FDI inflows after 1987 resulted directly from 
the SEM and anticipation of the SEM. At the other extreme, we could assume that the FDI 
inflows arose as a result of EU entry (in the cases of Portugal and Spain), and of EU membership 
(in the case of Ireland and Greece), and that any connection with the SEM was tenuous. We will 
discuss these choices later in the chapter when we implement them in detail. 
6.2.3. Growth-dependent effects 
With an increased proportion of tradables in the manufacturing sector and a diminished 
proportion of non-tradables, the peripheral economies would clearly become more directly 
dependent on world-demand growth and less directly influenced by domestic-demand growth. 
Thus, the increase in world demand in the EU as a whole, predicted by and quantified in the 
Cecchini Report, will have even stronger effects on the periphery than an equivalent world 
demand shock before the structural changes brought about by the SEM. Our methodology allows 
us calculate the increased responsiveness of both output and prices to changes in world activity. 
Indeed, this is one of the central methodological contributions of the present study. 
6.2.4. Dynamic effects 
There are a range of effects that are commonly called 'dynamic'. These include the 
intensification of competition that trade liberalization entails, and the rationalization of sectors in 
which economies of scale are important. The first of these factors we have attempted to capture 
through our quantification of the productivity gains and cost reductions associated with the SEM, 
drawing on the original Cecchini research. We handle the second in our estimates of which 
sectors are likely to respond successfully and which are likely to be unsuccessful, derived from 
the European Economy/Social Europe special issue (European Commission, 1990). 
Other dynamic effects possible in the case of the SEM are studied by Baldwin (1989) in the 
context of the Solow and endogenous-growth models. In the Solow model, savings drive 
investment. However, we do not feel that this is appropriate for the peripheral economies, given 
their access to, and insignificant impacts on, international capital markets. Again, while it is 
likely that the SEM will stimulate technological development, which is the linchpin of the 
endogenous-growth effects Baldwin discusses, we feel that these will impact on the periphery 
primarily through inflows of foreign direct investment, which we do take into account (including 
their contributions to increased productivity). Clearly, this is an area that will have to be the 
subject of further and deeper research. 
OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1994. Unpublished data from the Bank of Greece confirm 
that FDI inflows remained low until 1992. 
58 The cases of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
6.3. Quantification of the exogenous shocks 
Macroeconomic analysis of the SEM impacts carried out by Emerson (1988) was structured in 
terms of four categories that were closely identified with the policy initiatives. These were the 
removal of frontier controls; the opening up of public procurement; the liberalization of financial 
services; and supply effects, or the strategic reactions of firms in the new competitive 
environment. 
Although the above four categories are useful when relating the SEM legislative initiatives to the 
macroeconomic consequences, all four categories contain a common core of economic impacts 
that differ in magnitude rather than in kind. For example, all four categories have an impact on 
import prices and other external prices and costs; all four have an impact on manufacturing 
output. For our purposes, it is more useful to work directly with the main economic impact 
mechanisms. 
Hence, in our empirical analysis, the impact of the SEM consists of a sequence of seven 
separate, but inter-related, shocks that are illustrated schematically in Figure 6.2. Three of the 
shocks are derived directly from the results of the earlier Cecchini analysis. These are the 
reduction in world prices and costs (shock (ii)); the modest reduction in public sector 
employment as a result of abolition of customs barriers (shock (iii)); and the reduction in the 
subsector of market services associated with rationalization of distribution and financial 
services (shock (vi)). These require little explanation beyond that provided in Emerson (1988), 
and are described very briefly. 
Two further shocks have their origins in the Cecchini analysis, but are modified in their 
implementation by the special features of the peripheral Member States. These are the gains in 
manufacturing productivity associated with increased competitiveness (shock (i)); and the 
static gains to manufacturing output that follow directly from trade liberalization (shock (v)). 
The two remaining shocks require a new methodology and take into account factors that were 
excluded from the Cecchini analysis. These are the structural changes to the models as the 
economies become more open and exposed to direct world influences - a static effect 
(shock (iv)); and the increased impact of faster world growth on the structurally changed 
models - a growth dependent effect (shock (vii)). These latter four shocks require detailed 
explanations, which are provided in the chapters which follow. 
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Figure 6.2. Taxonomy of SEM shocks 
Shock i 
Shock ii 
Shock ill 
Shock iv 
Shock ν 
y 
Shock vi 
Shock vii 
Labour productivity 
shock in 
manufacturing 
(Cecchini) 
Yes Increase 
productivity 
effect 
No 
World price cuts and 
cost reductions 
(Cecchini) 
Public sector 
(customs) 
employment cuts 
(Cecchini) 
Shift to greater 
proportion of tradables 
in manufacturing 
(based on EC (1990)) 
I 
Shock to 
manufacturing output 
(based on EC(1990)) 
No 
Shock to output of 
market services 
(Cecchini) 
Influence of higher 
world growth on 
manufacturing, 
through bigger share 
of tradables 
f END J 
See figure 6.4 ^ ~ \ 
for details of changes to 
behavioural coefficients in 
output and price / 
equations 
Yes 
60 The cases of Greece. Spain. Ireland and Portugal 
6.3.1. Static effects 
Ignoring for the moment the three 'Cecchini' shocks (shocks (ii), (iii) and (vi) in Figure 6.2), the 
other static exogenous shocks we impose to represent the effects of trade liberalization are 
threefold. The first, rather uncontroversial one, is an increase in manufacturing-sector 
productivity that represents the effects of the more competitive post-SEM environment (shock (i) 
in Figure 6.2). Based generally on the Cecchini research, we assume that productivity will grow 
by a cumulative 5% over the ten-year period 1988 to 1998, but this needs to be modified in the 
context of increased FDI flows that may be associated with trade liberalization. We return to this 
point later in the next chapter. 
However, the second static shock, involving a shock to manufacturing output, is more difficult to 
quantify and requires computing the extent to which output in the expanding (S) sectors will 
grow, and output in the contracting (D) sectors will decline (shock (v) in Figure 6.2). The third 
static shock requires us to implement modifications to the output and price equations in the 
manufacturing sectors of the models to reflect the increased openness due to trade liberalization 
in the context of unchanged output volume (shock (iv) in Figure 6.2). 
In our quantification of the above three shocks (numbered (i), (iv) and (v) in Figure 6.2), we 
make a great deal of use of the special issue of European Economy/Social Europe (European 
Commission, 1990), which analysed the impact of the SEM by individual industrial sector. That 
study identified 40 out of the 120 NACE 3-digit manufacturing sectors which were likely to be 
affected by the development of the SEM. These sectors, characterized by high price dispersion 
across states, are ones in which public procurement policies were deemed to be restrictive or in 
which differences in national standards were found to hinder trade. 
On the basis of the four individual peripheral country studies in the European Economy/Social 
Europe special issue (subsequently European Economy, 1990), and on subsequent work by the 
author of the Irish study, O'Malley (1992), we classify these sectors by three-character codes as 
follows: 
(a) The first character, S (successful) or D (declining), describes whether the sector is 
expected to be positively or adversely affected by the transition to the SEM. This 
classification, which derives from European Economy (1990), is based on revealed 
comparative advantage; it depends largely on the export-import ratios prevailing in each 
sector, and on movements in these ratios over time.34 S-sectors are those with high and 
rising export-import ratios (amongst other characteristics) and are therefore predicted to 
grow as a result of the SEM, and D-sectors are those predicted to decline. 
(b) The second character can take a value of 1 or 2; these describe whether the EU-wide 
sectors are likely to be strongly affected by the SEM (as is the case for those for which 
strongly restrictive public procurement policies applied pre-SEM) or are likely to be 
only weakly affected (as is the case for those for which only low non-tariff barriers 
applied). 
(c) The third character describes whether world demand growth for the sector's products is 
strong (a value of 1), moderate (a value of 2) or weak (a value of 3). 
34 We identify some weaknesses in the European Economy (1990) methodology below, and will attempt to correct for 
them at that time. 
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Tables showing these classifications for each of the four countries are presented in Appendix B, 
with that for Ireland reproduced below in Table 6.1, along with the export-market (X/Y) and 
home-market (H/Y) orientation of each sector, and each sector's share in manufacturing output 
(Y/YM). 
Static manufacturing output effects (shock (v) in Figure 6.2) 
How are the projected decline in the D sectors and the projected expansion in the S sectors 
computed? The answer is implicit in the assumptions we make about the increased export 
orientation of the economy that arises as the SEM proceeds. For the S sectors the export-output 
ratio (X/Y) rises through an increase in exports with, for a given level of domestic demand, no 
change in home-market sales. For the D sectors, the increased export orientation occurs through 
a decline in home market sales as import penetration proceeds. 
Since we lack any firm data on the extent of the change in export orientation, we are forced to 
implement simple stylized rules, as follows. For the less strongly affected S2 and D2 sectors in 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland, we assume the home-market orientation falls by 25%, with an 
offsetting rise in the export market orientation. We would expect Spain, as a much larger 
economy, to remain more closed; thus, for Spain we assume the home-market orientation of the 
S2 and D2 sectors falls by only 15% rather than 25%. For the first three countries, we do not 
force the home-market orientation of any individual S2 or D2 sector to fall below 10%, while for 
Spain the equivalent is 40%.15 For the more strongly affected SI and Dl sectors, we raise the 
export orientation to 90% (for Greece, Portugal and Ireland) and to 60% for Spain, and assume 
that the expansion or contraction of these sectors (many of which are already close to these 
limits) is in the same proportion as applies to the S2 and D2 sectors. 
Where does our assumption about a 25% reduction in home-market orientation of the S2 and D2 
sectors come from? It is in fact the reduction that occurred for indigenous sectors of Irish 
manufacturing (other than the food, drink and tobacco sectors) as the Irish economy opened up 
much earlier to free trade between the 1950s and the 1980s.36 During the mid-1960s, at a time 
when over 70% of Irish trade was with the United Kingdom, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade 
Agreement effectively ushered in complete free trade for Ireland. We draw on the resulting 
behaviour of the Irish indigenous sector to gain some insight into how the other three peripheral 
Member States might react to a similar shock associated with the SEM. Although we believe our 
assumptions to be plausible, they will need to be checked against firm data, as they become 
available. 
For the S (or successful) sectors then, we compute dX/Y (where Y, the initial level of output, 
equals exports, X, plus the unchanging level of home-market sales, H) from the formula: 
(X+dX)/(Y+dX) = (X/Y)+(1/4)(H/Y) 
The assumptions about the rise in export orientation and the decline in home sales will be explored in the sensitivity 
analyses to be carried out during the computations reported in Chapter 8. 
If we included the highly export-oriented foreign sector of Irish manufacturing, the decline in home-market orientation 
would, of course, be much more dramatic. We deal with FDI effects later in this chapter. Data for the home-market 
orientation of indigenous industry in the early 1950s comes from Table 5.5 of O'Malley (1989) and data sources for the 
present come from O'Malley (1992). 
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The left-hand side of the equation shows the new export-to-output ratio, which is equal to the 
initial ratio (X/Y) plus 25% of the initial home-market orientation ratio (H/Y). Simple algebra 
then reveals that 
dX/Y=l/3 
Therefore an increase in output of one-third, accounted for completely through increased 
exports, will raise the export-output ratio in the required proportion.37 Since the S sectors in 
Ireland comprise 56% of manufacturing output, our calculations therefore imply an exogenous 
(positive) manufacturing-output shock of 19%, i.e. (l/3)*0.56 (see Table 6.1 and Appendix 
C). With the S sectors comprising 30% of total manufacturing output in Portugal and 14% in 
Greece, the beneficial output shocks in these countries work out at 10% and 5% respectively 
(see tables in Appendix B). For Spain, whose home-market orientation is reduced by 15% 
rather than 25% (see above), dX/Y is 15/(100-15), or 17.6%, rather than 25/(100-25), or 
33.3%, so the beneficial output shock is this proportion of the initial 20% of manufacturing 
output located in these sectors, which is 4% (see table in Appendix B). 
The calculations of the adverse output effects for the D sectors are a little more complicated. 
Here, for the D2 sectors (i.e. declining sectors that are only weakly affected by the SEM), the fall 
in home-market orientation of 25% occurs through a decline in production of goods for sale on 
the home market, with no offsetting increase in these sectors' exports (for a given level of world 
demand). In this case we need to compute dH/Y from the formula: 
(H-dH)/(X+H-dH) = .75(H/Y) 
The left-hand side of this equation shows the new (post-SEM) home-market orientation ratio, 
which is set at 75% of the initial home market orientation ratio. 
In this case, we find, of course, that the more export-oriented the sector is, the smaller is its 
decline. We predict that a sector with, for example, an initial home-market orientation of 30% 
will experience a fall of around 10% in output, so that H/Y falls to 20/90 or 22%. On the other 
hand, a sector with an initial H/Y ratio of 60% will experience an output decline of 27%, so the 
new home-market orientation ratio is 33/73 or 45%. For the D sectors, the fall in output (as a 
proportion of total manufacturing) is listed in the columns marked (-dH/YM) in Table 6.1. 
The static gains (dX/YM) and losses (-dH/YM) computed in this way for the peripheral countries 
other than Ireland are shown in Table 6.2. 
On the basis of the methodology just described, Ireland would experience a net static gain of 
18%. Why, though, do we treat Ireland differently from the other countries? The answer is that 
many of the S sectors in Ireland are dominated by multinational companies. (These sectors are 
listed in Table 6.3 below.) If they are to expand in the way that our methodology predicts, they 
can only do so through substantially increased inflows of FDI. But this FDI effect is in a 
different category from the shocks being analysed at present. Wishing to leave until later the 
shocks emanating from increased FDI inflows, we extract from our current calculations the 
37 For example, we assume that a sector with an export-output ratio of 60% initially will expand through exports until its 
ratio is 70%. This will occur through a 33% expansion in output, so the new export-output ratio is (60+33)/133. which 
is 70%. 
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multinational-dominated sectors (which are marked with an 'M' in Table 6.1). This brings the 
net static gain to Irish manufacturing output down from the level of 18% that emerges from 
Table 6.1 to the much lower level of 8% (see Appendix Β for the classification of the Irish 
indigenous sectors). 
Table 6.1. Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM (Ireland) 
SI 
S2 
Sil 
SI2 
S13 
S21 
S22 
S23 
NACE 
330 
344 
341 
421 
372 
251 
257 
345 
346 
351 
428 
325 
364 
413 
427 
247 
322 
323 
324 
326 
327 
432 
481 
491 
494 
Sector 
Office & data-processing machinery (M) 
Telecommunications equipment (M) 
Insulated wires and cables (M) 
Cocoa, chocolate (I) 
Medical & surgical equipment (M) 
Basic industrial chemicals (I) 
Pharmaceuticals (M) 
Radios, TVs. etc. (M) 
Domestic electrical appliances (M) 
Motor vehicles (I) 
Soft drinks (M) 
Plant for mines, steel (M) 
Aerospace equipment (I) 
Dairy products (I) 
Brewing, malting (I) 
Glass & glassware (I) 
Machine tools (M) 
Textile machinery (M) 
Food, chemical machinery (M) 
Transmission equipment (M) 
Other machinery (M) 
Cotton industry (M) 
Rubber products (M) 
Jewellery (I) 
Toys & sports goods (I) 
X/Y 
98 
87 
70 
62 
99 
43 
97 
38 
78 
33 
13 
69 
40 
29 
13 
55 
69 
69 
69 
69 
69 
84 
85 
50 
85 
H/Y 
2 
13 
30 
38 
1 
57 
3 
62 
22 
67 
87 
31 
60 
71 
87 
45 
31 
31 
31 
31 
31 
16 
15 
50 
15 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
D12 
D21 
D22 
D23 
342 
361 
417 
256 
321 
493 
431 
453 
455 
248 
347 
438 
451 
Electrical machinery (M) 
Shipbuilding (I) 
Spaghetti, macaroni (I) 
Other chemical products (M) 
Agricultural machinery (M) 
Photographic labs (I) 
Wool industry (I) 
Clothing (I) 
Household textiles (I) 
Ceramic goods (I) 
Electric lamps (M) 
Carpets, floor coverings (M) 
Footwear (I) 
90 
93 
50 
77 
69 
29 
70 
54 
74 
91 
90 
65 
42 
10 
7 
50 
23 
31 
71 
30 
46 
26 
9 
10 
35 
58 
Total 
Y/YM 
13.19 
2.72 
0.82 
2.49 
1.68 
2.28 
5.96 
2.12 
1.03 
0.19 
1.64 
0.39 
0.50 
12.01 
5.05 
0.89 
0.39 
0.03 
0.13 
0.07 
0.03 
0.78 
0.71 
0.16 
0.27 
55.53 
0.61 
0.14 
0.04 
0.78 
0.39 
0.12 
0.44 
1.43 
0.19 
0.18 
0.07 
0.30 
0.15 
4.83 
dXA'M 
18.51 
-dH/YM 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.25 
-0.02 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-0.54 
d(X/Y)* 
0.00 
0.09 
0.18 
0.70 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.36 
0.06 
0.03 
0.39 
0.03 
0.08 
2.13 
1.10 
0.09 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.05 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.16 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
6.10 
Legend 
X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output, 1986. 
I I/Y:( 100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of gross output. 1986. 
Y/YM: sectoral share of manufacturing output. 1987. 
dX/YM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
-dH/YM: loss in home-market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing output (detailed explanation below). 
d(X/Y)*: output-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions 
Data sources: European Economy. Special Edition 1990. part C, Ireland, pp. 247-61; Irish CSO Census of Industrial 
Production 1987. 
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Table 6.2. Static gains and losses of manufacturing output (without FDI effect) 
(% of manufacturing output) 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Greece 
Gain 
8 
10 
4 
5 
Loss 
0 
13 
11 
19 
Net gain 
+8 
-3 
-7 
-14 
Source: own calculations. 
An examination of the pattern of results shown in Table 6.2 suggests certain questions. For 
example, what explains the fact that the exogenous output shock of the SEM calculated using 
Table 6.2 for Ireland is strongly positive (at 8%), while all the others are negative, with Greece's 
being strongly negative (at -14%)?38 The major factor driving these results is the proportion of 
manufacturing located in the S (successful) and D (declining) sectors. Even the non-
multinational-dominated S sectors in Ireland, for example, account for 24% of manufacturing 
output while the equivalent D sectors account for only 5%. On the other hand, in Greece only 
14% of total manufacturing is in the S sectors while 29% is located in the D sectors. 
One possible weakness in the European Economy (1990) methodology is that the state of the 
overall trade balance was ignored in calculating export-import ratios for individual sectors, and 
in calculating changes in these ratios over time.39 For an economy with a positive and rising trade 
balance deficit over the period when these calculations were made - such as Greece, for example 
- these calculations would be overly pessimistic. For Ireland, on the other hand, the trade surplus 
was positive and rising, so the calculations in European Economy (1990) would be overly 
optimistic. The cases of Portugal and Spain are less clear-cut. 
The fact that the exogenous shocks for some of the countries turn out positive while those for 
other countries are negative could nevertheless be a reflection of the Krugman-Venables (1990) 
argument that when economies of scale are important the effects for peripheral regions can go in 
either direction.40 
If the Krugman-Venables effects are not so important, however, then the conventional textbook 
analysis depicted in Figure 6.1 above comes into play. This requires that the sum of exogenous 
shocks designed to represent trade liberalization must generate static gains (in the case of flexible 
factor markets), in which case the results of our analysis shown in Table 6.2 may be overly 
pessimistic, particularly for Spain and Greece. A further factor involved here is that the large 
(net) negative shocks computed above for Spain and Greece come about through increased 
import penetration, heavily outweighing the export expansion effect. Thus, trade liberalization in 
We may note in passing that the analysis of de Macedo agrees that Portugal is likely to fare better than Spain (de 
Macedo. 1990. pp. 326-332.) 
Our criticism here of the European Economy 1990 methodology is similar to the Aquino (1978) criticism of the Grubel-
Lloyd intra-industry trade indices. 
O'Malley (1992) presents a classification of sectors, based on Pratten (1988). that are characterized by economies of 
scale. According to this classification. 24 of the 40 sectors identified by the special issue of European Economy as 
likely to be affected by the SEM are sectors in which economies of scale are important. 
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these cases is associated with increased trade deficits.'" Trade deficits, however, can be viewed as 
macroeconomic or intertemporal rather than structural phenomena, in which case we might be 
wary of imposing exogenous shocks with such strong implications for the trade balance.42 
It is crucial to note, of course, that we are concerned so far only with calculating the exogenous 
manufacturing output shocks. The overall impact of the SEM will depend on the endogenous 
response of each economy to such shocks. A crucial component of this response will operate 
through the Phillips curve, for example, i.e. through the responsiveness of wage demands to 
unemployment. Since Greece appears to have a more flexible labour market than Spain, this 
means that the Greek transition process may possibly turn out to be easier than the Spanish one, 
even though the Greek manufacturing sector is hit with more adverse shocks. Furthermore, since 
the Irish labour market is very open, with large potential and actual international labour 
migration flows, and the Portuguese labour market is closed (at least as handled at present in the 
HERMIN model), then the country labour market responses could differ greatly, even where the 
Phillips curve semi-elasticities are identical. 
6.3.2. Locational effects 
Here we take into account the likelihood that FDI flows will play a more important role in the 
process of structural transformation of the periphery than allowed for in the methodology of the 
European Economy (1990) special issue. Our view emerges from studying structural 
transformation in the Irish economy as a consequence of the trade liberalization that occurred 
prior to the SEM proposals, indeed to a considerable extent prior to Ireland's accession to the 
EEC in 1972. The bilateral dismantling of tariff barriers between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom in 1965 effectively created the conditions of complete free trade for Ireland, since over 
70% of Irish exports were directed to the UK market and imports from the UK were also large. 
However, the major structural transformation of the Irish economy that took place during the 
1960s and 1970s was accompanied by large inflows of FDI, the importance of which was largely 
ignored in European Economy (1990). 
We argue that the factors focused upon in European Economy (1990) would have served as 
rather inaccurate predictors of the success or failure of individual industrial sectors in Ireland in 
the face of trade liberalization over the 1960-95 period, or even over the more recent 1973-95 
period. It appears crucial to us to understand the role of FDI flows in the structural 
transformation of the periphery, given the increasing importance of FDI flows into the other 
cohesion countries at present. 
41 This is in fact consistent with the assessment of the initial trade effects for Spain and Greece, by Viñals et al. (1990) 
and by Katseli (1990) respectively, who predict strong increases in imports with less favourable effects on exports. 
Macedo (1990) is more optimistic with respect to the Portuguese position. 
Our wariness in this regard would be alleviated if there were mechanisms within the macroeconometric models which 
ensured long-run current-account equilibrium. Such mechanisms could include the build-up of pressures towards 
exchange-rate devaluation when the trade balance got too seriously out of line, though this would not be too effective in 
the present case of full pass-through of prices into wage demands. The other alternative is to have foreign-debt 
accumulation impacting adversely on domestic demand: only in the Irish model is this mechanism fully operational, 
since this is the only one of the four countries at present where the gap between GDP and GNP is substantial and where 
the modelling of the various components of net factor income flows through the current account of the balance of 
payments is reasonably comprehensive. 
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For this analysis, then, one possibility is to identify the subset of industrial sectors that are 
sensitive to SEM effects and in which FDI flows into the periphery are likely to become more 
substantial. The sectors in which large foreign direct investment flows appear possible are 
identified, for the Irish case, in Table 6.3 below. We identify these sectors (marked M) by the 
fact that in Ireland at present employment in foreign companies in these sectors is substantially 
larger (generally around three times larger) than employment in indigenous industry.43 As before, 
data is available in some cases only for more highly aggregated sectors; we again assume that 
these numbers apply also to the individual sub-sectors. 
Table 6.3 reveals that large FDI flows are possible in many of these sectors.44 This suggests that 
the authors of the articles in the European Economy (1990) special issue may be overly 
pessimistic about the ability of the peripheral countries to compete successfully in sectors in 
which they are initially weak (i.e. identified as D sectors).45 
Therefore the methodology used as outlined in European Economy (1990) underestimates the 
growth potential in many sectors. If the fact that multinational corporation (MNC) employment 
in an individual sector is high in Ireland can be taken as an indication that FDI flows are possible 
into this sector in other countries of the periphery, then many of the weak (D) sectors that appear 
in the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish European Economy (1990) studies may actually prosper 
through inflows of FDI. In fact, using the analogue of the Irish case, 63% (in employment terms) 
of Spain's D sectors can be denoted as M (i.e. ones where a high potential exists for FDI 
inflows), and the equivalent proportions for Portugal and Greece are 62% and 37% respectively. 
Rather than continuing the analysis at the disaggregated sectoral level, though, we decided, 
instead, to focus on the macroeconomic level. Data from the OECD Foreign Direct Investment 
Statistics Yearbook indicates that real FDI inflows into Spain and Portugal have increased 
dramatically in recent years as indicated in Table 6.4 below.46 For example, real FDI inflows into 
Spanish manufacturing averaged $ 2,059 million (in 1990 dollars) between 1982 and 1988 and 
then rose to an annual average of $ 5,469 million. Real inflows into Portugal rose from an 
average of $ 160 million between 1982 and 1987 to an average of $ 349 million since then. 
Flows into Ireland showed no change over this period (remaining at very high levels relative to 
Our classification is confirmed by data on sectors in the other peripheral countries into which FDI flows have been 
substantial; they include most of the sectors identified as 'multinational dominated' in the following table, along with 
Motor Vehicles, into which FDI flows in some of the other countries have been substantial (European Commission, 
Foreign Direct Investment, 1997, p. 28). 
This appears to be particularly the case for sectors deemed likely to be positively affected. This is misleading, however, 
since one reason why they are deemed likely to be positively affected is their high export to output ratio, which reflects 
foreign companies' decisions to use Ireland as an export base. 
Applying the methodology used in European Economy 1990 to Irish data from the 1960s, the predictions for the high 
growth sectors are not entirely accurate. Strong growth is predicted for the Food sector: this materialized in the output share 
(increasing to 40.8% in 1978), yet the employment share declined from 23% in the mid-1960s to 20.9% in 1978. The 
methodology predicted that the Chemicals and Metals and Engineering sectors would decline. In fact the opposite occurred 
and Chemicals doubled its share of output and employment over the mid-1960s to 1978 period and Metals and Engineering 
substantially increased its share of employment from 17.6% to 23.1%. with moderate growth in output: these developments 
were due to strong FDI flows into these sectors (Barry and Hannan, 1996). 
We deflate the FDI flows by the national investment deflators. 
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the size of the economy), while flows into Greece also showed no change, remaining at relatively 
low levels.47 
Table 6.3. Sectors in which MNC employment in Ireland is substantial 
SI 
S2 
Dl 
D2 
Sil 
S12 
S13 
S21 
S22 
S23 
DI2 
D21 
D22 
D23 
NACE 
330 
344 
341 
421 
372 
251 
257 
345 
346 
351 
428 
325 
364 
413 
427 
247 
322 
323 
324 
326 
327 
432 
481 
491 
494 
342 
361 
417 
256 
321 
493 
431 
453 
455 
248 
347 
438 
451 
Sector 
Office & data-processing machinery' 
Telecommunications equipment 
Insulated wires and cables 
Cocoa, chocolate 
Medical & surgical equipment 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Radios, TVs. etc. 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Motor vehicles 
Son drinks 
Plant for mines, steel 
Aerospace equipment 
Dairy products 
Brewing, malting 
Glass & glassware 
Machine tools 
Textile machinery 
Food, chemical machinery 
Transmission equipment 
Other machinery 
Cotton industry 
Rubber products 
Jewellery 
Toys & sports goods 
Electrical machinery 
Shipbuilding 
Spaghetti, macaroni 
Other chemical products 
Agricultural machinery 
Photographic labs 
Wool industry 
Clothing 
Household textiles 
Ceramic goods 
Electric lamps 
Carpets, floor coverings 
Footwear 
M o r i 
M 
M 
M 
I 
M 
I 
M 
M 
M 
I 
M 
M 
1 
I 
I 
I 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
I 
I 
M 
I 
I 
M 
M 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
M 
M 
I 
Note: M represents multinational-dominated sectors, and I represents indigenous sectors. 
On the basis of unpublished information supplied by the Irish Industrial Development Authority 
(IDA), the level of investment per job in Ireland is known to average around $ 150,000 at 
present. We assume for Spain, with its somewhat higher GDP per capita, a slightly higher 
investment-to-employment ratio, of $ 175,000 per job, and for Portugal a somewhat lower one of 
$ 125,000 per job. For Spain then, this apparent structural change in FDI inflows represents an 
extra 19,000 jobs per annum in manufacturing, and in Portugal an extra 1,500 jobs per annum. 
Little or no structural change is apparent in the cases of Ireland (where FDI inflows are already 
47 We may be underestimating recent FDI inflows into Ireland and Greece, in that 1992 data (which is the most recent year 
for which data is available) shows a sharp increase in FDI inflows into Greece, while employment in the foreign-owned 
sector of Irish manufacturing has increased strongly in recent years. O'Malley (1992) argues that the SEM is likely to 
increase Ireland's attractiveness as a base for multinational investment still further. 
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very high) and Greece (where the inflows are rather low). It remains a moot point whether or not 
it was the SEM shock that caused the Portuguese and Spanish structural shift. If it did, then the 
FDI effect must be added to the other SEM effects. If it did not, then the FDI effect, although 
obviously related to Portuguese and Spanish accession in the late 1980s, is not strictly an SEM 
effect. We take both scenarios into account in the simulations reported in Chapter 8. 
Table 6.4. 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
FDI manufacturing flows into peripheral economies (US$ million) 
Greece 
Nominal 
113 
93 
118 
136 
152 
Real 
173 
127 
137 
136 
Ireland 
Nominal 
237 
198 
195 
244 
309 
223 
187 
194 
349 
Real 
304 
237 
224 
280 
354 
237 
187 
194 
Portugal 
Nominal 
60 
60 
61 
98 
68 
82 
222 
304 
428 
384 
Real 
222 
173 
145 
187 
114 
119 
278 
342 
428 
Sp 
Nominal 
1,150 
676 
878 
1.025 
1.758 
3.098 
2,674 
4.415 
6.250 
3,492 
ain 
Real 
1.990 
1.040 
1.235 
1.341 
2.180 
3,650 
2.979 
4.687 
6.250 
Sources: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1994, 1993, OECD. Paris. 
Deflator of Investment in Manufacturing (Various National Accounts: Greece. Ireland, Portugal and Spain) used 
to calculate Real FDI Flows (1990 = 1). 
IMF: International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1994, for local/US$ exchange rates. 
We wish to design a shock to represent these increased FDI flows, and this is illustrated in 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5. An extra 19,000 jobs per annum in Spanish manufacturing over a ten-year 
period represents an increase of 7% over the 1987 base level, while the extra jobs in Portugal 
over an equivalent time period represent an increase of 1.9%. We translate these numbers into 
combined output and productivity shocks. 
Productivity in the modern (largely foreign-owned MNC) sectors of Irish manufacturing is over 
twice that in traditional (largely indigenous) industry. Using the Irish analogue, since 
employment in foreign-owned enterprises was low in both Portugal and Spain in 1987, we can 
assume that the productivity level associated with these new jobs is twice that in existing 
industry. Thus, an increase of 7% in Spanish employment translates to an increase of 14% in 
output and an increase of 7% in productivity. For Portugal, the increase of 1.9% in jobs translates 
to an increase of 3.8% in output and an increase of 1.9% in productivity (e.g. with output 
increasing from a base of 100 up to 103.8 and employment going from 100 to 101.9, productivity 
goes from 100 to 101.9). 
The modifications to the static productivity effect are carried out as shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. 
Only for the cases of Portugal and Spain, where a structural shift in FDI flows is apparent, are the 
original Cecchini-motivated numbers modified. The two key assumptions made in constructing 
the FDI-modified shocks to output and productivity relate to the investment cost per new job and 
the extent to which the FDI-related jobs have a higher productivity. The Irish experience is 
drawn on to give initial guesses for these two assumptions, and these are modified in the light of 
what we know of the characteristics of the Portuguese and Spanish economies. 
Taking these FDI effects into account alongside the static effects discussed earlier, then, the 
exogenous shocks we work with are shown in Table 6.5 below: columns 1 and 2 show the output 
shock, without and with the FDI modification, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show the 
productivity shocks, where the 'no-FDI' numbers are taken from the original Cecchini research. 
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Table 6.5. Static output and productivity shocks 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Greece 
Net output shock (%) 
No FDI 
8 
-3 
-7 
-14 
With FDI 
8 
1 
7 
-14 
Productivity shock (%) 
No FDI 
5 
5 
5 
5 
With FDI 
5 
6.9 
12 
5 
Source: Own calculations. 
6.3.3. The shift to greater trade orientation (shock (iv), in Figure 6.2) 
Against the background of a fixed level of manufacturing output, another important effect of the 
SEM is to shift the economy towards a greater direct exposure to the world economy, i.e. to 
increase the share of tradables relative to non-tradables in the manufacturing sector. With the 
need to examine this kind of shock in mind, we imposed a uniform functional form structure on 
the output and producer price equations of the manufacturing sectors of all four HERMIN 
models. 
Manufacturing output (OT) and output price (POT) are determined as follows: 
log(Or) = a, + a, log(CW) + a3 \og(FDOT) 
+a4 \og(ULCT I POT) + a5 log( POT I PWORLD) + a6t 
log( POT) = b,+b2 log( PWORLD) + (1 - b2 ) \og(ULCT) 
where OW represents world manufacturing output, ULCT is (domestic) unit labour costs, POT 
is the (domestic) output price, FDOT is a weighted measure of domestic demand, and 
PWORLD is the price of world manufacturing output.48 
Free estimation of the output equation proved difficult, given the constrained formulation, the 
aggregate nature of the data, and the short time series available (e.g. only 1977 to 1990 for 
Portugal).4" We make the admittedly strong assumption that goods sold on the home market can 
be identified as non-tradables. This is done because for several of the countries the ratio (for the 
manufacturing sector) of goods exported to sales on the home market is very close to the weight 
of world demand in the manufacturing output equation relative to domestic demand (a ratio of 
around 2 to 1 for Ireland). Goods exclusively dependent on domestic demand are by definition 
non-tradable. 
The weighted measure of domestic demand assigns 1-0 weightings that represent the manufacturing output content of 
each expenditure component. The components included are private consumption (CONS), public consumption (G), and 
investment disaggregated into building and construction (IBC) and machinery and equipment (IME). 
Clearly, further research is needed in the area of output determination at a disaggregated level in the manufacturing 
sector. In the Irish case. Bradley. Fitz Gerald and Kearney (1993) provide such a study, based on a three-way 
disaggregation of manufacturing into high-technology, food processing and other traditional. The HERMIN aggregate 
manufacturing output equation for Ireland is based on this disaggregated research. 
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Figure 6.3. Shift to greater tradable orientation for manufacturing output 
Go to next 
sector 
No changes to 
be made to X/Y 
Increase X/Y by 
1/4(H/Y) in 1987 
to maximum of 90% 
Weight each sectoral change in X/Y by 
output share of sector in 1987 
No 
Strongly growing sectors, so increase weighted sectoral 
(X/Y) ratio change by 10% 
Slow growing sectors, so decrease weighted 
sectoral (X/Y) ratio change by 10% 
Sum sectoral (X/Y) changes to obtain aggregate, adjusted for 
demand conditions (Table 6.6, column 1, and Table 6.1, d(X/Y)*) 
Yes 
Calculate changes to 
ai, as and 02 coefficients 
(using column 1 of Table 6.6) 
Calculate changes to 
as, Q3 and b2 coefficients 
(using column 2 of Table 6.6) 
-ƒ ENDV 
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Consequently, we imposed constraints on the ratio of 02 to a^  (see Section 5.1.1), i.e. the 
estimated measure of within sample openness of the individual manufacturing sectors. For 
Ireland, the most open economy, the ratio 2 was imposed, reflecting the fact that two-thirds of 
output was initially dependent on world demand and one-third dependent on domestic demand. 
Greece and Portugal were intermediate cases, with the ratio 0.5 imposed; Spain, being the least 
open, had the ratio 0.33 imposed, reflecting the fact that a quarter of output was initially 
dependent on world demand and three quarters dependent on domestic demand. 
The sequence of calculations required to quantify the way the SEM may influence the structure 
of the output and price equations in manufacturing is illustrated in a flow-chart in Figure 6.3. 
Each of the sectors in European Economy (1990) is examined. If the export/output ratio is 
already greater than 90%, no further changes are made to the ratio. Otherwise, for strongly 
affected sectors (SI or Dl) we increase the ratio to 90%; for weakly affected sectors, we increase 
it by a quarter of the initial home market orientation, to a maximum of 90%. 
Each sector's export/output ratio is then weighted by its output share. For strongly growing 
sectors (according to the European Economy (1990) classification), we increase the ratio by a 
further 10%; for slow growing sectors, we decrease the ratio by 10%. Finally, an adjustment is 
made in the case where FDI inflows are rising since 1987 (i.e. for Portugal and Spain). The 
manner in which this is done is explained below and illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
6.3.4. Growth-dependent effects (shock (vii), Figure 6.2) 
We must also recognize that the increased export orientation of the economy generates growth-
dependent effects (i.e. any given increase in world demand will have more dramatic effects now 
that the economy is producing a higher proportion of tradable goods, and any increase in 
domestic demand will have less strong effects than before because the economy is now 
producing a smaller proportion of non-tradables, the output of which depends on domestic 
demand). 
We have already explained in Figure 6.3 how the increased export/output ratio in each sector is 
calculated. For example, for the Dl sector 'Spaghetti and macaroni' we expect its sales on the 
home market to fall from 50% of output down to 10%, while for the S2 and D2 sectors 
'Domestic electrical appliances' and 'Other chemical products', we expect home-market 
orientation to fall from 22% down to 16.5%, the former through increased exports and the latter 
through reduced home-market sales. 
To work out the implications for the overall export/output ratio for manufacturing, we weight 
each percentage point change in the export/output share by its share of manufacturing output, 
Y/YM, and then make an adjustment for demand growth, since if the economy is specializing 
into sectors for which world demand is growing strongly, this will increase the elasticity of world 
demand in the domestic output equation still further.50 (This adjustment entails factoring in data 
from the European Economy special issue on the state of demand for the output of individual 
sectors. For sectors for which EU demand is growing rapidly, the output-weighted percentage 
point change in the export/output ratio is multiplied by a factor 1.1; for average-growth sectors 
the numbers are unchanged, and for slow growth sectors the numbers are multiplied by a factor 
50 Technically the percentage point change, which for the S2 and D2 sectors of Greece. Portugal and Ireland is ( 1/4)(H/Y). 
is d(X/Y)[Y/(Y+dY)]. 
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0.9.) This yields the numbers presented in Table 6.1 and Appendix Β in the columns entitled 
'd(X/Y)*\ 
We see that the total in the Irish case is around 6%, which indicates that the export orientation 
of Irish manufacturing we predict to rise from its current level of around 67% to about 73%. 
Our methodology entails embodying these structural changes into the HERMIN model 
through adjusting the coefficients in the output and pricing equations in line with these 
proportions. These changes are now described, developing on the basic model presented in 
Chapter 5. 
6.4. Implementing the SEM shocks in the HERMIN models 
In most of the shocks illustrated in Figure 6.2, we simply have to alter an exogenous variable, 
such as world prices and costs (shock (ii)), public employment (shock (iii)), etc. In other shocks 
we only need to alter exogenous 'add-factors', such as in the case of shock (v) (manufacturing 
output), or shock (vi) (market services output). However, some of the more subtle shocks require 
us to alter the otherwise fixed coefficients of the model behavioural equations (e.g. shocks (iv) 
and (vii)). We turn to this latter category now. 
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Figure 6.4. Static productivity shock 
Assumption: 
Productivity in new 
FDI jobs = twice that J 
, in traditional sector , 
(Irish based) 
Standard 5% increase to labour 
productivity in manufacturing as a 
result of SEM (Cecchini) 
No 
Calculate change in FDI flows 
(1982­87) relative to (1988­91) 
xi units 
Convert to new 
FDI jobs per annum 
X2=x//investment cost per job 
Stock of new FDI jobs over period 
1988­1998 
XÎ = 1 0X2 
New FDI jobs created as proportion of total base 
year (1987) manufacturing employment 
X4 = xj/employment in 1987 
Impact on output growth 
X5=2(Xi) 
Impact on productivity growth 
X6=; 00[(1 00+XÍ)/(1 00ΛΧ4)-!] 
Construct Table 6.5, column 2 * 
[END) 
74 The cases of Greece, Spain. Ireland and Portugal 
Figure 6.5. Static output shock (with, without FDI effect) 
Calculateyi static output gains/losses 
using EE (1990) methodology 
(Column 1, from Table 6.5) 
No 
Yes 
FDI effect on 
output change 
xj (see Figure 6.4) 
Total output shock 
V2 =yi +X5 
Construct column 2, 
Table 6.5 
X5 = 0 
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6.4.1. Manufacturing output equation alterations 
The equation determining manufacturing output (OT) is a function of world demand (OW) and 
weighted domestic demand (FDOT), as well as cost and competitiveness terms (for simplicity, 
not shown explicitly below): 
log(Or) = a, + a2 \og(OW) + a3 log(FDOT) + relative price terms 
where 02 and a¡ are the coefficients on the two variables respectively. The structural changes 
described above require altering the values of «2 and 03 to increase the dependence on OW and 
decrease the dependence on domestic demand FDOT. The adjustments to 02 and as are 
calculated as follows. For given levels of OW and FDOT, the changes in Ü2 and as should not 
affect OT. Therefore we require: 
da2=-{log(FDOT)/\og(OW) }mida3 
where the shock is administered from the base year 1987. For this reason, we set indices so that 
the ratio of log(FDOT) to log(OW) for 1987 is unity. 
The initial values of 02 and as were, for the Irish case, in the 2­to­l ratio, reflecting the fact that 
67% of initial output was initially dependent on world demand and one­third was initially 
dependent on domestic demand. We predict that this 67% will now rise by 6 percentage points to 
73% of the sum of the initial values of 02 and aj. For Ireland, therefore, we need 
dü2 = 6% of (Ü2 +as). 
while the other coefficient falls by an equal amount. 
These calculations ensure that, for given levels of domestic and world demand, manufacturing 
output does not change. However, the increased export orientation of the economy after the 
introduction of the SEM means that the economy is now more reliant on world demand and less 
reliant on domestic demand. 
6.4.2. Manufacturing output price equation alterations 
The price of tradables (POT) is a function of world prices (PWORLD) and unit labour costs 
(ULCT), where price homogeneity is not rejected by the data: 
log( POT) = b,+b2 log( PWORLD) + (1 ­ b2) logOULCT) 
where b^ (80%) and (1­fø) (20%) are the coefficients on the two variables for Ireland 
respectively. In the Irish case, if the whole 33% of output which is initially non­traded switched 
to traded, then b2 (the coefficient on PWORLD) would rise from 80% to 100%. So each 1% 
switch in the output equation requires the following change, x, to the coefficient on PWORLD in 
the pricing equation: 
χ = 20/33 = 0.606 points. 
Therefore, every percentage point switch from non­traded to traded means we add 0.606 points 
to ¿>2 and obviously subtract 0.606 points from (I­62). So a 6% switch out of the non­traded 
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sector adds 3.6 points to the world price coefficient (bi), increasing it to 83.6% and a drop in (Ι­
οί) to 16.4%. 
6.4.3. Implications for the other peripheral countries 
We have carried out similar analyses for Greece, Spain and Portugal, and the equivalent results 
are listed in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6. Impact of the SEM: non-traded to traded shift (in output equations) 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Greece 
Without FDI increases 
6% 
13% 
9% 
14% 
With FDI increases 
6% 
16% 
18% 
14% 
Note: The figures shown represent the proportions of the manufacturing sector that shift from being non-tradable to being 
tradable. 
Source: Own calculations. 
Thus, before taking the impact of increased FDI inflows into account, the Spanish export/output 
ratio for manufacturing would rise from 25% to 34%. Taking the increased FDI inflows into 
account, though, assuming they would be almost completely export-oriented, will add 14% to 
both the numerator and denominator of the export/output ratio, raising it from 25% to 34%; thus 
we add another 9% for the FDI-flow effect. The total change for Spain is therefore 9+9=18%. 
The initial export/output ratio for Portugal is 33.3%. The increased FDI flows, which raise output 
by 3.8%, raise the export/output ratio to 35.8%, on the assumption that all this increased output 
is exported. This increase of some 2.5 percentage points must be added to the 13.5% calculation 
derived above to yield an overall change of 16%. 
6.5. Concluding comments on SEM methodology 
Many of the effects of trade liberalization are ambiguous a priori. We view what we have done 
in this report as an attempt to put numbers on some of these effects. Our main methodological 
contribution is in the way we have taken likely structural changes into account, through a 
recognition that liberalization will make many heretofore non-tradable goods (and services) 
tradable. Some of these sectors will disappear, while others will prosper. 
Finally, we suggest that the European Economy (1990) special issue, on which we have relied in 
our attempt to quantify these structural changes, may be overly pessimistic about the ability of 
some sectors in peripheral regions to prosper because it fails to recognize the enhanced ability of 
the periphery to attract FDI. This enhanced ability shows up clearly in the cases of Spain and 
Portugal, while there is no evidence that Ireland or Greece has suffered a reduced ability in this 
regard. 
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7. CSF impacts on the cohesion countries: methodology 
Analysis of the impact and effectiveness of CSF-type policies can proceed at various levels. 
The essential difference between different levels of analysis is the extent to which the rest of 
the economy is assumed to remain unchanged while a specific CSF policy initiative is 
investigated. Using terminology somewhat loosely, these three stages could be conveniently 
called micro, mezzo, and macro evaluations. Since our focus in this paper is on the macro 
level of analysis, we only describe the other two levels briefly.5' 
In the most extreme case of an individual project (e.g. a particular stretch of road; a particular 
port extension; a specific local tourism initiative), a conventional cost-benefit analysis could 
be carried out. In cost-benefit analysis the rate of return to the project can be calculated as the 
internal discount rate which equates the discounted flow of benefits arising from the project to 
the costs involved in implementing it. Competing projects can then be ranked in terms of 
increasing internal rate of return. Such analysis, however, is undertaken in isolation from the 
rest of the economy, ignoring any other effects of the CSF, giving rise to difficulties in relation 
to the need to evaluate the impact of spillover effects and externalities in the context of the 
complete CSF. 
Moving up the scale of aggregation, the totality of projects targeted at a general or systemic 
problem (say, long-term unemployment or industrial competitiveness) could be evaluated in 
terms of how successful they are in attaining the overall priority objective. In addition to the 
problems inherent in individual project cost-benefit analysis, extra issues and complications 
arise as a consequence of spillover effects and externalities, which may be difficult to quantify 
in isolation from the rest of the economy. Although such evaluations can be carried out 
informally, it is usually necessary to construct and use formalized sectoral economic models. 
Finally, the effectiveness of the entire CSF can be evaluated as an aggregate. Given the size of 
the funding in relation to the economy, it is important to examine the impact of the CSF in this 
context. In this type of analysis, economy-wide feedbacks and interactions must be allowed for 
and an attempt must be made to account for spillover effects and externalities. Here it is 
almost essential to make use of formal models of the national or regional economy being 
studied.52 
7.1. Economic mechanisms and the CSF 
To cany out the economic analysis of the effects of the Irish CSF 1989-93, an earlier 
methodology was developed and implemented in the large-scale HERMES model, which 
concentrated on the long-term implications of the different measures (Bradley, Fitz Gerald and 
Kearney, 1992). The channels through which the CSF would affect the supply side of the 
economy were identified, and, in some cases, the HERMES model was modified to facilitate 
quantification. 
51 Of course, insights and results available from the micro and mezzo level of analysis often appear as inputs to the macro 
level of analysis. However, they are 'off model", in the sense of being pre-recursive to the model rather than being 
simultaneous. 
A wide range of appropriate types of models exists, including macro-econometric, input-output (I-O), growth, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE), etc. 
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The ESRI study identified three channels through which the CSF investment will effect an 
economy's long-run supply potential: 
(a) through changes in human capital (the skills and education of the labour force); 
(b) through infrastructural investment; 
(c) through direct assistance to the private productive sector of the economy, reducing costs 
or increasing productivity. 
The Irish HERMES model went a considerable distance towards allowing one to quantify the 
effects flowing through the third of these channels, basically through a careful definition of the 
cost of capital. However, considerable uncertainty surrounded the magnitude of the effects 
arising through the first two economic mechanisms, namely human capital and physical 
infrastructure. 
7.1.1. Human capital 
An immediate impact of education and training schemes on the income-expenditure side of a 
model is fairly straightforward. A number of people (perhaps previously unemployed) are 
provided with full-time training, during which they are in receipt of an income supplement. A 
specified number of teachers/instructors also have to be hired and paid the going wage. 
Premises need to be built or rented, material and equipment needs to be purchased, other 
overheads need to be carried. All these aspects are 'inputs', and say little or nothing about the 
benefits of training schemes to individuals, firms or the economy at large. 
Training and education schemes have a number of objectives. Firstly, they are designed to 
increase the skills of the labour force and thereby increase labour and total factor productivity. 
Secondly, they aim to improve the labour market participation of certain disadvantaged 
groups, such as the long-term unemployed and the disabled. Consequently, they will affect the 
supply potential of the economy through a range of different mechanisms. 
To the extent that the additional people being trained or educated are taken out of the active 
labour force, the potential labour force will be reduced temporarily. This, in turn, will tend to 
reduce unemployment and emigration. Because of the Phillips curve effect, the reduction in 
unemployment will increase wage rates, with knock-on effects on unit labour costs. However, 
to the extent that those in training or education come from groups which are not active in 
seeking jobs although remaining in the labour force, such as the long-term unemployed, there 
may be less impact on wage bargaining. 
The second way in which the increase in human capital will impact on the economy is through 
the increased supply of skilled labour. In this regard the first issue that arises is the extent to 
which the change in skill composition of the new labour force entrants affects migration. 
There is likely to be some leakage of skilled labour abroad. However, the Irish evidence 
suggests that in the past emigrants have had fairly diverse educational backgrounds and that 
the incidence of emigration is not concentrated purely on those with good skills (NESC, 
1991). Thus, one expects that the training schemes will have a positive impact on the domestic 
supply of skilled labour, thereby reducing pressures in the labour market arising from skill 
shortages, and tending to reduce the rate of wage inflation below the baseline level. In 
addition, in so far as the schemes are successful in giving the long-term unemployed the skills 
and confidence to participate in the active labour force, they will reduce wage pressures at any 
given level of unemployment. 
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The third and most important effect of human capital on the productive capacity of the 
economy is the increase in efficiency and productivity which will arise from the greater skill 
and education of the labour force. The increase in productivity and efficiency reduces costs to 
existing firms, increasing the quality of output and may lead to new firms setting up to exploit 
this increased efficiency and productivity. This effect can be incorporated into a macro model 
(or rather grafted on) by the assumption of a rate of return to human capital investment that is 
in line with the limited empirical evidence. The assumption of a specific social rate of return 
to investment in human capital is crucial to any model-based quantitative analysis. However, 
the measurement of rates of return is fraught with difficulty. 
7.1.2. Infrastructural investment 
Infrastructural investment takes a number of different forms: increased expenditure on roads 
and ports; increased investment in sanitary services; developments in the telecommunications 
system; provision of advance factories. Generally, these investments will first impact on the 
economy through increased investment, thereby generating increased demand for building 
services. Most neo-Keynesian macromodels can handle these demand effects satisfactorily. 
It is on the supply side that infrastructural investment can be expected to have the biggest 
impact and it is here that the greatest uncertainty arises. Infrastructural investment may have a 
highly non-linear effect on the economy. For example, a telephone system below a required 
standard may simply prevent any industrial investment of a high technology type. Once a 
threshold standard is passed it may then be possible for such high technology investment to 
take place, but any given standard of telecommunications will not guarantee such investment. 
In the case of roads, improvements may have little effect if they merely serve to shift traffic 
jams from one town to another. However, the completion of the final link on a major artery 
could have a very big effect on travel times and, thus, on industrial costs. 
As with the measurement of the supply-side effects of investment in human capital, Bradley, 
Fitz Gerald and Kearney (1992) took an experimental approach to quantifying the effects of 
the infrastructural investment. While their macromodel allowed them to assess the impact on 
the industrial sector of a given percentage change in transport costs, it had no mechanism for 
measuring the potential impact on such costs of any given level of infrastructural investment. 
Indeed, little empirical evidence is available on this latter issue. In order to enter these cost 
savings into their model, the CSF peripherality programme was assumed to reduce transport 
costs by a specific amount, with an equal reduction in the unit costs of industrial production. 
Choice of the actual amount was influenced by the results of a micro-study. Within the model, 
a reduction in the cost of production increases competitiveness, leading to increased output 
and employment on a long-term basis. 
7.1.3. Aid to the private sector 
Aid to the private sector is generally given in the form of a grant or subsidy designed to 
encourage the private sector to undertake certain investments which are believed to be highly 
desirable, or of strategic importance. Such aid can take the form of incentives to expand or 
develop new industries; incentives for investment in forestry; incentives to agricultural 
investment; incentives and subsidies to increase the international marketing effort of firms and 
to encourage the greater use of research and development. 
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A key channel of influence for aid to the private sector is through the user cost of capital, and 
the crucial first step in assessing the impact of this aspect of the CSF is the quantification of 
the link between assistance and investment. Here, the micro-studies carried out for the Irish 
industrial and agricultural sectors helped fill this gap (Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney. 
1992). The effects of a change in the grant provision of the Irish Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA) on industrial investment and output in the long term were quantified within 
the macromodel. The same applied to some of the agricultural investment schemes. However, 
the quantification obtained was seen as imprecise because small changes in the terms or 
eligibility conditions, which might significantly affect behaviour, cannot be identified at a 
macroeconomic level. 
Having quantified the impact of aid on investment behaviour, the macromodel provides a 
good tool for examining the long-term supply-side impact of the resulting increase in the 
productive potential of the economy. Reduced user cost of capital results in more capital 
intensive production techniques. However, if profitability is also increased, production will 
increase, and with it employment. The supply side of the Irish HERMES model, used by 
Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney (1992), determines the production technology (i.e. factor 
proportions used in production) as a function of relative factor prices, i.e. cost of capital, wage 
rates, cost of energy, and cost of other material inputs. Also, output is driven by Irish cost 
competitiveness relative to a range of trading partners. Although the initial impact of the 
increase in investment is to disimprove the balance of payments since investment in machinery 
and equipment has a high component of imported capital goods, once the new capital stock is 
in place and productive, the effects on the balance of payments become positive. 
7.1.4. Other issues related to aggregate and indirect effects of the CSF 
CSF subventions from the European Commission require domestic co-financing, both public 
and private. Hence, the change in the balance of payments and government borrowing 
requirement, which will arise as by-products of the CSF, should not be ignored in any 
evaluation. The increase in growth and employment financed by the CSF will reduce certain 
aspects of government spending and increase tax revenue through buoyancy effects. The 
effects of these indirect changes could, over time, offset a considerable amount of the cost to 
the government of financing part of the CSF expenditure. Depending on how any remaining 
deficits to the balance of payments and the public sector balances are financed, they may 
reduce the benefits to the growth rate in the medium term.53 
7.2. The CSF and externalities: exploring growth mechanisms 
Recent developments in endogenous growth theory have begun to provide a more adequate 
representation of the processes of economic growth by extending beyond the simple 
framework of the neo-classical theory of the firm to look at human capital, public capital and 
technology. The concept of a production externality is central to endogenous growth theory, 
where the essence of an externality is that its costs or benefits are not reflected in market 
prices. For example, Lucas (1988) sees human capital externalities as explaining migration 
flows and the role of cities; Romer (1990) views externalities associated with knowledge as 
53 A similar issue of indirect additional effects arose in the Emersoti-Cecchini study of the Single European Market where 
the benefits of 1992 were recycled as increased public investment (Cecchini. 1988: Emerson et al.. 1988. pp. 215-217). 
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being central to the creation of new technologies; Barro (1990) sees externalities associated 
with public infrastructure as having important effects on productivity. 
Thus, when looking at the possible long-run growth effects of the CSF in the context of a 
specific national economy, it is useful to focus on externalities likely to be associated with 
public policy actions. Since externalities cannot be perceived by agents in their optimization 
behaviour, they can be exploited only through policy interventions. This highlights an 
important lesson for development policy analysts: in the presence of externalities, many of the 
simple policy rules emanating from the orthodox neo-classical growth theory are invalid. 
Policy rules aimed at minimizing static efficiency losses may miss potential gains arising from 
policy links to externalities. Indeed, de Melo and Robinson (1992) go further and assert that: 
If there appear to be externalities to be exploited, policy makers should pursue them aggressively and not 
worry too much about getting the instruments just right. 
In the four peripheral country HERMIN models, we consider three types of externalities which 
could be associated with the CSF expenditures (Bradley, Herce and Modesto, 1995): 
(a) Factor productivity externalities: these refer to increases in productivity arising out of 
investment in human capital and public infrastructure. In some cases, total factor 
productivity is involved. In other cases, factor specific productivity may be relevant 
(e.g. in the case of human capital externalities). 
(b) Industrial composition externalities: these refer to the increasing sophistication of 
manufacturing due to increased foreign multinational investment that accompanies 
improvements in physical infrastructure and human capital. 
(c) Labour market externalities: these increase the efficiency of the labour market by 
enhancing skills, in particular those of the long-term unemployment and school-leavers. 
7.2.1. Factor productivity externalities 
The factor productivity externality is associated with improved supply conditions in the 
economy as a result of the CSF investment in human capital and public infrastructure. These 
were incorporated into HERMIN by endogenizing the CES production function scale 
parameter, 'A', which is now modelled as a function of the stock of public and human capital. 
Increases in the value of 'A' imply that for a given amount ofinputs, a higher level of output 
is produced. 
Consider the production function 
Q=A* f(LJ) 
where A is the scale parameter, which can be considered to represent the state of technology, 
and L and I are the labour and investment inputs, respectively. 
Public infrastructural investment will increase the efficiency of the market services sector by 
cutting down on the costs of producing transport and other communication services, and by 
opening up greater opportunities for domestic competition to take place in the provision of 
non-traded goods. Unit labour costs in the market services sector of the HERMIN model have 
an impact on manufacturing sector price and cost competitiveness, so such cost reductions will 
also have a favourable supply-side effect on the exposed manufacturing sector. 
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The infrastructure factor productivity externality is incorporated into the production process as 
follows: 
A, =A0(KGINF, I KGINFJ 
where An is the original estimated value of the scale parameter and η is an unknown 
externality elasticity that can be assigned different numerical values in the empirical model; 
KGINF is the stock of public infrastructure, computed as an accumulation of infrastructure 
investments (using the perpetual inventory method with a specified depreciation rate). The 
baseline stock of infrastructure, KGINFo, is taken as the stock that would have been there in 
the absence of the CSF increases decided for the period under consideration. 
Similarly, the CSF Social Fund programmes on education and training can be considered to 
promote the efficiency of the workforce in both manufacturing and services sectors and can 
give rise to a human capital externality. Incorporation of externality effects associated with the 
accumulation of human capital is not as straightforward as in the infrastructure case, since 
there is no readily available measure of the stock of human capital equivalent to the stock of 
infrastructure. One has a measure of the extra number of trainees funded by the CSF schemes. 
Hence, as a first approximation, one can use the inputs into training as a measure of the 
unknown outputs, although if the training courses are badly designed and poorly executed, the 
relationship between training and increased human capital will be tenuous. 
We assume that, prior to the implementation of the CSF, the existing number of trained 
members of the labour force, NTRAINo, is known. If the CSF increases are used to fund an 
additional number of trainees, giving a total of NTRAINt trained members of the labour force 
in year t, then the scale parameter in the production function is modified as follows: 
A, =A0(NTRAIN, /NTRAINJ 
where An is the original estimated value of the scale parameter. In the empirical model, this 
externality is incorporated into the treatment of both the manufacturing and service sectors. 
7.2.2. Industrial composition externalities 
This second type of externality is viewed as operating directly through the multinational and 
indigenous firm location and growth process that is so important in the case of the EU 
periphery. The treatment of the manufacturing sector in HERMIN posits a supply-side 
approach in which the share of the world's output being allocated to, or generated within, a 
peripheral country is determined by measures of international competitiveness (Bradley and 
Fitz Gerald, 1988). 
However, this neglects the fact that many industries will require more than simply an 
appropriate level of, say, labour costs before they locate in, or grow spontaneously in, the 
periphery. Without an available labour force that is qualified to work in these industries, or 
without appropriate minimum levels of physical infrastructure, many firms simply may not 
even be able to consider the periphery as a location for production. Thus, a more realistic 
framework may be one which posits a two-stage process in which basic infrastructural and 
labour force quality conditions dictate the number of industries which could conceivably 
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locate in the periphery, while competitiveness decides how many of the industries which can 
locate in the periphery actually do. 
One simple way of describing this process is to link the growth of infrastructure and the 
increases in human capital to the HERMIN measure of world output, O WX, a key determinant 
of long-run domestic industrial output, in the following way: 
owx, = ow, *(KGINF, ι KGINFJ' *(NTRAIN, I NTRAINJ2 
where output in the manufacturing sector (OT) is determined by the modified equation 
log(Or) =....+«, log(OWX).... 
ignoring all other driving (or dependent) variables on the right hand side of the equation. 
Such a modification attempts to capture the notion that the periphery country can now attract a 
greater share of world mobile investment than it otherwise could in the absence of improved 
infrastructure and human capital. Another, demand-side, way of interpreting this externality 
could be to assume that the CSF may improve the quality of goods produced domestically and 
thus improve the demand for goods produced by firms already located in the country, whether 
foreign or indigenous. 
7.2.3. Labour market externalities 
A final externality mechanism which could be introduced into the model concerns the way in 
which the labour market functions. Many of the training programmes financed by the Social 
Fund component of the CSF are aimed at the long-term unemployed and school-leavers 
without qualifications. Empirical and theoretical work on hysteresis theories of the labour 
market has suggested that these social groupings are likely to have little influence on wage 
bargaining (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, pp. 173-213). Thus, one of the possible 
effects of the CSF human capital programmes could be to increase the number of active and 
influential labour market participants. 
One way to model this effect would be to assume that the CSF expenditures increase the effect 
which the better trained long-term unemployed (i.e. the outsiders) have on wage bargaining. 
This would require the wage bargaining mechanism to become more responsive to 
unemployment, both short- and long-term, and can be modelled by increasing the size of the 
Phillips curve coefficient to represent a tightening of the labour market. Thus, the Phillips 
curve parameter in the wage bargaining equation could be adjusted to reflect this. Although 
this would seem to represent a theoretically attractive way of incorporating supply-side 
benefits of the CSF into the model, to do so would raise complex issues that have yet to be 
dealt with in the literature. In this report we do not implement any labour-market externality 
mechanism. 
7.2.4. Externalities: choosing elasticity values 
We have described an analytical approach to incorporating externality mechanisms into a 
macromodel, which augment the usual neo-Keynesian impact mechanisms with further 
supply-side mechanisms. The magnitude of the externality effects are related to the relative 
improvement in a stock (e.g. infrastructure, trained workers, or sectoral capital) and to an 
84 The cases of Greece, Spain. Ireland and Portugal 
elasticity η. In order to operationalize the process within a model one needs to assign 
numerical values to these elasticities.54 
Physical infrastructure 
In the case of physical infrastructure, Aschauer (1989) showed that there was a significant 
relationship between public capital and private sector output, arguing that the fall in US 
productivity growth during the 1970s was precipitated by declining rates of public investment. 
Based on Aschauer's work, there have been many studies that have estimated regressions 
where the dependent variable is output and the independent variables are private capital, 
labour, public capital and a time trend to proxy technical progress (Munnell, 1992 and 1993). 
In such regressions the coefficient on public capital is generally significant, but varies over a 
wide range.55 
Aschauer's early work was based on an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, and 
suggested that the impact of public capital on private sector output and productivity was very 
large, with the implication that an increase of 1% in public capital would give rise to an 
increase of about 0.40% in output. For the USA, given the size of public capital and output, 
this would mean that the marginal productivity of public capital was about 60%, as compared 
with a value of only 30% for private capital. 
Various criticisms were made of this early work, ranging from econometric methodology (a 
need to use co-integration techniques), to a claim that causation ran in the opposite direction, 
i.e. from output to public capital. Furthermore, it was found that as the geographical focus 
narrows (from the whole nation, to states, to metropolitan areas in the USA), the elasticity falls 
because of leakages (i.e. it is impossible to capture all the benefits from an infrastructural 
investment within a small geographical area). 
In a survey of econometric results, Munnell (1993) shows that the elasticity with respect to 
public capital ranges from an upper bound of 0.39 for the entire USA, through 0.20-0.15 for 
individual states, to lower bounds of 0.08-0.03 for individual metropolitan areas. In the 
empirical CSF 1994-99 analysis reported in Chapter 9 below, we examine the case where the 
externality elasticities are zero, and carry out a sensitivity analysis over the range of values 
indicated by the literature. 
Human resources 
There is much less corresponding literature examining the quantitative impact of human 
capital on growth but a vast literature examining the private and social returns to education 
and training, recently surveyed by Weale (1993) and Psacharopoulos (1994). Irish work in this 
area includes Callan (1993). Once again there is a wide range of estimates for the social rate of 
return, from high rates of 25% to lower rates of 5%. The international findings seem to imply 
that there is a law of diminishing returns: the social returns to education fall, by and large, as 
national income and aggregate spending on education rises. 
54 As mentioned before, we do not treat the case of labour market (Phillips curve) externalities. These are examined in 
Bradley. Whelan and Wright (1993). 
55 Draper and Herce (1994) have surveyed the relevant literature: Christodoulakis (1993) has analysed the Greek case and 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) together with Argimon et al. (1993) have treated the Spanish case. 
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Psacharopoulos (1994) found that, even for the richer OECD countries, the social rate of 
return for higher education (the least beneficial case) is over 8%. In the empirical CSF analysis 
reported in Chapter 9, we examine the case of zero human capital elasticities and carry out a 
sensitivity analysis over a likely range of values. 
Aid to the private sector 
While a good case can be made for externalities in the case of physical infrastructure and 
human resources, which, after all, are areas of predominantly public sector activity, only a 
weaker case can be made in the case of investment aid to the private sector. Here, there is 
likely to be crowding out of private sector activity and considerable dead-weight (i.e. state 
aided private investment that would have gone ahead on the basis of purely private sector 
finance in the absence of the state aids). 
In the empirical CSF 1994-99 analysis reported in Chapter 9, we examine the zero elasticity 
case, and only allow for small positive elasticities of at most 2%. 
7.2.5. Conclusions on externalities and growth 
The three types of beneficial externalities described above are likely to enhance the standard 
neo-Keynesian impacts of well designed investment, training and aid policy initiatives. The 
first arises through the increased total or embodied factor productivity likely to be associated 
with improved infrastructure or a higher level of human capital associated with training and 
education. Of course, a side effect of increased factor productivity is that, in the restricted 
context of fixed output, labour is shed. This is particularly serious in economies like Ireland 
and Spain, where the recorded rate of unemployment is very high. 
The second type of externality is likely to be associated with the role of improved 
infrastructure and training in attracting productive activities through foreign direct investment, 
and enhancing the ability of indigenous industries to compete in the international market-
place. We have called this an industrial 'composition' externality, since it is well known that 
the range of products manufactured in developing countries changes during the process of 
development, and becomes more complex and technologically advanced. 
The simulations described in Chapter 9 in our analysis of the combined effects of CSF 1989-
93 and CSF 1994-99 for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, will indicate that the factor 
productivity externality is a two-edged process: industry and market services become more 
productive and competitive, but labour demand is weakened. The role of the industrial 
composition externality is more unambiguously beneficial: the higher it is, the faster the 
period of transitional growth to a higher income plateau. However, since it is attached only to 
the world demand variable in the equation determining industrial output, its power depends on 
the size of the estimated elasticity of world demand on output, i.e. on the openness of the 
economy in question. 
A third type of possible beneficial externality is both the most controversial and, as it turns out 
from experimental simulations, the most beneficial to a country that badly needs to improve 
the operation of its labour market. In Bradley, Whelan and Wright (1993), exploratory 
simulations examined the effects of assuming that better training schemes might improve the 
process of wage bargaining by increasing the force with which unemployment dampens wage 
inflation. There are many interpretations of this effect, the most obvious being the blurring of 
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the distinction between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. Trial simulations showed 
that even quite modest improvements in the efficiency of the labour market can yield very 
strong growth and employment effects, particularly when operating in combination with the 
first two types of externalities (Bradley, Whelan and Wright, 1993, pp. 138-155). However, 
this mechanism is still in the experimental stage and we do not incorporate it in this report. 
7.3. Incorporating the CSF into the HERMIN model 
We have seen that there are three main economic channels through which the CSFs will 
impact on a peripheral economy's long-run supply potential: 
(a) through increased investment designed to improve physical infrastructure; 
(b) through increases in human capital (the skills and education of the labour force), brought 
about by investment in human resources; 
(c) through direct assistance to the private sector to stimulate investment, thus increasing 
factor productivity and reducing sectoral costs of production. 
7.3.1. Phy sical infrastructure 
The HERMIN model assumes that any CSF-based expenditure, IGVCSFEC, on physical 
infrastructure that is directly financed by EU aid subvention is matched by a domestically 
financed expenditure of IGVCSFDP and a domestic privately financed component of 
IGVCSFPR. Hence, the total public and private CSF infrastructural expenditure is defined in 
the model as follows: 
IGVCSF = IGVCSFEC + IGVCSFDP + IGVCSFPR 
Inside the HERMIN model, these CSF-related expenditures are converted to real terms and 
added to existing (non-CSF) real infrastructural investment, determining total investment in 
infrastructure, IGINF. Using the perpetual inventory approach, these investments are 
accumulated into a notional 'stock' of infrastructure, KGINF: 
KGINF = IGINF + (1-0.05) * KGINF(-l) 
where a 5% rate of depreciation is assumed for all countries. This accumulated stock is 
divided by the (exogenous) baseline non-CSF stock (KGINFn) to give the CSF-related relative 
improvement in the stock of infrastructure: 
KGINFR = KGINF / KGINFn 
It is this ratio that enters into the calculation of any externalities associated with improved 
infrastructure, as described above. 
As regards the public finance implications of the CSF, the total cost of the increased public 
expenditure on infrastructure (IGVCSF - IGVCSFPR) is added to the domestic public sector 
capital expenditure (GK). Of course, any increase in the domestic public sector borrowing 
requirement (GBOR) is reduced by the extent of EU CSF aid subventions (IGVCSFEC). 
Whether or not the post-CSF domestic borrowing requirement rises or falls relative to the no-
CSF baseline will depend both on the magnitude of domestic co-financing and the stimulus 
imparted to the economy by the CSF shock. This differs from programme to programme. 
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In the absence of any externality mechanisms, the standard HERMIN model can only 
effectively calculate the Keynesian (mainly demand) effects of the CSF infrastructure 
programmes, the supply effects being only included to the very limited extent that they are 
captured by induced shifts in relative prices. 
The HERMIN model introduces various externality effects to augment the demand-side 
impacts of the CSF infrastructure programmes in order to capture likely supply-side benefits. 
In each case, the strength of the externality effect is defined as a fraction of the improvement 
of the stock of infrastructure over and above the baseline (no-CSF) projected level, i.e. 
Externality effect = KGINFRn 
where η is the externality elasticity. The way in which the externality elasticity can be 
approximately calibrated numerically, drawing on the empirical growth theory research 
literature, was discussed above. In all the computations reported below, the externality effects 
are phased in linearly over a five-year period, reflecting the implementation stages of the CSF 
programmes and the fact that benefits from improved infrastructure are only slowly exploited 
by the private sector in terms of increased activity. 
Externality effects associated with improved infrastructure are introduced into the following 
areas of the HERMIN model: 
(a) the influence of world activity on domestic manufacturing is enhanced, i.e. any given 
change in the level of world activity will give rise to a greater change in domestic 
manufacturing activity to the extent that the level of physical infrastructure is improved; 
(b) total factor productivity in the manufacturing and service sectors is increased. 
The first type of externality is an unqualified benefit to the peripheral economy, and directly 
enhances its performance in responding to a given level of world demand. However, the 
second type could have a negative down-side, in that labour is shed as total factor productivity 
improves, unless output can be increased to offset this loss. Inevitably production will become 
less labour intensive in a way that may differ from the experience of more developed 
economies in the EU core.56 
7.3.2. Human resources 
The HERMIN model assumes that any expenditure, GTRSFEC, on human resources directly 
financed by CSF aid subvention is matched by a domestically public financed expenditure of 
GTRSFDP, with perhaps some private finance, GTRSFPR. Hence, the total expenditure on 
human resources is defined in the model as follows: 
GTRSF = GTRSFEC + GTRSFDP + GTRSFPR 
As regards the domestic public finance implications, the total cost of the increased expenditure 
on human resources (GTRSFEC+GTRSFDP) is added to public expenditure on income 
56 Barry et al. (1994) explore the different core-periphery labour market experiences and their policy implications in the 
context of the recent Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. 
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transfers (GTR). However, the increase in the domestic public sector borrowing requirement 
(GBOR) is reduced by the extent of CSF aid subventions (GTRSFEC). 
Since the full institutional detail of the CSF human resource training and education 
programmes cannot be handled in a small macroeconomic model like HERMIN, we use the 
following method of approximation. Each trainee or participant in a training course is assumed 
to be paid an average annual income of WTRAIN, taken to be either a mark-up (TMUP) over 
the average rate of unemployment benefit or a mark-down on the average industrial wage. 
Each instructor is assumed to be paid the average annual wage appropriate to the market 
service sector (WN). We assume an overhead of 30% on total wage costs to take account of 
buildings, equipment, materials, etc. (OVERHD), and a trainee-instructor ratio of 15:1 
(TRATIO). Hence, total CSF expenditure (GTRSF) can be written as follows: 
GTRSF = (1+OVERHD) * (SFTRAIN*WTRAIN + LINS*WN) 
where SFTRAIN is the number of trainees being supported and LINS is the number of 
instructors, defined as SFTRAIN/TRATIO. This formula is actually inverted in the HERMIN 
model and used to estimate the approximate number of extra trainees that can be funded by the 
CSF for a given total expenditure GTRSF on human resources, i.e. 
SFTRAIN = (GTRSF/( 1+OVERHD)) / (WTRAIN + WN/TRATIO) 
The wage bill of the CSF programme (SFWAG) is as follows: 
SFWAG = SFTRAIN*WTRAIN + LINS*WN 
The CSF-funded trainees are accumulated in a perpetual inventory-like formula, with a 
'depreciation' rate of 5%: 
KSFTRAIN = SFTRAIN + (1-0.05) * KSFTRAIN(-l) 
Existing survey information indicates that about 78% of the Spanish labour force has at least 
first and second level education, and about 70% of the Irish labour force. In the case of 
Portugal, it appears that the corresponding figure is lower and nearer 40%, and the same figure 
is applied to Greece. This information is used to calculate a projected baseline, no-CSF, stock 
of trained labour force, as follows: 
KTRAINo = FRACTED * (LT+LN+LA) 
where FRACTED is the pre-CSF fraction of the labour force that is 'trained'. The accumulated 
stock of CSF trainees (KSFTRAIN) is added to the exogenous baseline stock of trained 
workers (KTRAINo) and is divided by the baseline stock to give the relative improvement in 
the proportion of trained workers associated with the CSF human resources programmes: 
KTRNR = (KTRAINo+KSFTRAIN) / KTRAINo 
It is this ratio (KTRNR) that enters into the calculation of externalities associated with 
improved human resources. 
In the absence of any externality mechanisms, the HERMIN model can only calculate the 
income-demand effects of the CSF human resource programmes. We have commented above 
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that these effects can be limited in magnitude. In addition, a sizeable fraction of the CSF 
payments to trainees will simply replace existing unemployment transfers. The Overhead' 
element of these programmes (equal to OVERHD* SFWAG) is assumed to boost non-wage 
public consumption directly. 
The HERMIN model introduces externality effects to augment the demand-side impacts of the 
CSF human resource programmes. In each case, the strength of the externality effect is defined 
as a fraction of the improvement of the stock of 'trained' workers over and above the baseline 
(non-CSF) projected level, i.e. 
Externality effect = KTRNR η 
where η is the externality elasticity. See above for an examination of how the externality 
elasticities can be quantified. 
Two types of eternality effects are introduced into the following areas of the model: 
(a) the influence of world activity on domestic manufacturing is enhanced, i.e. any given 
change in the level of world activity will give rise to a greater change in domestic 
manufacturing activity to the extent that a greater fraction of the labour force is trained; 
(b) labour embodied technical change in the manufacturing and service sectors is increased, 
where a given output can now be produced by less workers or where any increased level 
of sectoral output can become more skill intensive but less employment intensive. 
A final change made to the HERMIN model to handle the CSF human resources programmes 
relates to the impact on the rate of unemployment of moving people out of the labour force 
and into temporary training schemes. As mentioned above, it is well known that untrained 
and/or unskilled workers compete in the labour market in a very ineffective way, and are much 
more likely to end up as long-term unemployed than are skilled/trained workers (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman, 1991). For simplicity it is assumed in subsequent analysis of the CSF 
human resources investment impacts that all trainees are in the unskilled or semi-skilled 
category, and that their temporary removal from the labour force for the duration of their 
training scheme has almost no effect on wage bargaining behaviour through the Phillips curve 
'pressure' effect in the HERMIN wage equation. This assumption is consistent with the 
stylized facts of the hysteresis in Irish and Portuguese labour markets (Bradley, Whelan and 
Wright, 1993; Modesto and das Neves, 1993). It is implemented in the HERMIN model by 
defining a 'corrected' measure (URP) of the unemployment rate (UR) for use in the Phillips 
curve. 
7.3.3. Production/investment aid to the private sector 
Publicly financed expenditures in this category are targeted at three sectors: manufacturing, 
market services (in particular tourism) and agriculture. Unlike the categories of infrastructure 
and human resources, these aids are expected to induce very sizeable private sector co-
financing responses. 
In the HERMIN model, we assume that any public expenditure directly financed by EU aid 
subvention is matched by a domestically co-financed element of public expenditure. Hence, 
the total direct public expenditure in each of the three targeted sectors is defined in the model 
as follows: 
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TRIT = TRITEC + TRITDP + TRITPR 
TRIN = TRINEC + TRINDP + TRINPR 
TRIA = TRIAEC + TRIADP + TRIAPR 
where TRITEC, TRINEC and TRIAEC are the EU-financed elements in the traded, non-traded 
and agriculture sectors, and where the domestic public sector co-financing elements carry the 
designation 'DP'. The private domestic components carry the designation 'PR'. 
The real value of total CSF-related sectoral investment aid (i.e. the above totals deflated by the 
appropriate sectoral investment price) is added to the other - non-CSF - sectoral investments, 
determined behaviourally in the HERMIN factor demand equations. Sector specific capital 
stocks are generated within the model using the perpetual inventory formula. For the 
manufacturing and service sectors, these are as follows: 
KT = IT + (1-0.08) *KT(-1) 
KN = IN + (1-0.05) *KN(-1) 
where an 8% rate of depreciation is assumed in the traded sector and a 5% rate in the 
non-traded.57 These accumulated sectoral stocks are divided by the exogenous baseline 
no-CSF stocks (KT0 and KN0, respectively) to give the relative improvement in the 
sector-specific capital stock: 
KTR = KT / KTo 
KNR = KN / KN0 
In the HERMIN model, these ratios for the manufacturing and service sectors enter into the 
calculation of externalities associated with improved sectoral capital stock. 
As regards the domestic public finance implications of the CSF, the total public cost of the 
increased expenditure on sectoral productive/investment aids (i.e. the 'EC' and 'DP' 
components in the above equations) is added to public capital expenditure (GK). However, the 
increase in the domestic public sector borrowing requirement (GBOR) is reduced by the extent 
of EU aid transfers (TRITEC+TRINEC+TRIAEC). 
In the absence of any externality mechanisms, the HERMIN model calculates the Keynesian 
demand effects of the CSF sectoral investment aid, the supply effects being only included to 
the limited extent that they are captured by induced shifts in unit labour costs and relative 
prices. 
As regards externalities associated with the sectoral investment programmes, for the 
manufacturing (T) sector, the strength of the externality effect is defined as a fraction of the 
improvement of the stock of infrastructure over and above the baseline (non-CSF) projected 
level, i.e. 
Externality effect = KTR η 
In the case of Spain, depreciation rates of 10% are assumed for both manufacturing and market services. 
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where η is the externality elasticity. The influence of world activity is enhanced through this 
externality in exactly the same fashion as for infrastructure and human resources. In the case 
of the market service sector, no externality mechanism is assumed to operate and sectoral 
investment is simply augmented by the full amount of the CSF programme, public and private. 
The same approach is used in agriculture, where much of the aid programme is concerned with 
environmental improvements and quasi-income transfers. 
7.3.4. Terminating the CSF after 1999 
The HERMIN simulations of the CSF reported in Chapter 9 below are designed to handle both 
the Delors-I package (1989-93) and the follow-on Delors-II package (1994-99). In fact we 
phase both CSFs together into one continuous package that covers the full 10-year period, 
1989-99. 
The question arises as to how we should handle the terminal conditions after the year 1999. In 
the absence of information to the contrary, we are obliged to implement stylized terminal 
conditions along the following lines: 
(a) continue the CSF programmes unchanged at their 1999 levels for the year 2000 and 
thereafter; 
(b) wind down the CSF after 1999; 
(c) eliminate the CSF entirely immediately after 1999. 
In the wind-down and elimination scenarios, it would be open to us to modify the EU 
subvention element alone, or both the EU and domestic elements together. Clearly, the 
different choices are likely to have very different impacts on the economy. 
For simplicity, we only consider two options in the simulations presented in Chapter 9. The 
first case freezes all three elements of the CSF expenditures in nominal terms at their 1999 
values (i.e. the EC subvention, the domestic public co-financing, and the domestic private co-
financing). The alternative case eliminates all elements of the CSF expenditures immediately 
after the year 1999, i.e. all CSF-related EU subventions cease, and both domestic co-financing 
elements also cease. These two polar alternatives should serve to bracket the likely way in 
which the CSF will be gradually wound down for the existing periphery, paving the way for a 
transfer of structural aid to new Central and Eastern European members. 
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8. The impact of the single market: simulation results 
In this chapter we present a sequence of simulations designed to capture the effects of the 
impact of the single market. The simulations are carried out along the lines described in 
Chapter 6 above, i.e. as a sequence of shocks that explores the impacts of the different 
elements that make up the complete single market policy initiative. Section 8.1 reviews the 
nature of the sequence of shocks and describes the standardized method we use for presenting 
the simulation results. 
To give an overview of the total impact of the single market, Section 8.2 presents the results of 
a simulation that incorporates all seven shocks. Section 8.3 focuses on a particularly 
interesting subset of the full set of shocks, namely the subset that most closely resembles those 
analysed in the Cecchini study for the core countries (Emerson, 1988). 
Since these first two packages of shocks incorporate a complex series of different individual 
shocks, it is difficult to rationalize the pattern of economic responses for the different models 
without examining the impacts of each of the seven individual shocks in isolation. These 
individual shock results are presented in Section 8.4. 
8.1. The impact of the single market: introduction 
The effects of the single market are handled by means of the following sequence of seven 
shocks, illustrated in a flow chart in Figure 6.2. 
(a) The first shock is to total factor productivity. This consists of a baseline 5% increase of 
the kind posited by Cecchini (Emerson, 1988, pp. 259-61; Catinai and Italianer, 1988), 
with extra increments associated with the projected increased FDI inflows that are likely 
to occur in Portugal and Spain. Details of the exact magnitude of the shocks for each of 
the four countries have been presented in Chapter 6, Table 6.5. They are implemented in 
the model by altering the scale parameter, 'A', in the CES production function for the 
manufacturing sector. There are two cases for this shock: the first ignores the 
productivity consequences of shifts in FDI flows for all four countries and the second 
includes the impact of changed FDI inflows on manufacturing productivity for Portugal 
and Spain, thus attributing them to an SEM effect. 
(b) The second shock involves a reduction of 6.4% in all external prices and costs. This 
comes from the original Cecchini study (Emerson, 1988, p. 264). Given the specification 
of the wage and price equations in all four models (where homogeneity is imposed), the 
real effects of this shock are quite modest for each model, and domestic wages, prices 
and costs all simply adjust to the changed world price environment. 
(c) The third shock implements a modest cut of 0.15% in public-sector employment for 
each country, reflecting primarily the abolition of border controls and consequential 
reductions in employment in the customs and excise branches of public administration.58 
In fact, this is a very minor shock and has negligible impact relative to the other shocks. 
(d) The fourth shock represents the effects of structural change on the manufacturing sector 
as production shifts from the non-traded to the traded goods categories, and was 
58 The public employment shock is expressed as a percentage of total public employment, and is calibrated from the actual 
Irish changes. 
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described in detail in Sections 6.3.3 and 6.4 above. This shock is implemented through 
exogenous shifts to the behavioural coefficients in the model equations that determine 
manufacturing output and the price of output. 
(e) The fifth shock implements an exogenous change in manufacturing sector output, 
capturing static gains or losses as trade liberalization proceeds. This was described in 
Chapter 6, Table 6.5. There are two variations of this shock. In the first, we ignore the 
role of increased FDI inflows on the static gains to trade liberalization. In the second, we 
take into account the effects of the projected increased FDI inflows for Portugal and 
Spain, thus attributing them to SEM effects. 
(f) The sixth shock involves a modest exogenous cut of 1% in market services output and 
employment, designed to represent the rationalization of distribution channels and 
financial services in the periphery (see Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 1992, pp. 28-
38). There is great uncertainty about the magnitude of this shock, so we are obliged to 
carry out a sensitivity analysis in order to explore its consequences. 
(g) Finally, the seventh shock implements an increase in 'world' manufacturing output, 
superimposed on the structurally changed model (derived in shock (iv) above). We 
assign a value of 8% to this world output shock, which is consistent with the GDP effect 
within the range specified by Cecchini.59 Basically, it represents the improvement in the 
EU and world economies that have been quantified by Cecchini as arising directly from 
the EU-wide benefits of the single market. In the context of our analysis, these EU-wide 
benefits are held to be pre-recursive to the periphery, i.e. the feedback effects from the 
periphery to the core are held to be negligible compared with the influence of the core on 
the periphery. 
We now describe the individual effects of these seven shocks, as well as the total effect, for all 
four models. We also examine an intermediate case that is designed to capture the same kind 
of package of shocks as was analysed in the Cecchini Report for the core EU members. This 
intermediate case is a subset of the total package of seven shocks outlined above and, as we 
will see, it gives a rather incomplete picture of the SEM impacts on the cohesion countries. 
We use a standardized format of table that shows the impacts on three groupings of model 
variables:60 
(a) The first grouping shows the impacts on sectoral output (manufacturing (OT), market 
services (ON) and total GDP at factor cost (GDPFC)). These are shown as percentage 
deviations from the no-SEM baseline projection for the period 1987 to 2010 inclusive. 
The year 1987 is the base year, and the single market shocks are phased in over a 10-
year period to 1997, after which the exogenous shock is frozen at its full 1997 value.61 
(b) The second grouping shows the impacts on prices and wages (the deflator of GDP in 
manufacturing (POT), average annual earnings in manufacturing (WT), and the deflator 
The SEM impacts on GDP estimated by Emerson, 1988 (p. 264), and Cecchini. 1988 (pp. 99-102). are consistent with a 
slightly higher impact on manufacturing. 
A full set of simulation results is available on request. 
We have imposed a common stylized phasing in pattern on all four countries, i.e. a constant incremental process over 
10 years from 1988. In future work, we will seek better proxies, such as the actual implementation of the SEM 
directives in each country. 
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(c) The third grouping shows the impacts on four measures of economic imbalance (the rate 
of unemployment (UR), the PSBR (GBORR) and the balance of trade (BPTR), 
measured as percentages of GDP or GNP, and the public debt/GDP ratio (RDEBT), also 
measured as a percentage of GDP). For this third set of variables, the results are shown 
as simple deviations from the baseline. 
8.2. Overall effects of the SEM 
In this section, we report the overall effects of the SEM resulting from the combination of all 
the shocks discussed above. We characterize the SEM in terms of the totality of the above 
sequence of seven shocks. Thus, all the simulations are combined into one, noting, however, 
that the final shock (vii) already encompasses the structural change shock (iv). These are 
summarized in Table 8.1(a) for the case that excludes any FDI effect, and in Table 8.1(b) for 
the case where an additional FDI-related effect is incorporated for Portugal and Spain. 
Turning first to Table 8.1(a), the case that excludes the FDI effects, it is perhaps not 
surprising, given the massive negative output shock with which we hit the Greek and Spanish 
economies (a net loss of manufacturing output of 14 and 7%, respectively, as shown in 
Chapter 6, Table 6.2), that Greece and Spain emerge furthest down the table in terms of GDP 
effects. In both cases, the reduction in GDP by 1995 is just over 1%, but this turns positive 
before 2010, the end of the simulation period. The effects on Ireland and Portugal are positive, 
rising from a boost of 5% in GDP by 1995 to just over 9% by 2010 (in the case of Ireland), 
and 2% rising to 7.5% (in the case of Portugal). 
Turning to the disaggregated impacts on manufacturing and market services output, we see 
that big losses in manufacturing output are experienced by Greece and Spain, and large gains 
enjoyed by Ireland and Portugal. Both Greece and Spain experience deteriorations in their 
PSBR positions and, as a consequence, their debt/GDP ratios rise by 12 and 18 percentage 
points, respectively, relative to the baseline.62 However, this only facilitates a modest rise in 
income transfers and market services output, resulting in net losses, or zero gains, in GDP. 
The net trade surplus moves in tandem with the PSBR, i.e. deteriorating in the cases of Greece 
and Spain, but improving in the cases of Ireland and Portugal. 
Not surprisingly, Greece and Spain experience rises in their rates of unemployment of about 2 
and 1 percentage points, respectively. In Ireland, the rate of unemployment falls initially by just 
under 1 percentage point, and in the long run, by just over 1.5 percentage points. The situation 
in Portugal is more dramatic, the initial fall also being just under 1 percentage point, but this 
becomes a fall of just over 5 percentage points in the long term. The difference in behaviour as 
between Ireland and Portugal can be explained by the openness of the Irish labour market and 
the fact that any economic improvement relative to the baseline will induce net inward 
migration flows, which will serve to increase the labour force, thus largely offsetting the decline 
in unemployment. 
62 A number of the shocks reported have budgetary implications. To the extent that large government budget surpluses or 
deficits accumulate, this essentially entails combining an implicit fiscal policy shock with the other explicit shocks we 
wish to focus upon. We could correct for this by imposing a 'policy feedback rule' which attempts to stabilize the debt-
to-GDP ratio. 
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Table 8.1(a). Total SEM shock (no change in FDI) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
-1.30 
-7.70 
0.55 
-6.98 
-6.40 
-5.66 
2000 
-0.88 
-7.65 
1.28 
-8.67 
-7.47 
-7.14 
2010 
0.13 
-5.65 
2.23 
-8.88 
-5.68 
-6.48 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
2.00 
0.57 
-0.29 
8.47 
2.04 
0.76 
-0.38 
11.61 
1.60 
0.74 
-0.24 
12.28 
Ireland 
1995 
4.95 
11.14 
2.40 
-4.70 
1.08 
-2.82 
2000 
7.24 
15.14 
3.62 
-5.86 
1.15 
-3.71 
2010 
9.24 
17.11 
4.75 
-5.87 
0.37 
-4.39 
-1.43 
-0.88 
0.91 
-5.51 
-1.55 
-1.45 
1.30 
-11.06 
-1.23 
-2.09 
1.61 
-21.62 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
2.23 
5.70 
1.83 
-3.54 
-0.59 
-2.92 
2000 
4.29 
10.43 
3.67 
-2.45 
5.00 
-0.93 
2010 
7.54 
16.77 
6.91 
0.96 
18.01 
4.67 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.95 
-0.18 
0.38 
-0.43 
-2.34 
-0.28 
0.70 
-1.97 
-5.03 
-0.16 
0.66 
-0.55 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
Spain 
1995 
-1.01 
-3.23 
-0.37 
-7.57 
-5.92 
-5.80 
2000 
-0.74 
-3.11 
0.09 
-8.93 
-6.75 
-7.10 
2010 
0.06 
-1.63 
0.87 
-8.60 
-6.24 
-6.70 
1.04 
0.79 
-0.34 
7.08 
1.07 
1.13 
-0.42 
12.48 
0.72 
1.07 
-0.10 
17.92 
The impact of the SEM on price determination in the manufacturing sector (POT) is dominated 
initially by the imposed cuts in world prices and costs (shock (ii)). In all cases except Portugal, 
these price reductions endure into the long run. The case of Portugal is complicated because it 
experiences a significant increase in the level of wages (WT) that does not occur in any of the 
other country models. This effect operates mainly through the Phillips curve and, unlike Ireland, 
the permanent fall in the unemployment rate continues to exert upward pressure on wages into 
the long term. Both Greece and Ireland have somewhat similar Phillips curve semi-elasticities 
(see Chapter 5). However, the rise in Greek unemployment serves to depress wage levels 
relative to the baseline, and the upward pressure on wage levels in Ireland is diluted rapidly 
because of inward migration and the consequential high elasticity of labour supply. 
Turning next to Table 8.1(b), here we attribute the increased FDI flows apparent in the data for 
Portugal and Spain to the SEM. Given the dramatic increase in inflows into Spain (documented 
in Chapter 6, Table 6.4), the overall SEM effect is substantially improved. Thus, in the long run 
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the impact on Spanish GDP rises from 0.1% to 9.2%, while the impact on Portugal rises more 
modestly from 7.5% to 11.5%. 
Table 8.1(b). Total SEM shock (increased FDI inflows in Portugal and Spain) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
-1.30 
-7.70 
0.55 
-6.98 
-6.40 
-5.66 
2000 
-0.88 
-7.65 
1.28 
-8.67 
-7.47 
-7.14 
2010 
0.13 
-5.65 
2.23 
-8.88 
-5.68 
-6.48 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
2.00 
0.57 
-0.29 
8.47 
2.04 
0.76 
-0.38 
11.61 
1.60 
0.74 
-0.24 
12.28 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
3.81 
10.49 
2.63 
-2.36 
3.70 
-0.90 
2000 
6.90 
17.64 
5.29 
-0.43 
13.15 
2.64 
2010 
11.47 
26.26 
9.96 
4.12 
32.93 
10.63 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-1.88 
-0.30 
0.82 
-2.06 
-3.97 
-0.42 
1.18 
-4.08 
-7.73 
-0.23 
0.86 
-1.55 
Ireland 
1995 
4.95 
11.14 
2.40 
-4.70 
1.08 
-2.82 
2000 
7.24 
15.14 
3.62 
-5.86 
1.15 
-3.71 
2010 
9.24 
17.11 
4.75 
-5.87 
0.37 
-4.39 
-1.43 
-0.88 
0.91 
-5.51 
-1.55 
-1.45 
1.30 
-11.06 
-1.23 
-2.09 
1.61 
-21.62 
Spain 
1995 
4.75 
12.71 
2.95 
-7.96 
-2.25 
-4.03 
2000 
7.13 
18.18 
4.59 
-8.99 
-1.59 
-4.22 
2010 
9.16 
22.01 
6.07 
-8.33 
-0.31 
-3.44 
-1.17 
-0.77 
1.04 
-2.93 
-1.98 
-1.61 
1.48 
-10.07 
-3.00 
-2.77 
1.87 
-28.15 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of pri vate consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
8.3. The 'Cecchini' single market shock 
In the results reported above, we have included a number of channels over and above those 
taken into account in the original Cecchini analysis of Emerson et al, 1988. In this section we 
compare our overall results (reported above) to those that would have emerged had we focused 
exclusively on the channels identified by Cecchini. The numerical simulation results are 
presented in Table 8.2. These channels are a subset of shocks (i) to (vii), and are as follows: 
(a) the ex ante flat rate increase in manufacturing productivity of 5% (shock (i) with no FDI 
effects); 
(b) the world price and cost reductions (shock (ii)); 
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(c) the modest reduction in public sector employment (shock (iii)); 
(d) the reduction in output of market services (shock (vi)); 
(e) the increase in world manufacturing output in the context of an unchanged model 
structure (i.e. shock (vii) with unchanged output and price elasticities). 
From Table 8.2, we see that the impact on GDP is quite similar for each country, with Ireland 
leading slightly and Spain lagging slightly behind. Spain does relatively poorly because as the 
least open economy it benefits least from the SEM-generated expansion of world 
manufacturing. Ireland gains most, as we will show below, because of the competitiveness 
effect of the reduction in unit labour costs generated by the productivity increase in shock (i). 
Table 8.2. Original 'Cecchini' effects for the periphery 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
1.70 
1.87 
2.75 
-3.67 
4.04 
-1.13 
2000 
2.48 
2.38 
3.97 
-4.10 
6.86 
-0.42 
2010 
3.04 
2.44 
4.65 
-3.59 
8.74 
0.47 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.45 
0.26 
-0.29 
-0.78 
-0.77 
0.23 
-0.33 
-1.59 
-1.12 
0.28 
-0.33 
-0.14 
%dif GDPFC 
or 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
1.80 
4.33 
1.67 
-5.55 
-2.33 
-4.06 
2000 
2.55 
5.60 
2.59 
-6.47 
-1.75 
-4.50 
2010 
2.96 
5.72 
3.40 
-5.90 
-0.16 
-3.73 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.60 
-0.13 
0.09 
0.09 
-0.96 
-0.21 
0.18 
-0.83 
-1.31 
-0.27 
0.23 
-2.16 
Ireland 
1995 
1.87 
3.84 
1.23 
-5.23 
-1.74 
-3.80 
2000 
2.64 
4.89 
1.89 
-6.48 
-2.11 
-4.76 
2010 
3.21 
5.06 
2.58 
-6.49 
-2.18 
-4.88 
-0.30 
-0.28 
0.42 
0.34 
-0.37 
-0.47 
0.51 
-1.58 
-0.35 
-0.72 
0.52 
-6.18 
Spain 
1995 
1.02 
2.32 
0.82 
-7.26 
-5.07 
-5.27 
2000 
1.55 
3.05 
1.41 
-8.92 
-6.15 
-6.79 
2010 
1.87 
3.II 
1.89 
-8.83 
-5.98 
-6.68 
0.01 
0.09 
0.16 
2.74 
-0.10 
0.17 
0.12 
4.28 
-0.24 
0.04 
0.30 
4.30 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
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As we will discuss later in our concluding Chapter 10, none of these GDP effects are as large 
as those predicted by the Cecchini Report for the core countries (i.e. all fall below the average 
impact of 4.5% in Emerson, 1988, Table B.5, p. 264).61 Thus, in the absence of the additional 
channels which we have identified in Chapter 6, all the cohesion countries would have 
appeared to lose out relative to the core countries. The truth is likely to be more complex, as 
comparison of Tables 8.1 and 8.2 indicates. 
8.4. Decomposing the single market shocks 
8.4.1. Total factor productivity (shock (i)) 
The ex ante total factor productivity shock in manufacturing implemented for each country 
involves two different cases. The first, shown in Table 8.3(a), involves a baseline increase of 
5% where no FDI effect is present (Greece and Ireland) or where the factor productivity 
implications of the FDI effect are ignored, i.e. not attributed to the SEM (Portugal and Spain). 
The second, shown in Table 8.3(b), involves a productivity shock for Portugal (6.9%) and 
Spain (12.0%) that is higher than the baseline shock, but involves only the baseline 5% shock 
for Greece and Ireland. In this second case, the effect of increased FDI inflows into the Iberian 
Peninsula are taken into account and attributed to the single market. 
Some of the main qualitative effects of the productivity shock are likely to be as follows. For 
fixed manufacturing output, a rise in productivity will cause labour to be shed and 
unemployment to rise. But higher labour productivity will be associated with lower unit labour 
costs, increased international cost competitiveness, higher output and a rise in labour demand. 
To a limited extent, these two effects serve to offset each other. 
Productivity shocks will also affect output pricing and wage bargaining. The more open the 
economy, the higher will be the extent of price taking, with a corresponding lower element of 
mark-up pricing. Thus, the Spanish model has a relatively high weight of 0.6 on unit labour 
costs, capturing the less open nature of the economy. At the other extreme, the Irish model has 
a weight of only 0.2 on unit labour costs, consistent with the very open nature of Irish 
manufacturing. 
Higher productivity is also passed through to higher wage rates to some extent in all four 
models. At one extreme, all productivity is passed through to wages in Greece; about three 
quarters is passed through in Ireland; two thirds in Spain and only one third in Portugal. 
Consequently, we would expect the wage inflationary effects to be highest in Greece and 
lowest in Portugal, ceteris paribus. Of course, the Phillips curve parameter will heavily 
influence the actual outturn. We saw in Chapter 5 that Spain had a very low semi-elasticity of 
wages with respect to the unemployment rate, while all the other models had higher values.64 
It should be noted that the Bradley et al. 1992 study of the impact of the single market on Ireland produced a result that 
was in line with the Cecchini estimates for the core countries. However, the characterization of the manufacturing 
sector in the version of the HERMES model used to carry out the simulations was one of total tradability. which served 
to exaggerate the impact of world growth. 
Note that the Irish labour market is the only one modelled as being open, with a very elastic labour supply because of 
international migration flows. 
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We turn first to Table 8.3(a), the case of an ex ante flat 5% rise in total factor productivity in 
manufacturing. There are modest rises in real GDP in all cases, the strongest effect being in 
Ireland (about 0.5% in the long term), with lowest effects in Spain (about 0.25 in the long 
term). In all cases, the unemployment rate rises over the long term as labour is shed. In the 
Irish case, the unemployment rate converges to its baseline value as migration flows restore 
the baseline equilibrium situation. Manufacturing output increases in all models, the rise being 
smallest in the case of Greece (0.5% in the long term) and highest in the case of Portugal 
(1.5% in the long term). 
Turning to wage and price effects, the shock results in significant wage and price deflation in 
Portugal (with reductions of between 2 and 3% in the long term). There are many reasons for 
this behaviour. First, the econometric results indicated that very little of the productivity 
increase feeds through to wages in Portugal. Second, wage bargaining in Portugal is 
characterized by a large Phillips curve effect, and has no migration mechanisms to dilute this 
effect over time (in contrast to the Irish case). Third, the weight attached to mark-up pricing in 
manufacturing is in the intermediate range of 0.4, above Ireland and Greece but below Spain. 
The situation in Portugal contrasts strongly with the wage inflationary impact on Greece, 
where all productivity rises feed through to wages, but where prices are somewhat more 
anchored to world prices. Ireland and Spain are intermediate cases, where the almost complete 
absence of any Spanish Phillips curve effect influences the outturn.65 
The consequences for movements in real unit labour costs (i.e. nominal unit labour costs 
deflated by the price of manufacturing output) differ between the four models. The results are 
summarized in Table 8.3(c). The largest reduction is for Portugal, where increased 
productivity reduces unit labour costs directly, since it does not feed through to wage 
demands. In Greece, the effect is essentially zero since all the increased productivity feeds 
through to wage demands, and Ireland and Spain are intermediate cases. 
Turning now to Table 8.3(b), we see the effects of attributing the higher FDI inflows for 
Portugal and Spain to the SEM effect. The impact on real GDP increases by about one third in 
Portugal and more than doubles in Spain, relative to the flat 5% productivity shock. Basically 
this is due to the larger FDI inflow in Spain relative to Portugal. Note, however, that there is a 
deterioration in the public finances in Spain, with a rise in the debt/GDP ratio of over 8%. 
This comes about because the wage deflationary impacts on Portugal serve to reduce the 
public sector wage bill, which is a huge element in total public expenditure. No such wage 
deflation occurs in Spain, for reasons explained above. 
65 Labour market closure can be forced by increasing the Phillips curve parameter in the wage bargaining equation. 
Although such behaviour seems inconsistent with past data, it might very well be consistent with the future policy 
imperatives of Spain's adjustment to the SEM. 
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Table 8.3(a). Labour productivity shock in manufacturing (no change in FDI) 
%dif GDPFC 
ΟΙ­
ΟΝ 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
0.22 
0.27 
0.34 
0.18 
4.71 
2.05 
2000 
0.33 
0.42 
0.48 
0.23 
5.92 
2.70 
2010 
0.35 
0.53 
0.44 
0.06 
5.30 
2.43 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
0.61 
0.17 
-0.05 
-1.66 
0.77 
0.19 
-0.06 
-1.39 
0.89 
0.27 
-0.06 
1.34 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
0.29 
1.27 
-0.11 
-2.31 
-2.12 
-1.32 
2000 
0.34 
1.58 
-0.22 
-3.02 
-3.02 
-1.84 
2010 
0.30 
1.51 
-0.36 
-3.21 
-3.56 
-2.13 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
0.60 
-0.05 
0.17 
0.27 
0.80 
-0.10 
0.28 
-0.11 
0.93 
-0.16 
0.36 
-1.26 
Ireland 
1995 
0.33 
0.73 
0.16 
-0.35 
1.96 
0.71 
2000 
0.43 
0.87 
0.24 
-0.45 
2.69 
1.02 
2010 
0.48 
0.79 
0.33 
-0.37 
3.12 
1.21 
0.33 
0.22 
0.08 
-0.17 
0.29 
0.26 
0.10 
0.68 
0.15 
0.28 
0.05 
2.41 
Spain 
1995 
0.17 
0.80 
0.01 
-2.53 
-0.43 
-0.78 
2000 
0.27 
1.01 
0.04 
-3.16 
-0.55 
-1.03 
2010 
0.27 
1.01 
0.02 
-3.20 
-0.61 
-1.10 
0.41 
0.16 
0.08 
1.02 
0.52 
0.22 
0.09 
2.01 
0.57 
0.27 
0.09 
3.65 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
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Table 8.3(b). Labour productivity shock in manufacturing 
(increased FDI inflows in Portugal and Spain) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
0.22 
0.27 
0.34 
0.18 
4.71 
2.05 
2000 
0.33 
0.42 
0.48 
0.23 
5.92 
2.70 
2010 
0.35 
0.53 
0.44 
0.06 
5.30 
2.43 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
0.61 
0.17 
-0.05 
-1.66 
0.77 
0.19 
-0.06 
-1.39 
0.89 
0.27 
-0.06 
1.34 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
0.39 
1.73 
-0.15 
-3.11 
-2.83 
-1.78 
2000 
0.47 
2.14 
-0.29 
-4.05 
-4.04 
-2.47 
2010 
0.41 
2.05 
-0.48 
-4.31 
-4.74 
-2.84 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
0.81 
-0.07 
0.22 
0.36 
1.08 
-0.14 
0.38 
-0.15 
1.25 
-0.21 
0.49 
-1.70 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
Table 8.3(c). Labour productivity shock in manufacturing (percentage change 
in real unit labour costs from baseline) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
1995 
0.42 
-1.57 
-3.70 
-1.77 
Shock i(a 
2000 
0.53 
-1.78 
-4.82 
-2.22 
) (no FDI) 
2010 
0.13 
-1.46 
-5.14 
-2.24 
1995 
0.42 
-1.57 
-4.96 
-3.98 
Shock i(b) 
2000 
0.53 
-1.78 
-6.45 
-4.96 
(with FDI) 
2010 
0.13 
-1.46 
-6.86 
-5.02 
8.4.2. External price and public-sector employment (shocks (ii) and (iii)) 
Given that all the models are largely homogeneous with respect to transmission of price 
effects, it comes as no surprise that the price shock has relatively minor real effects, as Table 
8.4 reveals. There are, of course, real effects, which, in the case of Portugal, give rise to an 
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increase in GDP of almost 0.5% in the long run. However, this arises mainly due to 
differences in the way price indexation of policy instruments is handled in the public sector. 
For example, current public expenditure is indexed mainly to wage inflation, but capital 
expenditure is fixed in nominal terms. Most elements of tax revenue are indexed to prices, 
usually consumer prices. In the cases of Greece and Spain, these effects result in a long-term 
build-up of public debt of between 7 and 8 percentage points of GDP. 
The effects of the very small cut in public-sector employment are also relatively insignificant 
and are not shown in a separate table. 
Table 8.4. Reductions in 'world' prices and costs (Cecchini) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
0.24 
0.05 
0.46 
-4.90 
-4.30 
-4.68 
2000 
0.25 
0.07 
0.45 
-6.16 
-5.60 
-6.02 
2010 
0.17 
0.05 
0.28 
-6.23 
-5.83 
-6.13 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.16 
0.25 
-0.27 
4.56 
-0.17 
0.37 
-0.32 
6.72 
-0.12 
0.41 
-0.22 
7.96 
%dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
0.49 
0.55 
0.82 
-4.62 
-3.68 
-4.50 
2000 
0.60 
0.70 
1.01 
-5.68 
-4.41 
-5.51 
2010 
0.48 
0.57 
0.81 
-5.78 
-4.71 
-5.63 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.39 
0.03 
-0.37 
1.25 
-0.49 
0.01 
-0.45 
1.22 
-0.42 
-0.01 
-0.36 
0.67 
Ireland 
1995 
0.06 
0.00 
0.14 
-5.13 
-5.05 
-5.02 
2000 
0.07 
0.01 
0.15 
-6.38 
-6.30 
-6.35 
2010 
0.05 
0.02 
0.10 
-6.39 
-6.38 
-6.38 
-0.04 
-0.17 
0.08 
3.82 
-0.04 
-0.17 
0.02 
3.18 
-0.01 
-0.21 
-0.01 
0.34 
Spain 
1995 
0.28 
0.18 
0.40 
-5.03 
-4.96 
-4.71 
2000 
0.45 
0.32 
0.64 
-6.24 
-6.13 
-6.18 
2010 
0.33 
0.24 
0.46 
-6.28 
-6.19 
-6.23 
-0.15 
0.10 
-0.06 
2.71 
-0.22 
0.30 
-0.20 
4.87 
-0.17 
0.39 
-0.15 
7.38 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
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8.4.3. Structural change (shock (iv)) 
In these shocks changes are made to parameters in the output and pricing equations of the 
manufacturing sector, but no other changes are made to exogenous variables relative to the 
benchmark. In Chapter 6 we explained the methodological rationale for this shock, and in 
Table 6.6 we gave the data needed to calculate the values of the shifts to the parameters. Thus, 
in the case where FDI effects are ignored, there will be shifts of varying magnitude in the four 
countries. In Greece, about 14% of manufacturing is likely to shift from non-tradable to 
tradable. Portugal is similar at 13%, with Spain at 9%. Ireland, being the most open and 
having experienced a much earlier transition to free trade, is likely to have a shift of only 6% 
from non-tradable to tradable. In the cases of Portugal and Spain, the magnitude of these shifts 
increase, to 16 and 18% respectively, when the likely increases in FDI inflows are attributed to 
the SEM effect (see Table 6.6). 
Having made the necessary changes to the behavioural coefficients in the manufacturing 
output and price equations (see Section 6.4 for details), Tables 8.5(a) and (b) give the 
simulation results for the no-FDI and with-FDI cases. 
In all cases there are positive impacts on real GDP. These are greatest for Portugal, where even 
in the no-FDI case (Table 8.5(a)), real GDP rises by almost 5.5% in the long term. However, 
this is accompanied by upward pressure on wage and price levels. In the long term, nominal 
wage levels increase by almost a quarter relative to benchmark levels, and real wage levels 
increase by some 12%, mainly due to a falling rate of unemployment (down by over 4.5 
percentage points in the long term) in conjunction with a relatively strong Phillips curve effect 
in the wage bargaining equation. 
Although the shock which is administered to the Greek model is of the same size as that 
applied to Portugal, its effects are much smaller. This is because the Greek economy is less 
influenced by world growth than is the Portuguese economy to begin with, and so the 
equiproportionate increase in the elasticity with respect to world output implies an absolute 
increase of smaller magnitude.66 
The effects of including the projected increase in FDI inflows for Portugal and Spain are to 
increase further the already large boost to the Portuguese economy and to double the positive, 
but more modest, boost to the Spanish economy (Table 8.5(a)). 
66 Thus, the elasticity of manufactured output (OT) with respect to world output (OW) is 0.25 for Greece and 0.37 for 
Portugal. The absolute shifts in these elasticities are 0.105 for Greece and 0.145 for Portugal. 
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Table 8.5(a). Shift to greater proportion of tradables in manufacturing 
(no change in FDI) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
0.39 
1.27 
0.28 
-0.33 
1.28 
0.47 
2000 
0.98 
3.18 
0.67 
-0.22 
3.54 
1.39 
2010 
1.68 
5.02 
1.27 
0.02 
7.69 
3.29 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.33 
-0.01 
-0.06 
-0.95 
-0.86 
-0.03 
-0.11 
-2.58 
-1.65 
-0.04 
-0.27 
-4.36 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
1.09 
3.26 
0.57 
2.85 
4.22 
2.36 
2000 
2.57 
6.98 
1.66 
5.32 
10.34 
5.34 
2010 
5.48 
13.16 
4.26 
8.70 
22.94 
10.82 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.89 
-0.10 
0.43 
-1.36 
-2.10 
-0.12 
0.63 
-2.09 
-4.61 
0.07 
0.44 
0.75 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
8.4.4. Tradable sector output (shock (v)) 
This shock is implemented in the models as an exogenous change to manufacturing output, 
and is designed to capture the static gains or losses to trade liberalization. The actual 
magnitudes of the exogenous changes involved were shown in Table 6.5. We see that the 
impact on Greece, Portugal and Spain are negative when the increased FDI inflows are 
ignored. However, it becomes positive for Portugal and Spain when the benefits of FDI effects 
are taken into account.67 Thus, in the case of Spain, an ex ante fall of 7% in manufacturing 
output is transformed into an ex ante rise of 7% if FDI inflows are taken into account. 
Barry (1996) shows that the adverse effects highlighted in the Krugman-Venables analysis have shown up in Ireland for 
indigenous industry, but these effects have been dominated by the increased inflows of foreign direct investment. A 
similar process seems to be operating in the present case in the Iberian Peninsula, but not in Greece. 
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Table 8.5(b). Shift to greater proportion of tradables in manufacturing 
(increased FDI inflows in Portugal and Spain) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
0.39 
1.27 
0.28 
-0.33 
1.28 
0.47 
2000 
0.98 
3.18 
0.67 
-0.22 
3.54 
1.39 
2010 
1.68 
5.02 
1.27 
0.02 
7.69 
3.29 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.33 
-0.01 
-0.06 
-0.95 
-0.86 
-0.03 
-0.11 
-2.58 
-1.65 
-0.04 
-0.27 
-4.36 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
1.34 
4.02 
0.70 
3.44 
5.19 
2.89 
2000 
3.18 
8.62 
2.07 
6.35 
12.84 
6.55 
2010 
6.83 
16.34 
5.38 
10.36 
29.09 
13.43 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-1.10 
-0.11 
0.52 
-1.65 
-2.60 
-0.14 
0.74 
-2.50 
-5.75 
0.10 
0.45 
1.12 
Ireland 
1995 
0.28 
0.65 
0.11 
0.13 
0.35 
0.15 
2000 
0.64 
1.41 
0.26 
0.23 
0.69 
0.28 
2010 
1.32 
2.60 
0.51 
0.40 
1.05 
0.38 
-0.12 
-0.05 
0.05 
-0.55 
-0.22 
-0.14 
0.11 
-1.30 
-0.30 
-0.31 
0.25 
-3.08 
Spain 
1995 
0.71 
1.92 
0.42 
-0.13 
0.07 
-0.06 
2000 
1.53 
4.03 
0.93 
0.33 
0.77 
0.45 
2010 
2.86 
7.24 
1.72 
0.93 
1.80 
1.19 
-0.37 
-0.18 
0.14 
-0.81 
-0.80 
-0.51 
0.32 
-3.49 
-1.56 
-1.17 
0.57 
-11.65 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
The simulation results are shown in Table 8.6(a) for the no-FDI case, and in Table 8.6(b) for 
the case where FDI effects are included for Portugal and Spain. The results are rather 
straightforward in the light of the magnitude of the shocks imposed that were shown in Table 
6.5. In the no-FDI case (Table 8.6(a)), Greece fares worst, followed by Spain and Portugal, 
while Ireland improves. Taking the Portuguese and Spanish FDI inflows into account, Spain 
improves considerably while Portugal experiences a more moderate improvement. 
Other things being equal, these effects have fiscal consequences. Thus, the impact on the 
debt/GDP ratio in each case is inversely related to the impact on the real economy. 
Consequently, the Greek fiscal position deteriorates while the Irish one improves. 
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Table 8.6(a). Shock to manufacturing output (no change in FDI) 
%dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
-3.45 
-11.14 
-2.45 
-3.52 
-11.50 
-5.12 
2000 
-4.33 
-13.55 
-3.21 
-5.19 
-16.60 
-7.98 
2010 
-4.46 
-13.33 
-3.38 
-6.09 
-19.21 
-9.52 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
2.90 
0.33 
0.07 
10.71 
3.79 
0.58 
0.06 
16.67 
4.40 
0.52 
0.37 
17.81 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
-0.86 
-2.53 
-0.49 
-1.19 
-3.05 
-1.56 
2000 
-1.20 
-3.25 
-0.79 
-1.73 
-4.43 
-2.24 
2010 
-1.41 
-3.42 
-1.08 
-2.05 
-5.28 
-2.64 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
0.71 
0.07 
-0.23 
1.15 
0.98 
0.07 
-0.24 
1.44 
1.19 
0.07 
-0.13 
1.33 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
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Table 8.6(b). Shock to manufacturing output (increased FDI inflows in Portugal and 
Spain) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
-3.45 
-11.14 
-2.45 
-3.52 
-11.50 
-5.12 
2000 
-4.33 
-13.55 
-3.21 
-5.19 
-16.60 
-7.98 
2010 
-4.46 
-13.33 
-3.38 
-6.09 
-19.21 
-9.52 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
2.90 
0.33 
0.07 
10.71 
3.79 
0.58 
0.06 
16.67 
4.40 
0.52 
0.37 
17.81 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
0.21 
0.60 
0.12 
0.28 
0.74 
0.37 
2000 
0.29 
0.78 
0.19 
0.42 
1.09 
0.54 
2010 
0.34 
0.82 
0.27 
0.50 
1.32 
0.65 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.17 
-0.02 
0.05 
-0.27 
-0.24 
-0.01 
0.06 
-0.33 
-0.29 
-0.02 
0.03 
-0.30 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of pri vate consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
Ireland 
1995 
2.61 
6.19 
1.00 
0.49 
2.50 
0.91 
2000 
3.60 
8.02 
1.33 
0.51 
2.58 
0.88 
2010 
4.21 
8.44 
1.47 
0.30 
1.51 
0.20 
-0.97 
-0.53 
0.43 
-5.16 
-0.91 
-0.82 
0.67 
-7.96 
-0.55 
-1.04 
0.84 
-12.20 
Spain 
1995 
2.59 
6.99 
1.56 
1.02 
1.77 
1.16 
2000 
3.34 
8.85 
1.99 
1.33 
2.31 
1.64 
2010 
3.50 
8.93 
2.07 
1.45 
2.52 
1.76 
-1.34 
-0.83 
0.59 
-5.14 
-1.75 
-1.35 
0.78 
-11.12 
-1.90 
-1.79 
0.75 
-22.01 
8.4.5. Non-tradable sector output (shock (vi)) 
This shock also exerts a multiplier effect, so that non-traded sector output falls by more than 
the initial exogenous 1% negative shock (Table 8.7). 
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Table 8.7. Exogenous shock to output of market services 
Legend 
GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
-0.47 
-0.01 
-0.95 
-0.35 
-1.33 
-0.57 
2000 
-0.56 
-0.01 
-1.10 
-0.53 
-1.80 
-0.82 
2010 
-0.48 
-0.01 
-0.86 
-0.47 
-1.58 
-0.73 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
0.32 
0.05 
0.00 
1.25 
0.38 
0.08 
-0.01 
1.81 
0.33 
0.08 
0.01 
1.70 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
-0.41 
-0.06 
-0.96 
-0.57 
-1.52 
-0.79 
2000 
-0.52 
-0.12 
-1.20 
-0.76 
-2.01 
-1.03 
2010 
-0.48 
-0.17 
-1.12 
-0.75 
-1.99 
-1.01 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
0.34 
0.04 
-0.11 
0.59 
0.43 
0.04 
-0.10 
0.72 
0.43 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.80 
Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
GDP in manufacturing (real) 
GDP in market services (real) 
Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
Deflator of private consumption 
Unemployment rate 
Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
National debt (% of GDP) 
Ireland 
1995 
-0.34 
0.06 
-0.84 
-0.11 
-0.53 
-0.26 
2000 
-0.40 
0.02 
-0.96 
-0.09 
-0.45 
-0.24 
2010 
-0.35 
-0.06 
-0.78 
-0.02 
-0.12 
-0.08 
0.21 
0.11 
-0.03 
1.14 
0.16 
0.16 
-0.04 
1.59 
0.04 
0.16 
-0.03 
2.07 
Spain 
1995 
-0.66 
-0.20 
-1.06 
-0.23 
-0.40 
-0.31 
2000 
-0.78 
-0.24 
-1.25 
-0.28 
-0.48 
-0.40 
2010 
-0.68 
-0.21 
-1.10 
-0.26 
-0.45 
-0.37 
0.31 
0.23 
-0.23 
1.44 
0.37 
0.36 
-0.27 
3.00 
0.34 
0.44 
-0.23 
5.57 
8.4.6. World output combined with structural change (shock (vii)) 
In this shock we include a Cecchini-inspired world output shock of 8% combined with all the 
structural changes to the manufacturing sector output and price equations that were examined 
in the simulation of shock (iv) above. To understand the outcome of this shock, we need to 
apply the insights obtained in Chapter 5 from the effects of altering world output in isolation 
(Table 5.7), and combine them with the known impacts of the structural changes in isolation 
(shown in shock (iv) above). The results of this combination of shocks are shown in Tables 
8.8(a) and (b). 
110 The cases of Greece. Spain. Ireland and Portugal 
Table 8.8(a). Influence of higher world growth on manufacturing through 
greater share of tradables (no change in FDI) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
2.23 
3.11 
3.28 
1.02 
7.04 
2.86 
2000 
3.61 
5.44 
4.96 
1.92 
13.48 
5.78 
2010 
4.86 
7.12 
6.26 
2.78 
21.06 
9.19 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-1.67 
-0.18 
-0.09 
-5.72 
-2.78 
-0.35 
-0.14 
-10.58 
-4.06 
-0.39 
-0.43 
-13.72 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
2.85 
6.60 
2.73 
4.90 
10.78 
5.53 
2000 
5.35 
11.83 
5.30 
8.65 
22.19 
10.74 
2010 
9.19 
18.79 
9.60 
13.46 
41.57 
18.74 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-2.34 
-0.20 
0.80 
-3.33 
-4.39 
-0.22 
0.94 
-4.35 
-7.79 
0.03 
0.42 
-0.17 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
Ireland 
1995 
2.21 
3.89 
1.93 
0.48 
2.46 
1.00 
2000 
3.35 
5.73 
2.79 
0.60 
2.96 
1.20 
2010 
4.56 
7.30 
3.52 
0.63 
2.53 
0.84 
-0.97 
-0.50 
0.32 
-4.90 
-1.06 
-0.86 
0.53 
-8.19 
-0.86 
-1.26 
0.77 
-13.98 
Spain 
1995 
1.62 
2.73 
1.67 
0.31 
0.76 
0.48 
2000 
2.55 
4.37 
2.55 
0.73 
1.44 
1.02 
2010 
3.56 
6.09 
3.48 
1.23 
2.28 
1.64 
-0.81 
-0.50 
0.43 
-2.86 
-1.29 
-0.98 
0.67 
-7.44 
-1.88 
-1.66 
0.87 
-18.25 
Thus, the direct strength of the 8% rise in world output, considered in isolation, will depend 
on two factors. First, the size of the elasticity of domestic manufacturing output on world 
output. Here, Ireland has the highest elasticity (at 0.51), Spain the lowest at 0.18, and Greece 
and Portugal are at intermediate values. Second, the strength of the direct effect of world 
output on market services, where Greece and Portugal have the highest elasticities (in the 
region of 0.2), and Ireland the lowest.68 
It should be noted that in using the multiplier results from Chapter 5 to deconstruct shock (vi), there is an additional 
component that is included in the simulations reported in Tables 8.7(a) and 8.7(b), i.e. the fact that the elasticity of OT 
with respect to OW will change as a result of shock (iv). 
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Table 8.8(b). Influence of higher world growth on manufacturing through greater share 
of tradables (increased FDI inflows in Portugal and Spain) 
Legend 
GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
% dif GDPFC 
ΟΙ­
ΟΝ 
POI 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
2.23 
3.11 
3.28 
1.02 
7.04 
2.86 
2000 
3.61 
5.44 
4.96 
1.92 
13.48 
5.78 
2010 
4.86 
7.12 
6.26 
2.78 
21.06 
9.19 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-1.67 
-0.18 
-0.09 
-5.72 
-2.78 
-0.35 
-0.14 
-10.58 
-4.06 
-0.39 
-0.43 
-13.72 
%dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
3.18 
7.54 
2.92 
5.47 
12.02 
6.15 
2000 
6.12 
13.82 
5.85 
9.67 
25.53 
12.21 
2010 
10.80 
22.42 
11.04 
15.20 
49.92 
21.99 
Dif UR 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-2.60 
-0.22 
0.89 
-3.64 
-5.01 
-0.23 
1.03 
-4.73 
-9.15 
0.08 
0.38 
0.43 
Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
GDP in manufacturing (real) 
GDP in market services (real) 
Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
Deflator of private consumption 
Unemployment rate 
Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
National debt (% of GDP) 
Ireland 
1995 
2.21 
3.89 
1.93 
0.48 
2.46 
1.00 
2000 
3.35 
5.73 
2.79 
0.60 
2.96 
1.20 
2010 
4.56 
7.30 
3.52 
0.63 
2.53 
0.84 
-0.97 
-0.50 
0.32 
-4.90 
-1.06 
-0.86 
0.53 
-8.19 
-0.86 
-1.26 
0.77 
-13.98 
Spain 
1995 
2.06 
3.93 
1.93 
0.19 
0.76 
0.42 
2000 
3.46 
6.80 
3.10 
0.74 
1.72 
1.15 
2010 
5.18 
10.20 
4.44 
1.45 
2.99 
2.05 
-1.03 
-0.61 
0.52 
-3.34 
-1.76 
-1.27 
0.85 
-9.35 
-2.75 
-2.27 
1.16 
-24.25 
In the case of Portugal, the already strong positive GDP effect of shock (iv) (i.e. 5.5%) rises to 
9.2% in the long run for shock (vii). Hence, the 8% increase in world output has added an 
extra 3.7% increase to GDP. The multiplier in Table 5.7 would suggest that an 8% rise in OW 
would lead to a 2.7% increase in OT. The difference of 1% (i.e. between 3.7 and 2.7) is 
accounted for by the increase in the elasticity coefficient that results from shock (iv). 
In the case of Ireland, the weak but positive GDP effect of shock (iv) (i.e. 1.3%) rises to 4.6% 
in the long run for shock (vii). Hence, the 8% increase in world output has added an extra 
3.3% increase to GDP, which is just 0.1% above what we would have expected on the basis of 
the multiplier in Table 5.7. Since the change in the elasticities is very small for Ireland, the 
effects are almost additive. 
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8.5. Summary on the single market simulations 
In this chapter we have presented a simulation analysis of the impacts of the single market in 
isolation from the role of the Community Support Framework. We started with the full effects 
as studied in Chapter 6, and then showed the effects of a subset of the full set of shocks, 
designed to reproduce the more limited channels of influence studied in the original Cecchini 
project. We concluded with a set of simulations that gave the effects of each of the individual 
components of the full single market shock, but in isolation from each other. 
In our concluding Chapter 10 we will return to a wider evaluation of the above simulations, 
taken together with the likely impacts of the CSF (to be examined in isolation in the next 
chapter). However, a few key conclusions should be briefly noted here. 
First, if our analysis of Chapter 6 is correct, and if we have correctly identified channels of 
influence that were not taken into account in the Cecchini analysis of the core countries, then 
the 'Cecchini' subset of our full set of seven shocks will present a misleading picture of the 
likely impact of the single market on the cohesion countries. 
Second, the issue of whether or not the projected increase in FDI inflows is counted as a single 
market effect, is crucial for the cases of Portugal and Spain. In the case of Spain, if FDI effects 
are not included, the overall impact of the single market on GDP is effectively zero. If they are 
included, then the overall impact suggests a rise of over 9% in the long run. 
Third, we suggest that there is little evidence for a structural shift in FDI inflows in the case of 
Greece. If this is, indeed, the case, then the Greek economy seems set to lose out as a result of 
the single market, even though the previous 'Cecchini' methodology would indicate otherwise. 
Fourth, the manner in which wage bargaining and price setting is handled in the four 
HERMIN models is crucial to the transmission of the individual single market shocks. This 
was illustrated in Table 8.3(a) for the transmission of the shock to total factor productivity, 
which was price deflationary for Portugal and inflationary for Greece. 
Finally, two of the seven shocks proved to be of major importance in terms of their impacts on 
GDP, namely the shift to a greater proportion of tradables in manufacturing and the knock-on 
effect on the cohesion countries of the higher level of manufacturing activity in the rest of the 
EU. 
lhe impact of the CSF: simulation results 113 
9. The impact of the CSF: simulation results 
9.1. Introduction 
We have implemented the CSF methodology described in Chapter 7 for all four models. CSF 
expenditure data was taken from the official EU Community Support Framework documents 
(European Commission, 1990a, 1990b, 1989, 1990c, for CSF 1989-93, and European 
Commission, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c and 1994d, for CSF 1994-99). All expenditures in ECU 
were converted to national currencies using the following exchange rates: 
CSF 1989-93 
Greece: 178.841 Drachmas per ECU 
Ireland: 0.7769 Irish pounds per ECU 
Portugal: 173.388 Escudos per ECU 
Spain: 130.357 Pesetas per ECU 
CSF 1994-99 
Greece: 288.034 Drachmas per ECU 
Ireland: 0.7935 Irish pounds per ECU 
Portugal: 196.905 Escudos per ECU 
Spain: 158.903 Pesetas per ECU 
The Delors I and II packages were negotiated between the Commission and the national 
authorities and implemented separately as two distinct CSFs, even though they form a logical 
10-year continuous programme of EU-assisted investment planning in the periphery. In our 
simulations, we combine both CSFs into one policy shock that starts in the year 1989 and 
continues to 1999, the terminal year of the Delors II CSF. 
Since the externality effects described earlier in Chapter 7 are not yet well defined or 
quantifiable, we restrict ourselves initially to the more straightforward standard (or neo-
Keynesian) impacts (i.e. we set the externality elasticities to zero). This means that any build-
up of stocks of infrastructure or of stocks of trained labour do not have additional impacts over 
and above the standard neo-Keynesian ones reported in the first set of simulations. 
Having examined the standard (or neo-Keynesian) impacts of the CSF, we then introduce 
positive values for the externalities that are associated with increases in the stocks of physical 
infrastructure and human capital. Since we are quite ignorant of the exact values to be 
assigned to these elasticities, we examine the impact of low values and high values and 
compare these to the case of zero values. 
Finally, we explore the case where the CSFs are terminated after the year 1999. It would have 
been open to us to simulate a wide range of termination paths, ranging from the case of 
permanent finance (i.e. no termination) to the abrupt and complete termination of all CSF-
related activities after the year 1999. For simplicity, we only present results for this latter case, 
since any intermediate case would be a weighted average of the permanent and the abrupt 
termination cases. 
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As in the case of reporting the single market simulations, we again use a standardized format 
of table that shows the impacts on three groupings of model variables:69 
(a) The first grouping shows the impacts on sectoral output (manufacturing (OT), market 
services (ON) and total GDP at factor cost (GDPFC)). These are shown as percentage 
deviations from the no-CSF baseline projection for the period 1988 to 2010 inclusive. 
The year 1988 is the base year, and the CSF shocks are implemented over a 10-year 
period to 1999. 
(b) The second grouping shows the impacts on prices and wages (the deflator of GDP in 
manufacturing (POT), average annual earnings in manufacturing (WT), and the deflator 
of private consumption expenditures (PC)). These are also shown as percentage 
deviations from the no-SEM baseline. 
(c) The third grouping shows the impacts on four measures of economic imbalance (the rate 
of unemployment (UR), the PSBR (GBORR) and the balance of trade (BPTR), 
measured as percentages of GDP or GNP, and the public debt/GDP ratio (RDEBT), also 
measured as a percentage of GDP). For this third set of variables, the results are shown 
as simple deviations from the baseline. 
In order to give an impression of the size of the CSF relative to GDP, Table 9.1 shows the 
values generated from the model simulations. In this table, the measure of the size of the CSF 
includes all elements of the CSF, i.e. EU financial aid, domestic public co-finance and private 
domestic co-finance. The measure of GDP is the ex post value, i.e. it includes the impact of 
the CSF. In the case of Ireland GNP is used. 
We present the results of five different simulations, designed to explore the role of 
externalities and the consequences of termination of the CSFs after the year 1999. These 
simulations are as follows: 
(a) In this case we assume that the CSF funding, from the EU, the domestic public co-
finance and the private finance, is frozen at its 1999 value and continues indefinitely. 
We term this 'infinite EU finance'. In addition, we assume that the externality 
elasticities are zero. Thus, only the standard neo-Keynesian mechanisms operate. We 
refer to this as 'permanent CSF finance with no externalities'. 
(b) This case is identical to case (a) with the exception that the externality elasticities take 
on positive, but small, values. Thus, the externality elasticities associated with public 
infrastructure and human capital that operate directly on manufacturing output, are set at 
5%, and all other elasticities are set at 2%. We refer to this as 'permanent CSF finance 
with low externalities'. 
(c) This case is identical to case (b) with the exception that the externality elasticities take 
on larger values. Thus, the externality elasticities associated with public infrastructure 
and human capital that operate directly on manufacturing output, are set at 10%, and all 
other elasticities are set at 4%. We refer to this as 'permanent CSF finance with high 
externalities'. 
A full set of simulation results is available from the Consultant on request. 
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(d) This is identical to case (c), but all the CSF expenditures are terminated after the year 
1999. We refer to this as 'temporary CSF finance with high externalities'. 
(e) This case is identical to case (d) above, but all the CSF expenditures are terminated after 
the year 1999 and with the externality elasticities now set once again to zero. We refer to 
this as 'temporary CSF finance with no externalities'. 
Table 9.1. CSF as a percentage of ex post GDP1 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
Greece 
4.74 
4.12 
4.24 
4.38 
4.52 
7.21 
7.15 
8.27 
8.21 
8.45 
8.76 
8.49 
8.26 
8.02 
7.75 
7.47 
7.19 
6.94 
6.71 
6.49 
6.27 
6.05 
Ireland 
5.56 
4.80 
4.97 
5.30 
5.73 
3.44 
3.99 
4.05 
4.21 
4.45 
4.63 
4.41 
4.21 
4.01 
3.83 
3.65 
3.47 
3.31 
3.15 
2.99 
2.85 
2.70 
Portugal 
6.24 
6.53 
6.71 
7.19 
7.83 
7.04 
7.33 
7.07 
7.06 
7.45 
7.59 
7.25 
6.98 
6.71 
6.46 
6.21 
5.96 
5.71 
5.47 
5.23 
5.00 
4.77 
Spain 
0.84 
0.88 
0.95 
1.02 
1.10 
1.92 
1.99 
2.07 
2.16 
2.25 
2.34 
2.26 
2.18 
2.10 
2.03 
1.95 
1.88 
1.81 
1.74 
1.68 
1.61 
1.55 
These projections differ from the Officiai' ones supplied by the Commission, since the HERMIN model-generated 
projections for GDP are different to the implicit ones used in the Commission's calculations. 
9.2. The CSF simulations: description 
We have implemented the CSF shocks in the HERMIN national models along the lines 
described in Chapter 7. Thus, the total CSF expenditures are considered under three headings: 
(a) expenditures on physical infrastructure; 
(b) expenditure on human resources; 
(c) production/investment aid to the private sector. 
Within each of these three economic categories we consider three sources of funding: 
(a) EU transfers in the form of subventions to the domestic public authorities; 
(b) domestic public sector co-financing as set out in the CSF treaties; 
(c) domestic private sector co-financing as set out in the CSF treaties. 
A full understanding of how the CSF shocks influence the economies would require a detailed 
disaggregation of the individual components of the CSF along the above lines. Details of these 
individual shocks are available from the Consultant on request. However, we restrict ourselves 
here to a presentation of the aggregate impacts of the CSF and examine the influence of 
different assumptions on the values of externality elasticities and on the termination 
conditions. 
116 The cases of Greece, Spain. Ireland and Portugal 
9.3. The CSF simulations: results 
9.3.1. Permanent CSF finance with no externalities 
We show the standard set of results for this case in Table 9.2. Here there is a sharp distinction 
between the relatively strong effects on Greece and Portugal and the weaker effects on Ireland 
and Spain. The impact on Portuguese GDP is strongest, for two reasons: first, since the CSF 
funds represent a high proportion of GDP (see Table 9.1 above), and second, since the 
Portuguese public investment multiplier is quite strong (see Table 5.9 in Chapter 5). 
Even though CSF funds represent a larger proportion of GDP for Greece, the lower public 
investment multiplier there ensures that the overall GDP effects are weaker. Spanish CSF 
funds as a proportion of GDP are the lowest of all four countries, but the fact that its public 
investment multiplier is larger than Ireland's results in the overall GDP effects also being 
somewhat larger than is the case for Ireland. 
A somewhat worrying feature of this simulation is that the CSF programme is seen to give rise 
to fiscal imbalances in all four economies, for several reasons. The co-financing requirements 
tend to be proportional to the size of the EU injection of finance, and this bears most heavily 
on Greece and Portugal. This is exacerbated by the inflationary impact on wages and 
consequently on the public-sector wage bill in Greece and Portugal. 
The unemployment effects for Portugal and Greece are also very large, and in fact 
unrealistically so. They arise because of the high employment impact of the CSF, whether 
through direct employment creation in building and construction (a sub-sector of market 
services), or indirectly through the funding of training schemes that have the effect of reducing 
the ranks of the unemployed. In each table, we also show a corrected measure of the 
unemployment rate, URP, which can be interpreted as the effect on unemployment when the 
trainees are assumed to be new entrants to the labour force, rather than being drawn from the 
ranks of the existing unemployed. This measure of the unemployment rate was designed for 
use in the Phillips curve, since the effect of training schemes is arguably to increase the 
effective pool of labour (and so bid down wages), rather than to reduce the effective pool and 
bid up wages. 
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Table 9.2. Delors I and II combined (permanent CSF finance with no externalities) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
6.16 
2.75 
11.52 
6.35 
23.28 
9.72 
2000 
8.00 
3.28 
14.46 
9.39 
35.67 
16.03 
2010 
5.74 
2.35 
9.54 
7.08 
26.15 
12.13 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-9.87 
-4.66 
2.29 
-6.85 
-0.96 
-11.76 
-5.96 
2.33 
-8.47 
0.28 
-8.95 
-4.48 
3.05 
-6.17 
28.84 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
8.15 
7.42 
15.03 
13.20 
38.74 
18.56 
2000 
9.10 
8.36 
16.96 
15.30 
45.80 
21.44 
2010 
7.14 
6.96 
13.18 
12.26 
35.95 
16.92 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-12.01 
-6.97 
2.63 
-6.00 
12.07 
-13.27 
-7.88 
3.07 
-6.37 
22.39 
-10.16 
-6.46 
3.05 
-4.95 
38.73 
Ireland 
1995 
1.65 
0.88 
3.09 
0.27 
1.35 
0.74 
2000 
1.88 
1.03 
3.52 
0.29 
1.47 
0.74 
2010 
I.2I 
0.94 
1.98 
-0.10 
-0.50 
-0.25 
-2.13 
-0.58 
0.96 
-3.00 
5.08 
-1.96 
-0.47 
1.20 
-3.36 
9.02 
-0.58 
0.20 
1.43 
-1.63 
17.79 
Spain 
1995 
1.94 
1.79 
2.60 
0.43 
0.75 
0.55 
2000 
2.08 
1.94 
2.78 
0.45 
0.77 
0.64 
2010 
1.33 
1.26 
1.75 
0.27 
0.46 
0.38 
-1.88 
-0.57 
0.24 
-1.13 
0.14 
-2.14 
-0.59 
0.35 
-1.20 
1.07 
-1.53 
-0.35 
0.63 
-0.78 
5.51 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
9.3.2. Permanent CSF finance with low externalities 
The standard set of simulation results for this case are shown in Table 9.3. The effects of the 
CSF on GDP, unsurprisingly, are larger than in the previous case where externality elasticities 
were set at zero. Portuguese GDP now rises by 9.3% above the baseline, as compared to 7% in 
the previous scenario. Greece and Ireland experience an extra 1 percentage point increase in 
GDP, while Spain experiences a more modest increase of 0.4%. Ireland now surpasses Spain 
in terms of effects on GDP, since the most important externality mechanism operates by 
enhancing the beneficial impact of the world economy, a channel which operates particularly 
strongly in the Irish case (see Table 5.7). 
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Table 9.3. Delors I and II combined (permanent CSF finance with low externalities) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
6.53 
4.17 
11.69 
5.85 
23.01 
9.13 
2000 
8.63 
5.90 
14.71 
8.31 
34.31 
14.40 
2010 
6.52 
6.01 
9.68 
5.37 
23.36 
9.46 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-9.42 
-4.22 
-2.37 
-7.45 
-1.54 
-11.00 
-5.17 
2.54 
-8.81 
2.32 
-7.81 
-3.28 
3.42 
-6.57 
34.05 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
9.33 
11.12 
15.55 
11.75 
36.77 
16.79 
2000 
10.81 
13.58 
17.68 
13.21 
42.81 
18.88 
2010 
9.26 
13.30 
13.89 
9.69 
32.34 
13.84 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-11.80 
-6.70 
2.61 
-6.16 
12.36 
-12.98 
-7.49 
3.02 
-6.46 
22.56 
-9.73 
-5.95 
2.93 
-4.89 
38.12 
Ireland 
1995 
2.16 
2.15 
3.25 
0.19 
1.63 
0.58 
2000 
2.66 
2.82 
3.75 
0.19 
1.93 
0.51 
2010 
2.26 
3.10 
2.30 
-0.20 
0.22 
-0.49 
-2.04 
-0.50 
1.00 
-3.20 
6.61 
-1.86 
-0.38 
1.26 
-3.28 
9.16 
-0.51 
0.26 
1.51 
-1.48 
18.41 
Spain 
1995 
2.07 
2.12 
2.69 
0.15 
0.64 
0.24 
2000 
2.34 
2.57 
2.96 
-0.07 
0.59 
0.06 
2010 
1.70 
2.16 
1.99 
-0.47 
0.19 
-0.48 
-1.80 
-0.48 
0.28 
-1.17 
0.38 
-1.99 
-0.44 
0.45 
-1.29 
1.79 
-1.30 
-0.13 
0.83 
-0.90 
7.59 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
9.3.3. Permanent CSF finance with high externalities 
The standard set of simulation results are shown in Table 9.4. Doubling the elasticities in this 
case serves simply to accentuate the processes discussed in the previous simulation. Thus the 
effect on the level of Portuguese GDP as we move from zero through low to high elasticities is 
7.1, 9.3 and 11.6% respectively. In the case of Ireland, the corresponding impacts are 1.2, 2.3 
and 3.4% respectively. 
The research literature in this area is such that it is difficult to select values of the externality 
elasticities with any degree of precision. In the above three cases, we have selected a range of 
values, ranging from zero to 10%. The survey of research findings in Chapter 7 indicated that 
for infrastructure, these elasticities could be in the higher range. However, there is 
considerable doubt if the value of some of the expenditures on training will generate any 
positive elasticities, i.e. if it will have any long-term benefit. Hence, our simulations serve to 
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bracket the probable range of possibilities. The (unknown) actual impacts are probably greater 
than in the zero elasticity case, but lower than in the high elasticity case, but nothing very 
precise can be said using macroeconometric models in the absence of detailed microeconomic 
research. 
Table 9.4. Delors I and II combined (permanent CSF finance with high externalities) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
6.90 
5.62 
11.86 
5.36 
22.77 
8.55 
2000 
9.31 
8.61 
14.95 
7.27 
33.10 
12.86 
2010 
7.38 
9.86 
9.86 
3.75 
20.96 
7.01 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-8.98 
-3.78 
2.44 
-7.61 
-0.97 
-10.23 
-4.40 
2.74 
-9.14 
4.28 
-6.66 
-2.10 
3.79 
-6.94 
39.07 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
10.58 
15.03 
16.10 
10.33 
34.92 
15.09 
2000 
12.66 
19.24 
18.46 
11.19 
40.11 
16.46 
2010 
11.62 
20.32 
14.73 
7.27 
29.30 
11.01 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
11.61 
-6.44 
2.58 
-6.30 
12.60 
-12.72 
-7.14 
2.96 
-6.52 
22.62 
-9.36 
-5.50 
2.78 
-4.77 
37.23 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
Ireland 
1995 
2.68 
3.43 
3.40 
0.11 
1.91 
0.43 
2000 
3.45 
4.64 
3.99 
0.08 
2.41 
0.29 
2010 
3.35 
5.32 
2.63 
-0.30 
0.95 
-0.73 
-1.96 
-0.42 
1.03 
-2.91 
5.02 
-1.76 
-0.30 
1.32 
-3.19 
9.28 
-0.45 
0.31 
1.59 
-1.32 
18.95 
Spain 
1995 
2.20 
2.47 
2.78 
-0.14 
0.54 
-0.07 
2000 
2.61 
3.22 
3.14 
-0.58 
0.41 
-0.53 
2010 
2.08 
3.08 
2.23 
-1.21 
-0.08 
-1.35 
-1.71 
-0.40 
0.33 
-1.21 
0.62 
-1.84 
-0.29 
0.55 
-1.37 
2.52 
-1.08 
0.10 
1.03 
-1.02 
9.70 
9.3.4. Temporary CSF finance with high externalities 
In this case we terminate all CSF-related expenditures after the year 1999. Thus, all CSF-
related grants from the EU, together with domestic co-financing public expenditure and 
domestic private expenditure, are cut off from the year 2000, and revert to their pre-1989 zero 
values. However, we leave in place the high values of the elasticities that were examined in 
the previous, no-termination case. 
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Table 9.5. Delors I and II combined (temporary CSF finance with high externalities) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
6.90 
5.62 
11.86 
5.36 
22.77 
8.55 
2000 
2.94 
3.82 
4.34 
4.66 
21.80 
10.08 
2010 
0.54 
2.93 
0.00 
-1.34 
-1.77 
-1.87 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-8.98 
-3.78 
2.44 
-7.61 
-0.97 
0.19 
0.19 
0.44 
-1.05 
11.63 
1.03 
1.03 
1.82 
-0.08 
37.49 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
10.58 
15.03 
16.10 
10.33 
34.92 
15.09 
2000 
5.69 
11.74 
6.25 
5.57 
21.82 
8.24 
2010 
2.31 
6.42 
1.23 
-1.47 
-0.52 
-1.44 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-11.61 
-6.44 
2.58 
-6.30 
12.60 
-1.44 
-1.44 
0.95 
-1.26 
24.36 
0.10 
0.10 
0.71 
-0.07 
22.97 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
Ireland 
1995 
2.68 
3.43 
3.40 
0.11 
1.91 
0.43 
2000 
1.42 
3.40 
0.32 
-0.33 
0.12 
-0.45 
2010 
0.90 
2.05 
0.06 
-0.27 
-0.26 
-0.69 
-1.96 
-0.42 
1.03 
-2.91 
5.02 
1.28 
1.28 
0.90 
0.51 
11.69 
0.37 
0.37 
0.86 
0.50 
14.78 
Spain 
1995 
2.20 
2.47 
2.78 
-0.14 
0.54 
-0.07 
2000 
0.43 
1.09 
0.28 
-0.89 
-0.31 
-0.78 
2010 
0.20 
0.59 
0.08 
-0.57 
-0.24 
-0.68 
-1.71 
-0.40 
0.33 
-1.21 
0.62 
0.26 
0.26 
0.08 
-0.08 
3.85 
0.20 
0.20 
0.50 
-0.06 
7.08 
9.3.5. Temporary CSF finance with no externalities 
As would be expected, the withdrawal of CSF-related expenditures produces an abrupt and 
large fall in GDP. Thus, in the case of Greece, the impact on GDP falls from 9.31% (in the 
infinite finance case of Table 9.4) to 2.9% in the present case (Table 9.5). The impacts on the 
other countries are also quite dramatic: from 3.5 to 1.4 for Ireland; from 12.7 to 5.7 for 
Portugal; and from 2.1 to 0.2 for Spain. 
The other feature in Table 9.5 is that the impact of the CSF falls to small but positive values 
by the year 2010. There is a major reason for this: the stocks of CSF-related physical 
infrastructure 'decay' at set depreciation rates (2% per year for infrastructure and 5% per year 
for human capital). Thus, if the CSF-related expenditures are cut off after the year 1999, the 
externality elasticities will operate on a declining incremental stock. 
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Table 9.6. Delors I and II combined (temporary CSF finance with no externalities) 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Greece 
1995 
6.16 
2.75 
11.52 
6.35 
23.28 
9.72 
2000 
1.96 
-0.66 
4.17 
6.59 
24.26 
12.98 
2010 
-0.04 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.06 
-0.04 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-9.87 
-4.66 
2.29 
-7.29 
-2.13 
-1.18 
-1.18 
0.11 
-0.63 
7.35 
0.01 
0.01 
1.49 
0.07 
31.78 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
Portugal 
1995 
8.15 
7.42 
15.03 
13.20 
38.74 
18.56 
2000 
2.84 
2.57 
5.36 
9.11 
26.30 
12.27 
2010 
0.46 
0.68 
0.74 
0.71 
1.88 
0.88 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-12.01 
-6.97 
2.63 
-6.00 
12.07 
-2.17 
-2.17 
1.13 
-1.37 
24.22 
-0.42 
-0.42 
0.91 
-0.30 
24.58 
Legend 
GDPFC Gross domestic product at factor cost (real) 
OT GDP in manufacturing (real) 
ON GDP in market services (real) 
POT Deflator of GDP in manufacturing 
WT Average annual earnings in manufacturing 
PC Deflator of private consumption 
UR Unemployment rate 
GBORR Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) 
BPTR Net trade surplus (% of GDP) 
RDEBT National debt (% of GDP) 
Ireland 
1995 
1.65 
0.88 
3.09 
0.27 
1.35 
0.74 
2000 
0.02 
0.18 
-0.10 
-0.14 
-0.72 
-0.06 
2010 
-0.01 
0.19 
-0.22 
-0.20 
-1.01 
-0.52 
-2.13 
-0.58 
0.96 
-3.00 
5.08 
1.16 
1.16 
0.79 
0.37 
11.40 
0.36 
0.36 
0.76 
0.36 
13.70 
Spain 
1995 
1.94 
1.79 
2.60 
0.43 
0.75 
0.55 
2000 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.28 
2010 
-0.06 
-0.06 
-0.08 
-0.03 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-1.88 
-0.57 
0.24 
-1.13 
0.14 
0.01 
0.01 
-0.11 
0.08 
2.43 
0.03 
0.03 
0.29 
0.03 
4.49 
This last case is identical to the previous case, with one exception: the externality elasticities 
are set at zero. The simulation results are shown in Table 9.6, where it is seen that the long-
term impacts decline to zero. This merely illustrates a Keynesian withdrawal of expenditure, 
where the CSF leaves no long-term positive impact. However, because of the domestic co-
financing requirement during the years 1989-99, the public debt has risen as a percentage of 
GDP. 
9.4. Conclusions on the CSF 
We have examined the impact of the CSF under different assumptions about externality 
elasticities and under different termination conditions. Some general conclusions can be 
drawn. 
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First, focusing on the purely neo-Keynesian impacts of the CSF (i.e. under the assumption of 
zero externalities), the effects are broadly in line with the known multiplier properties of the 
models, as previously discussed in Chapter 5. Thus, the public investment multipliers are 
largest for Portugal (in the range 1.5) and smallest for Ireland (in the range 1.0). On the other 
hand, the multipliers associated with human resource programme transfer payments are less 
than unity for all models. 
Second, we have presented the impacts on gross domestic product (GDP). However, the CSF 
grant allocations coming from the European Commission will also contribute directly to 
'national resources', (i.e. GNDI plus capital transfers from abroad). These will be additional to 
the GDP effects, but will vanish when the CSF is terminated. 
Third, increasing the size of the externality elasticities will boost the impact of the CSF 
programmes. This is most dramatically illustrated by the Irish case, where the GDP impact is 
tripled in the case of high elasticities relative to the zero elasticity case. 
Fourth, the beneficial impacts of the CSF programmes decay after the termination of the CSF, 
since the incremental stocks of infrastructure and human capital also decay. However, there 
are modest positive effects in the long run. 
Finally, if the CSF is terminated and there are no beneficial externality effects, then there are 
no long-term benefits from the CSF. Thus, the withdrawal of the CSF simply reverses the 
previous Keynesian expansion. 
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10. Summary and conclusions 
10.1. Conclusions 
To arrive at a definitive answer to the question of the combined effects of the single market 
and the CSF programmes requires choosing amongst a range of scenarios, for example: are the 
increased FDI flows into Spain and Portugal to be attributed to the SEM? Is the CSF funding 
temporaiy or permanent? Are the economic mechanisms that generate long-run supply 
responses to CSF programmes strong or weak? In the light of the most recent research, we do 
not yet have definitive answers to these difficult questions. 
Table 10.1 reproduces the overall effects of the SEM and CSF shocks, and the sum of these, 
for each of the peripheral countries. Since we have examined various kinds of SEM and CSF 
shocks, we need to define the nature of the combined shock presented in these tables. 
The SEM variant presented in the table below consists of the complete set of seven shocks 
detailed in Section 8.1, but excludes the effects of the increased FDI inflows into Portugal and 
Spain, on the assumption that they cannot be ascribed to the SEM. Thus, the data for the 
simulations is taken from Table 8.1(a). 
The CSF shock consists of the combined Delors I and II packages, with Delors II phased in to 
take over from Delors I in 1994. This table is based on the assumption that all CSF 
expenditures will remain fixed in nominal terms after the terminal year of Delors II (i.e. the 
year 1999). Thus, we use the permanent finance case in this table. We have examined in 
Chapter 9 the consequences of terminating the CSF after 1999, but this case is not used here. 
Furthermore, in this table we assume that there are no externalities associated with the CSF 
expenditures. The consequences of alternative assumptions on externality effects have also 
been explored in Chapter 9. The data for the CSF simulations are taken from Table 9.2. 
As previously noted, we report the outcomes for the following variables: GDP at factor cost 
(GDPFC); manufacturing sector output (OT); output of building, construction, utilities and 
market services (ON); the manufacturing sector wage (WT) and the consumer price index 
(PC); the unemployment rate (UR) and a corrected unemployment rate (URP) that takes into 
account the fact that the training programmes associated with the CSF, while technically 
reducing the labour force, do not in fact increase labour market tension; the government 
borrowing requirement as a proportion of GDP (GBORR); the net trade surplus as a 
proportion of GDP (BPTR); and the national debt/GDP ratio (RDEBT). 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the SEM effects, taken alone, are strongest for Ireland. Then, in 
descending order come Portugal, Greece and Spain. The reason for this order is that Ireland 
and Portugal have been found to have the largest shares of employment and output in the 
sectors in which these individual countries are expected to benefit from the SEM, relative to 
those in the (country-specific) sectors which are expected to be adversely affected. 
We saw in Chapter 8 that Portugal and Spain, in addition, experienced large increases in FDI 
inflows as a result of EU accession-cum-SEM. Ireland, in contrast, although continuing to do 
well in terms of attracting FDI flows, has not experienced any substantial increase in its 
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relative attractiveness in recent times.70 However, these FDI effects are not included in the 
summary Table 10.1. 
For Spain and Greece, output and employment are at present concentrated in sectors in which 
these individual countries are not expected to do very well as a result of the single market. To 
that extent, a tremendous amount of restructuring is required, which imparts substantial 
negative shocks to manufacturing output and employment in the early stages of the SEM 
process. 
This is the case particularly for Greece. Spain requires somewhat less restructuring, and the 
negative shocks are substantially ameliorated by increased inflows of FDI, which, as we have 
seen, occurred for Portugal also. FDI inflows into Greece remain low at present, meaning that 
the whole massive burden of adjusting to the adverse shocks is thrown onto indigenous Greek 
industry. 
Only after the year 2000 do the effects of the SEM on Greek GDP become positive. This 
reversal in sign occurs for two reasons: firstly, through the classical adjustment mechanism of 
a downward adjustment of real wages in response to the adverse shocks, and secondly, and 
most importantly, because of the 'growth-dependent effects' we have identified. As the Greek 
and other economies become more integrated with the rest of Europe, they benefit more than 
previously from growth in the European core. 
Appropriately enough, since Greece is found to benefit least substantially from the SEM, it, 
along with Portugal, is found to benefit most substantially from the CSF. The effects on 
Ireland and Spain are very much less.71 
The relative size of these effects is due both to the relative sizes of the CSF shocks and to the 
endogenous response of each economy to the shocks. Although Ireland does well in per capita 
terms from the CSF allocations, for example, its relatively large GDP means that the CSF 
shocks as a ratio of GDP are smaller than the equivalent ratios for Greece and Portugal (see 
Tables 9.1 and 10.2). 
It should be noted again, with respect to the CSF shocks, that the results presented in Tables 
9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6 take account mainly of the expenditure side of these programmes. We 
have left aside many of the crucial supply-side effects which are, of course, the primary raison 
d'être of the CSF programmes. These supply-side effects would generate extra benefits, and 
some of these have been discussed and explored in Chapter 9. Our reason for not including 
them here is that there is little agreement on the empirical magnitudes of the externality 
mechanisms through which these programmes affect the supply side of the economy. In our 
discussion of the CSF impacts in Chapter 9, we argued that these externality mechanisms 
could well prove to be quite substantial. 
70 
71 
Ireland in fact experienced an equivalent substantial increase in inflows upon its accession to the EU in 1972. 
Note that the proportion of the CSF allocations coming from the European Commission contribute directly to 'national 
resources" (i.e. GNDI plus capital transfers). The GDP effects reported in Tables 10.1 to 10.4 are additional to these 
effects. 
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Table 10.1. SEM and CSF effects: no FDI, permanent CSF finance, no externalities 
Greece 
%dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
1995 
SEM 
-1.30 
-7.70 
0.55 
-6.98 
-6.40 
-5.66 
CSF 
6.16 
2.75 
11.52 
6.35 
23.28 
9.72 
TOTAL 
4.86 
-4.95 
12.07 
-0.63 
16.88 
4.06 
2000 
SEM 
-0.88 
-7.65 
1.28 
-8.67 
-7.47 
-7.14 
CSF 
8.00 
3.28 
14.46 
9.39 
35.67 
16.03 
1 TOTAL 
7.12 
-4.37 
15.74 
0.72 
28.20 
8.89 
2010 
SEM 
0.13 
-5.65 
2.23 
-8.88 
-5.68 
-6.48 
CSF 
5.74 
2.35 
9.54 
7.08 
26.15 
12.13 
1 TOTAL 
5.87 
-3.30 
11.77 
-1.80 
20.42 
5.65 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
2.00 
2.00 
0.57 
-0.29 
8.47 
-9.87 
-4.66 
2.29 
-6.85 
-0.96 
-7.87 
-2.66 
2.86 
-7.14 
7.51 
2.04 
2.04 
0.76 
-0.38 
11.61 
-11.76 
-5.96 
2.33 
-8.47 
0.28 
-9.72 
-3.92 
3.09 
-8.85 
11.89 
1.60 
1.60 
0.74 
-0.24 
12.28 
-8.95 
-4.48 
3.05 
-6.17 
28.84 
-7.35 
-2.88 
3.79 
-6.41 
41.12 
Ireland 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
V/T 
PC 
1995 
SEM 
4.95 
11.14 
2.40 
-4.70 
1.08 
-2.82 
CSF 
1.65 
0.88 
3.09 
0.27 
1.35 
0.74 
TOTAL 
6.60 
12.02 
5.49 
-4.43 
2.43 
-2.08 
2000 
SEM 
7.24 
15.14 
3.62 
-5.86 
1.15 
-3.71 
CSF 
1.88 
1.03 
3.52 
0.29 
1.47 
0.74 
TOTAL 
9.12 
16.17 
7.14 
-5.57 
2.62 
-2.97 
2010 
SEM 
9.24 
17.11 
4.75 
-5.87 
0.37 
-4.39 
CSF 
1.21 
0.94 
1.98 
-0.10 
-0.50 
-0.25 
TOTAL 
10.45 
18.05 
6.73 
-5.97 
-0.13 
-4.64 
Dil' UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-1.43 
-1.43 
-0.88 
0.91 
-5.51 
-2.13 
-0.58 
0.96 
-3.00 
5.08 
-3.56 
-2.01 
0.08 
-2.09 
-0.43 
-1.55 
-1.55 
-1.45 
1.30 
-11.06 
-1.96 
-0.47 
1.20 
-3.36 
9.02 
-3.51 
-2.02 
-0.25 
-2.06 
-2.04 
-1.23 
-1.23 
-2.09 
1.61 
-21.62 
-0.58 
0.20 
1.43 
-1.63 
17.79 
-1.81 
-1.03 
-0.66 
-0.02 
-3.83 
Portugal 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
1995 
SEM 
2.23 
5.70 
1.83 
-3.54 
-0.59 
-2.92 
CSF 
8.15 
7.42 
15.03 
13.20 
38.74 
18.56 
TOTAL 
10.38 
13.12 
16.86 
9.66 
38.15 
15.64 
2000 
SEM 
4.29 
10.43 
3.67 
-2.45 
5.00 
-0.93 
CSF 
9.10 
8.36 
16.96 
15.30 
45.80 
21.44 
TOTAL 
13.39 
18.79 
20.63 
12.85 
50.80 
20.51 
2010 
SEM 
7.54 
16.77 
6.91 
0.96 
18.01 
4.67 
CSF 
7.14 
6.96 
13.18 
12.26 
35.95 
16.92 
TOTAL 
14.68 
23.73 
20.09 
13.22 
53.96 
21.59 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
-0.95 
-0.95 
-0.18 
0.38 
-0.43 
-12.01 
-6.97 
2.63 
-6.00 
12.07 
-12.96 
-7.92 
2.45 
-5.62 
11.64 
-2.34 
-2.34 
-0.28 
0.70 
-1.97 
-13.27 
-7.88 
3.07 
-6.37 
22.39 
-15.61 
-10.22 
2.79 
-5.67 
20.42 
-5.03 
-5.03 
-0.16 
0.66 
-0.55 
-10.16 
-6.46 
3.05 
-4.95 
38.73 
-15.19 
-11.49 
2.89 
-4.29 
38.18 
Spain 
% dif GDPFC 
OT 
ON 
POT 
WT 
PC 
1995 
SEM 
-1.01 
-3.23 
-0.37 
-7.57 
-5.92 
-5.80 
CSF 
1.94 
1.79 
2.60 
0.43 
0.75 
0.55 
TOTAL 
0.93 
-1.44 
2.23 
-7.14 
-5.17 
-5.25 
2000 
SEM 
-0.74 
-3.11 
0.09 
-8.93 
-6.75 
-7.10 
CSF 
2.08 
1.94 
2.78 
0.45 
0.77 
0.64 
TOTAL 
1.34 
-1.17 
2.87 
-8.48 
-5.98 
-6.46 
2010 
SEM 
0.06 
-1.63 
0.87 
-8.60 
-6.24 
-6.70 
CSF 
1.33 
1.26 
1.75 
0.27 
0.46 
0.38 
TOTAL 
1.39 
-0.37 
2.62 
-8.33 
-5.78 
-6.32 
Dif UR 
URP 
GBORR 
BPTR 
RDEBT 
1.04 
1.04 
0.79 
-0.34 
7.08 
-1.88 
-0.57 
0.24 
-1.13 
0.14 
-0.84 
-0.57 
1.03 
-1.47 
7.22 
1.07 
1.07 
1.13 
-0.42 
12.48 
-2.14 
-0.59 
0.35 
-1.20 
1.07 
-1.07 
0.48 
1.48 
-1.62 
13.55 
0.72 
0.72 
1.07 
-0.10 
17.92 
-1.53 
-0.35 
0.63 
-0.78 
5.51 
-0.81 
0.37 
1.70 
-0.88 
23.43 
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Table 10.2. CSF shock as % of GDP 
Greece 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
1995 
8.29 
3.91 
7.93 
2.17 
2000 
11.4 
4.32 
8.25 
2.44 
2010 
10.1 
2.68 
6.15 
1.73 
Source: Model simulations. 
Whereas the SEM effects operate primarily on the manufacturing sector (OT), with positive 
but generally smaller knock-on effects on the services sector (which includes building and 
construction) (ON), the effects of the CSF shocks operate primarily through ON. 
Shocks with the same quantitative effects on GDP, but which operate through ON rather than 
OT, have larger employment effects, given the labour intensity of services (e.g. compare the 
employment effects of the SEM and CSF shocks for Ireland in 1995). Thus, a country like 
Greece, with a large CSF shock combined with a relatively adverse SEM shock, experiences 
high employment growth, while Ireland, with a strongly beneficiai SEM shock combined with 
a relatively small CSF shock, experiences much lower employment growth. 
Thus, the Greek unemployment rate, corrected, comes down 3% by 2010 while Ireland's 
comes down only 1% (though, of course, the reduction in net out-migration from Ireland - not 
shown separately - contributes to this relatively small reduction in unemployment). 
The small overall effects on Spanish and Irish unemployment rates means that real wage 
growth is moderate (at around 4% by 2010) in these countries, compared to the situation in 
Greece and Portugal where the large drop in (corrected) unemployment rates (of 3% and 11% 
respectively) brings both economies close to full employment relative to their baselines, and 
results in substantial real wage growth (of 15% and 32% respectively). In the case of Greece 
and Portugal, the reduction in the unemployment rate is unrealistically large and would call 
into question the modelling assumptions made in the labour markets in these two HERMIN 
models. This clearly should be the subject of further research. 
The overall government borrowing requirement is up by about 4% in Greece and 3% in 
Portugal, while it is largely unchanged in the other two economies, indicating that the output 
and employment effects for Greece and Portugal, in a balanced budget environment, would be 
less favourable. A mirror image of this fiscal overspending is, of course, a deterioration in a 
country's net trade surplus. Thus, both Greece and Portugal suffer some deterioration in their 
trade surpluses, but the net trade surpluses of Ireland and Spain are largely unaffected by the 
combined shocks. 
Portugal, we see, is the only economy to experience overall price increases of any magnitude. 
These, of course, come primarily through the stimulation of the non-traded (ON) sector due to 
the large CSF shocks. For Greece, which also experiences large CSF shocks, the inflationary 
effects are largely offset by the price reductions associated with the single market. For 
Portugal, though, the SEM effects are so strong that they, too, generate inflation. For Ireland 
and Spain, the CSF shocks are relatively moderate, and so no strong inflationary impulses are 
imparted to the system. 
We can now compare our results for the SEM shock and the combined SEM/CSF shocks for 
the year 2010 to the medium-term effects emerging from the Cecchini Report and the 
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subsequent analysis of Baldwin (1989). This is done in Table 10.3 below, where in this table, 
in contrast to Table 10.1 above, we have included the FDI effects as SEM-related for Portugal 
and Spain. Although we excluded the FDI effects from Table 10.1, a case could be made that 
the FDI effects are SEM-related, rather than related to accession. 
Table 10.3 
GDP 
PC 
GBORR 
BPTR 
Results compared to Cecchini72 
Spain 
SEM Total 
9.16 10 49 
-3.44 -3.06 
-2.77 -2.14 
1.87 1.09 
Portugal 
SEM | Total 
11.47 18.61 
10.63 27.55 
-0.23 2.82 
0.86 -4.09 
Ireland 
SEM 
9.24 
-4.39 
-2.09 
1.61 
Total 
10.45 
-4.64 
-0.66 
-0.02 
G 
SEM 
0.13 
-6.48 
0.74 
-0.24 
reece 
| Total 
5.87 
5.65 
3.79 
-6.41 
Cecchini 
SEM 
4.5 
-6.1 
-2.2 
1.0 
Leaving the most important effect, on GDP, until last, let us focus first on consumer prices. 
Cecchini predicts a fall in prices; and this result emerges from our analysis also, for all 
countries except Portugal. For Ireland, by far the most open of the economies, the explanation 
is clear-cut: the dominant price effect is the fall in international prices that we have taken 
directly from Cecchini. For Portugal, though, these effects are offset by the growth in domestic 
demand that results from economic expansion: there is still a good degree of price-cost 
marking up. For Greece and Spain, which are also relatively closed, the expansionary effects 
of the SEM shock are not as strong as in Portugal, and so the imported reduction in prices 
dominates. 
With regard to the government borrowing requirement, the SEM results for Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain are reasonably close to the Cecchini estimates, resulting from the relatively strong 
output effects of the SEM for these countries. Greece does not benefit so strongly from the 
SEM according to our analysis, however, and so their budgetary position also remains less 
buoyant. 
The results for the net trade surplus effects are all quite close to Cecchini, with the exception 
of that for Greece and, to a lesser extent, Portugal; the deterioration in the former, however, 
appears simply to reflect the deterioration in the Greek budgetary position. 
Now we come to the GDP effects. Here we find that Greece comes in below the Cecchini 
estimates while Ireland, Spain and Portugal come in above. Note that we have included the 
FDI effects as SEM-related for Portugal and Spain. In fact, all our results are outside the 
Cecchini range, which runs from 3.2% to 5.7%. It is perhaps not so surprising that Greece 
comes in below the Cecchini estimates, since part of the rationale for the CSF programmes 
was that just such an eventuality was possible. 
How do we explain the strong performance of Ireland, Spain and Portugal relative to the 
Cecchini estimates? An answer to this question is, of course, only worthwhile attempting on 
the assumption that our methodology, if applied to the whole EU, would reveal the periphery 
economies coming out ahead of the average. This does appear to be the case, however, since 
Ireland and Portugal appear to be well positioned in terms of revealed comparative advantage 
Note that the SEM impacts include the FDI effects for Portugal and Spain. 
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in the sectors deemed likely to be affected by the SEM, while both Portugal and Spain appear 
to be attracting strongly increased FDI inflows which that analysis largely ignores. 
In the main body of our analysis we made a good deal of use of the country studies contained 
in the special edition of European Economy (1990), which looked at both static and dynamic 
indicators of competitiveness in the affected sectors. The only relevant data that the special 
edition provides for all EU countries is, unfortunately, based solely on the static indicators 
(pp. 34-37). The charts presented there, however, reveal that Portugal is as well positioned in 
these sectors as the leaders, Germany and Italy, while both Ireland and Portugal appear well 
ahead of the other large EU economies, France and the UK. Thus, on the basis of our method-
ology, both would appear to come out ahead of the EU average. Spain and particularly Greece 
appear more vulnerable than the average. 
We have argued, though, that Spain's proven ability to attract increased FDI flows dominates 
the vulnerability of its existing industry. Of the countries studied, Greece appears to lag far 
behind the others in terms of its ability to attract FDI. Our feeling is that this is a consequence 
of the unsettled nature of Greek macroeconomic policy, rather than an inherent characteristic 
of the economy, and so if the macroeconomic problems could be overcome, the Greek position 
in our analysis would appear much more favourable. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that our estimates of the growth effects of the SEM for Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal are within the bounds of the range predicted by Baldwin (1989), who 
argued that the medium-term growth bonus (resulting from increased investment) which 
Cecchini ignored, would more than double the range of predicted GDP effects presented in 
that report. 
10.2. Remaining issues 
Preliminary analysis of our results has identified a number of issues that remain to be dealt 
with in future research. 
The first of these concerns the Greek model. We have constructed this model from scratch, 
though we have included references to the Greek literature to support the assumptions we 
adopted in constructing the model. We are encouraged by the fact that the properties of the 
model appear very similar to those of the two-sector SOE model of Greece due to 
Alogoskoufis (1990b). 
The second issue concerns our treatment of the implications of the SEM for the services 
sector. Our treatment in this report has, in fact, been minimal. On the strength of the literature 
reviewed in Appendix C on this issue, however, there appears to be relatively little work done 
on quantification of the implications of the SEM for this sector. It should be possible, 
however, to incorporate the interest-rate effects of the integration of financial services, as was 
done in an earlier Irish study (Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 1992). 
The third issue concerns the wage bargaining mechanism in Portugal and Greece, where up to 
now we have assumed an inelastic labour supply in the context of fairly strong Phillips curve 
effects. An implication of this modelling approach is that shocks to the Portuguese and Greek 
models can produce large changes to the real wage. In the case of Ireland, on the other hand, 
the moderately large Phillips curve parameter occurs in the context of an extremely open 
labour market. In the case of Spain, the Phillips curve effect was found to be very small. It 
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remains to be investigated whether, in the case of Greece and Portugal, the existence of rural-
urban migration might play a similar role to the international migration mechanism. 
The fourth issue concerns our treatment of the CSF shocks. We have seen that the implications 
of the structural changes wrought by the SEM are in some cases quite dramatic. The 
consequences of the CSF shocks within the context of the structurally changed models could 
be explored in future work. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we suspect that even temporary CSF programmes can 
have stronger permanent effects than those identified here. These 'industrial composition 
externalities' have been identified in recent work by authors such as Romer (1986) and 
Krugman (1987). The essential idea here is that of 'learning-by-doing', in which the 
economy's stock of knowledge is modelled as a function either of cumulative output or of 
cumulative gross investment. By increasing these, programmes such as the CSF can have 
permanent hysteresis-type effects on the structure of the economy, with implications for long-
run growth prospects. To capture these would require that we would extend the HERMIN 
model to take on the characteristics of an endogenous growth model. These effects could well 
prove to be much more profound than those emerging from the incorporation of the externality 
elasticities explored in the present study. 
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APPENDIX A 
The analytics of regional and small-open-economy macro-
models 
Versions of the small open economy model provide the framework for most macroeconomic 
debates in Ireland and other small economies. This appendix offers a unified treatment of the 
simple analytics of such models. 
A.l. Introduction 
With the demise of the Keynesian demand-driven view of the world, attention came to be 
focused on cost competitiveness as the most important ingredient in output determination, in 
highly open economies at least. This view was encapsulated in the one-sector small-open-
economy model, in which all goods were internationally tradable. Recognition that domestic 
demand continued to play some role lead to an increasing interest in the two-sector small-open-
economy (SOE) model, in which some goods were recognized to be non-(internationally-) 
tradable. 
Although the model is variously denoted the 'Australian' or the 'Scandinavian' model, its 
popularity is probably primarily due to the works of Dornbusch published in the 1970s and 
collected in Dornbusch (1980). Many authors, such as Helpman (1977), Neary (1980), Calmfors 
and Viotti (1982) and Cuddington and Viñals (1986a, 1986b), subsequently made important 
contributions to the model's development. 
Surprisingly, however, given that the model provides the corner-stone for most discussions of the 
macroeconomy of Ireland, for example, there is no unified treatment of the simple analytics of 
how the model operates.73 This appendix provides such a unified framework. It also shows how 
relatively simple versions of the model can be used to structure many of the debates that take 
place over macroeconomic issues in small open economies. 
The appendix is structured as follows. The next section presents the basic one-sector SOE 
model, illustrating how, though highly oversimplified, it provides the easiest means by which the 
interrelatedness of macroeconomic aggregates, such as output, employment, investment, 
inflation and interest rates, can be grasped. Some of the difficulties that the model encounters in 
explaining aspects of the macroeconomy are then pointed out, and it is shown how these can be 
overcome by moving to the two-sector model. The latter, of course, allows Keynesian elements 
to be introduced quite easily. 
For the most part, inter-temporal issues are not dealt with, as they increase the complexity of the 
model considerably. They have been dealt with recently in some detail by Barry and Devereux 
(1995) who present a two-period version of the two-sector model presented here. 
73 The model does not appear explicitly, for example, in any of the three most popular textbooks on the Irish 
macroeconomy: O'Hagan (1995). Leddin and Walsh (1995), and Norton (1994), though the latter discusses it 
informally. 
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A.2. The one-sector small-open-economy model 
In this model all goods are assumed to be internationally tradable, and all firms in the SOE are 
perfect competitors. This has two implications; first, that goods produced domestically are 
perfect substitutes for goods produced elsewhere so that prices (mediated through the exchange 
rate) cannot deviate from world levels, and second, that firms are able to sell as much as they 
desire to produce at going world prices. The latter is arguably an undesirable implication, and 
will be further discussed later. Note that it rules out Keynesian phenomena right from the start. 
The 'law of one price', operating through goods arbitrage, therefore ensures: 
0 ) Pt = ep* 
where e is the price of foreign currency and p, is the world price. Under a fixed exchange rate 
this means that domestic inflation is determined abroad. In the pre-1979 period when the Irish 
pound was linked one-for-one with sterling, Irish and UK inflation were indeed equal, and it was 
widely felt that breaking the link with sterling and tying to the DM would bring Irish inflation 
down quite rapidly to the much lower German level. 
The second implication of perfect competition is that the SOE faces an infinitely elastic world 
demand function for its output, and an infinitely elastic world supply function for whatever it 
wishes to purchase. This is marked World D/S in Figure A. 1 below at the initial price level pto 
(where, for simplicity, we assume zero world inflation). 
Figure A.l. The traded goods sector 
S,(W/Pt) 
World D/S 
Y, to D„ 
Output is determined by firms choosing labour inputs and a level of investment (It) that 
maximizes profits 7r.t: 
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(2) Kt=pYt-r*pt(KQ+I + bI2)-wLt 
where Y - F(K + 1+ L ) is the firm's constant returns to scale production function, the 
second term is the cost to the firm of borrowing for its capital investments, bl is a capital-
adjustment cost term which ensures that firms do not adjust instantaneously to their desired long-
run capital stock, as is common in the theory of the firm, and the final term on the right is the 
wage bill. 
Optimization yields the following labour demand and investment functions: 
(3) Fu=wlPt 
and 
(4) It=I(FKt/r*) 
With constant returns to scale, the marginal products of capital and labour depend only on the 
capital labour ratio, which, as (3) reveals, is determined by the real product wage. 
With capital fixed at a point in time, a disequilibrating increase in real wages will lead to labour 
shedding in the short run, and will lead to reduced investment and further labour shedding over 
time. Higher world interest rates, for a given real wage, will also lead to reduced investment and 
a decrease in employment over time. 
This simple model therefore reveals that output is determined by real wages and interest rates. As 
interest rate effects take time to impact on output, let us concentrate for the moment on the role 
of real wages in output determination. 
The supply of output depends on the real wage (w/pt), which is graphed as St in Figure A. 1. A 
rise in wage demands shifts the supply curve to the left, and output is reduced. 
So much for output, employment, inflation and interest rates. What of the trade balance? The 
trade deficit is determined by the excess of expenditure (C+I+G) over income (Yt). If 
expenditure is as drawn in Figure A.l, represented by Dt, there is a trade deficit of D - Y . 
Now consider the impact of fiscal and exchange rate policies in this model. Ignoring taxation (so 
that it may be realistic to assume that nominal wages are not affected), an increase in government 
spending raises Dt but leaves Yt unchanged. Its only effect therefore is to worsen the trade 
balance. When it comes to be financed by taxation, however, it is reasonable to suppose that 
wage demands will rise to some extent in an attempt to compensate, so output and employment 
will fall. This reveals the extremely non-Keynesian nature of the model. 
Now consider a devaluation. The increase in the exchange rate (i.e. the price of foreign currency) 
raises domestic prices and shifts the world supply/demand line upwards. If domestic wages do 
not respond, then output and employment are increased and the trade deficit reduced. If real 
wages are rigid, on the other hand, so that wage demands rise in line with inflation, the domestic 
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supply curve will shift upwards in the same proportion, and there will be no real effects. The 
devaluation will have generated inflation without raising employment or output.74 
A.3. Defects of the one-sector SOE model 
That this very simple model dominated policy-making for at least one short period in recent Irish 
economic history is attested to by Honohan (1988) who writes that 
One oversimplified view enjoyed an early vogue, and was, I believe, influential in 
determining the course of policy between 1981 and 1984. According to this view the 
Government's overspending was closely matched by national overspending, as reflected in 
the balance of international payments, which has increased in line with the Government's 
borrowing. Accordingly the task facing the Government was a mechanical one with limited 
adverse consequences: if the Government's overspending could be reduced - by whatever 
means - the impact would be on national spending, and not on production. It was held by 
many that the expansion of the Government's deficit had created jobs abroad rather than at 
home. If so, then by an argument of symmetry, the elimination ofthat deficit need have little 
effect on jobs at home. 
We now need to take note of the weaknesses of the model as a description of economic reality 
for even as open an economy as Ireland's. 
One weakness is that the assumption (implied by perfect competition) that firms can sell all they 
desire to produce at going world prices is patently unrealistic. As long ago as 1981 Honohan 
showed that contrary to the predictions of the model, world demand exerted an impact on Irish 
output independent of its impact on price. Kennedy and Foley (1978) explored one way out of 
this dilemma using the kinked-oligopoly-curve model. A more satisfactory solution, however, 
has been provided by Bradley and Fitz Gerald (1990). They propose a model in which all 
tradable-sector production is done by internationally footloose companies (MNCs); pricing 
decisions are therefore independent of the SOE's factor costs. When world output expands 
MNCs expand production at all their production locations. The proportion of MNC investment 
located in any individual SOE, however, depends on the relative competitiveness of the SOE in 
question. This allows SOE output to be determined both by domestic factor costs and by world 
demand. Since SOE demand is tiny relative to world demand, it plays no role in the MNCs' 
output decisions. 
There are two further weaknesses, however, that drive one in the direction of the two-sector SOE 
model. The first is that purchasing power parity (PPP), to the extent to which it is valid, is known 
to break down for substantial periods of time. PPP holds that the relationship between domestic 
and foreign price levels (rather than the prices of traded goods only) can be described as: 
(5) pt = ep* 
If all goods are tradable and if arbitrage ensures that the law of one price holds, then this 
relationship clearly must hold. If some goods are non-(internationally-)tradable, however, then 
arbitrage does not occur; PPP will hold in this case only if all shocks are nominal shocks (i.e. 
74 Kouri (1979) shows that devaluations in Finland typically had real effects lasting several years before the 
competitiveness gain was lost through increased wage demands. 
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monetary or exchange rate shocks), and even then only in the long run (if there are some nominal 
rigidities such as wage stickiness that apply in the short run but disappear over time). 
In a model with non-tradables, one does not expect PPP to hold in the face of real shocks, such 
as government expenditure or taxation changes or disequilibrating movements in wages. As 
Purvis (1982) puts it: 'PPP should be interpreted as a comparative static result arising from a 
monetary disturbance and embodying the essential feature of monetary neutrality.' 
Labour market hysteresis would, however, invalidate PPP since nominal shocks in this scenario 
can exert real long-run effects (Barry, 1994). 
The other weakness of the one-sector SOE model is that, as already noted, government spending 
is precluded from having any positive effects. Yet most studies of Irish employment and 
unemployment conclude that the debt-financed fiscal expansion of the late-1970s did indeed 
boost employment and reduce unemployment (albeit at the expense of requiring very 
contractionary policies over the course of the whole 1980s) (Walsh (1987), and Barry and 
Bradley (1991)). 
A.4. The two-sector small-open-economy model 
Let us therefore add an extra sector, the non-tradable (NT) sector, to the model. Output and 
employment in tradables continues to be determined as before, while the NT sector operates 
more like a closed economy model. The interactions between the two sectors prove interesting, 
however. 
The price of NTs is determined by the interaction of supply and demand for these goods, as in 
Figure A.2. 
Analogous to the situation with tradables, the supply of non-tradables depends on real product 
wages in that sector (w/pn), while the demand for NTs, Dn, depends on relative prices and on real 
expenditure as follows: 
(?) D„=Dn[p)1/pl;Yl+(pJpt)Yn] 
The first derivative is negative, of course, and the second is positive. 
As before, the results depend very much on whether nominal wages or real wages are rigid. 
Consider nominal wage rigidity first of all. An increase in government spending on non-tradables 
raises the demand for non-tradables and shifts D„ to the right in Figure A.2, raising prices and the 
output level in that sector. With no effect on wages the output of tradables is not affected, so the 
policy has unambiguously positive effects on aggregate output and employment, and adverse 
effects on the price level. The trade balance is also adversely affected, as before. To see this note 
that, in line with (7), expenditure on tradables is 
(8) D,=D,[pn/p,;Y,+(pn/p,)Yn] 
where both derivatives in this case are positive. The increase in the relative price of NTs and the 
increase in NT-sector output both raise the demand for tradables, shifting the D, line to the right 
in Figure A. 1, which worsens the trade deficit. 
136 The cases of Greece. Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
Figure A.2. The non-traded goods sector 
Sn(W/Pn) 
Yn 
A devaluation once again pushes up the world D/S line and expands Yt. This output effect 
alongside the increase in the relative price of tradables expands the demand for non-tradables, 
and leads to a knock-on expansion in this sector. 
The devaluation of the Irish pound in 1986, at a time when unemployment was at an all time 
high, appeared to have had such unambiguously positive effects on output and employment, 
which were not then inflated away through wage catch-up (Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Barry 
(1991)).75 
If wages do catch up with policy-generated inflation, however, the effects can be substantially 
different. This case, of real wage rigidity, can be written: 
(9) ™ = Φ(Ρ„,Ρ,) 
where Φ() is a linearly homogenous function. 
Now, with no nominal rigidities in the system, a nominal shock such as a devaluation can have 
no real effects. An increase in e will simply give rise to equiproportionate increases in/?,, p„ and 
w, and employment and output levels will be unchanged. 
There is a possible non-homogeneity in response to devaluation, however. Barry (1994) argues 
that if nominal wages are sticky in the short run, becoming more flexible over time, but if the 
labour market is characterized by hysteresis as appears to be the case in Ireland, then the 
increased pool of insiders created by a devaluation will exert downward pressure on wage 
demands in the longer term, so that the rise in employment may be sustained. This may account 
75 The fact that they were not inflated away, though, could possibly be an effect of the fiscal contraction which began in 
1987. 
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for the success of the strong Irish devaluation of 1986 (Leddin and Walsh, 1995), and Barry 
(1994) adopts this hypothesis in arguing that the devaluation of January 1993 should have been 
more substantial. 
Even with wage demands linearly homogenous in prices, however, a fiscal shock will still have 
real effects. We now turn to an analysis of these effects. 
With the exchange rate fixed in the SOE model, p, remains constant, so any increase in p„ gives 
rise to a less-than-proportionate increase in w (which follows from the linear homogeneity of 
equation (8)). An increase in government spending on non-tradables in this scenario, then, 
pushes up Dn and p„ as before. Since w rises less than p„, the fall in the real product wage 
stimulates output and employment in the NT sector. The wage shock, however, gets transmitted 
to the tradable goods sector, so w/pt rises, and Y, and L, are reduced. 
The Τ and NT sectors therefore move in opposite directions in response to a government 
expenditure shock, when real wages are rigid. 
The impact on aggregate employment, L, can be calculated from 
(10) L=Ln(pn/w)+L(p(/w) 
and the wage equation (9). 
The effect of a fiscal expansion is positive, zero or negative, then, depending on whether the 
following expression is greater than, equal to, or less than 1 : 
(11) [e(Ln;pn/w)/£(Lt;pt/w)][£(w;pt)/£(w;pn)][Ln/Lt] 
The functions on the left-hand side are the elasticities of sectoral labour demands and of wage 
demands. Total employment is therefore more likely to rise in response to increased government 
expenditure on non-tradables, the greater the elasticity of labour demand and the initial level of 
employment in that sector, and the lower the influence of non-tradable goods prices on the 
nominal wage, the latter obviously being related to the share of these goods in private 
consumption. This is a standard condition in the literature (see Barry and Devereux, 1995 and the 
references cited there), and is usually considered to hold. 
If one believes that the Irish economy is characterized by such classical (high wage) constraints 
rather than Keynesian demand constraints, then the results of Barry and Bradley (1991) and 
Walsh (1987) alluded to earlier would suggest that the expansion in non-tradable employment 
generated by the Irish fiscal expansion of the late 1970s more than dominated the contraction in 
tradable sector employment induced by increased wage demands. This indeed suggests that the 
elasticities condition above is likely to be greater than 1. 
Adopting the long-run condition that the return to capital be equalized across sectors will, of 
course, tie down prices in the SOE, as the following equations reveal: 
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(12) ρ =a, w + a„ r 
v ' ^n Ln kn 
ρ = a, w + a ,,r vt Lt kt 
since both w and p, are fixed, yielding two equations in two unknowns, pn and r (ay represents 
units of factor / per unit output of goody). 
For wage stickiness to be possible as an equilibrium in this model, r must be endogenous to the 
region/SOE (since p,, w and r cannot all be exogenous), i.e. the stock located there must be 
related to the gap between regional (or SOE) and national (or international) required rates of 
return.76 While it may at first seem implausible that these required rates of return could differ, not 
allowing them to differ would require that the own price elasticity for capital should be infinite. 
Bradley and Fitz Gerald (1990), however, are able to model Ireland's share of world output as 
dependent on relative profitability levels, and show that the own price elasticity of capital, when 
domestic output is allowed to adjust, is of the order of-0.4. 
The empirical evidence for Ireland suggests then that the appropriate long-run condition on rates 
of profitability should be: 
(13) K = K(r-r*) 
rather than r = r*, where Κ is the domestic capital stock and r is the international rate of 
profitability. Combining this with equations (12) above then gives us a system of three equations 
in three unknowns, when wages are rigid, and the model can then generate an equilibrium. 
Allowing the return to capital to be determined endogenously in this way, a fiscal contraction in 
the wage-rigidity case reallocates capital from the NT sector to the Τ sector; capital-labour ratios 
remain unchanged in each sector, and the impact on employment then depends on the relative 
factor intensities of the two sectors (Helpman, 1976). 
Besides generating more realistic fiscal policy effects, one of the other advantages of introducing 
a non-tradable goods sector is that deviations from PPP are more easily analysed in this context. 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) holds that a relationship such as that depicted in equation (5) 
holds not just for traded goods prices but also for price levels. This will hold, however, only if 
relative prices (i.e. the ratio of non-traded to traded goods prices or the real exchange rate) are 
constant. As noted above, this will apply only if shocks hitting the economy are monetary in 
nature (since real shocks will change equilibrium relative prices), and even then, given some 
short-run nominal rigidities, PPP would only be expected to hold in the long run. 
Given the existence of NTs, it would have been completely wrong of policy-makers in 1979 to 
expect that simply because Irish inflation closely matched UK inflation in the pre-1979 period, it 
would come quickly down to German levels regardless of domestic conditions if the currency 
were tied to the DM. 
What kind of factors would have led to an overvalued currency in the post-1979 period? 
Amongst the real shocks that would cause this are fiscal expansion and excessive wage growth, 
76 This is in fact similar to applying an Armington assumption to the financial sector, an assumption which does not. of 
course, apply to goods markets in the SOE model. 
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since both would push pn up relative to p,.11 According to this view, Ireland would have been 
susceptible to overvaluation against sterling pre-1979 if fiscal policy had been very expansionary 
or if wage agreements had far exceeded the exogenous component of productivity growth. 
In the post-1979 period, wage demands, fuelled by fiscal stimulation, rose at a rate that was 
inconsistent with the exchange rate target, so PPP was violated (i.e. pn/pt rose relative to the 
country's trading partners). While fiscal retrenchment began in 1982, it proceeded at first 
through tax increases which exerted further upward pressure on wages, thereby worsening the 
overvaluation.78 
The problem did appear to be brought substantially under control, however, by the large 
devaluations of 1986 and 1993, combined as they were with policies which achieved fiscal 
retrenchment through tight controls on government spending (with concomitant effects on 
expected taxes) rather than through further increases in taxation. 
These deviations from PPP can be seen by looking either at hourly earnings in a common 
currency relative to one's trading partners, or by graphing relative output prices against the 
exchange rate. Each method tells the same qualitative story, with slight differences in timing. 
The cost competitiveness measure is depicted in Table A.l (where a decline in the index 
represents a depreciation of the real exchange rate and an improvement in competitiveness). 
Table A.l 
1979 
96 
A measure of cost competitiveness 
1981 
95 
1983 
101 
1985 1 1987 
104 115 
1989 
109 
1991 
112 
1993 
110 
1995 
110 
A.4.1. Introducing Keynesian phenomena 
Another advantage of introducing a non-tradable goods sector is that Keynesian phenomena are 
also more easily analysed. Given the intense competition assumed to prevail in the international 
marketplace, as well as the possibility of arbitrage, it is difficult to envisage long-lasting 
deviations from the law of one price. The possibility of non-tradable prices remaining at 
disequilibrium levels for some period of time is less controversial however (Neary, 1980). 
The requirements for a Keynesian recession are that nominal wages and some output prices be 
sticky (Neary, 1990).79 Thus, if a fall in demand for non-tradables occurs, this sector will contract 
without any stimulus towards the expansion of the tradable sector being imparted. Under 
Note though that if the 'elasticities condition' is satisfied, an overvaluation due to the spending effects of fiscal 
expansion (as opposed to the effects of the associated present or anticipated future tax increases) is associated with 
employment gains, while an overvaluation due to excessive costs is associated with unemployment. 
Econometrically. labour costs seem to exert a stronger influence on Irish prices than do domestic demand factors. The 
tax aspects of fiscal policy may therefore be more important for the extent of overvaluation than the level of government 
spending. Accordingly, one could argue that the fiscal expansion of 1977-82 induced some overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate, which was worsened by the tax increases thereafter. This overvaluation is frequently interpreted as an 
indication that the commitment to the exchange rate target was not credible. It is hard to believe, however, that the 
response of wage demands to these fiscal shocks would have been different under any alternative exchange rate regime. 
Thus. Neary writes that 'it is the interaction of such failures (e.g. a sticky price of the non-traded good, or an export 
sales constraint) with the rigid wage in the labour market which gives rise to Keynesian phenomena". 
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Keynesian conditions, therefore, a decline in government spending will have large effects on 
output and employment whether real or nominal wages are rigid. 
Short-run stickiness in the price of non-traded goods means that a devaluation of the nominal 
exchange rate translates into a real exchange rate depreciation. The resulting fall in the real 
product wage in the traded goods sector induces that sector to expand, while the knock-on effects 
seen in equation (7) are likely to cause the other sector to expand also. 
Both fiscal and exchange rate policies are therefore likely to have strong positive short-run 
effects in conditions of Keynesian recession. A similar result applies to monetary policy, even 
under fixed exchange rates, as will be clear from the discussion above of the monetary approach 
to the balance of payments. In line with Dornbusch (1976), similar effects will arise under 
flexible exchange rates, as with sticky nominal wages and non-traded goods prices the real 
exchange rate depreciates temporarily in response to a monetary expansion. 
Accordingly, the British monetary contraction of the early 1980s would have caused a real 
appreciation of sterling in the early 1980s, which would have pushed Irish inflation above UK 
levels, leading to a competitiveness loss for Ireland vis-à-vis Germany, and a gain against the 
UK. This is, in fact, exactly what occurred (Leddin and Walsh, 1995). 
A.5. Concluding comments 
Appendix A has demonstrated the broad range of issues that can be tackled in the context of the 
small-open-economy model. The model yields insights into the macroeconomic impact of 
policies such as devaluation and government spending programmes, as well as exogenous shocks 
such as disequilibrating wage movements. 
We have suggested that the two-sector version, embodying non-tradable goods as well as 
tradables, is a more useful tool of analysis than the model that assumes that all goods are 
tradable, and that there may be benefits to be gained from recognizing that Keynesian 
assumptions may sometimes be appropriate (i.e. the recognition that prices as well as wages may 
not move perfectly flexibly to their equilibrium levels). 
We saw that this relatively simple model can give a reasonable account of the response of the 
Irish economy to the macroeconomic shocks of recent decades. 
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APPENDIX Β 
Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM 
for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
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Table B.l. Greece: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM 
(employment weighted) 
SI 
S2 
Si l 
Sil 
S12 
S21 
S21 
S21 
S22 
S22 
S23 
S23 
NACE 
341 
351 
453 
417 
436 
471 
431 
432 
224 
481 
Sector 
Insulated wires and cables 
Motor vehicles 
Clothing 
Spaghetti, macaroni 
Knitting mills 
Pulp and paper manuf. 
Wool industry 
Cotton industry 
Prod, of non-ferrous metal 
Rubber products 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
Dl l 
Dll 
Dll 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D13 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D2I 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
251 
344 
442 
256 
315 
342 
427 
451 
455 
248 
255 
257 
347 
352 
411 
428 
441 
483 
222 
247 
316 
325 
328 
346 
412 
413 
419 
472 
494 
314 
343 
362 
424 
438 
467 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Telecommunications equipment 
Leather industry 
Other chemical products 
Boilermaking 
Electrical machinery 
Brewing, malting 
Footwear 
Household textiles 
Ceramic goods 
Paints, varnishes & inks 
Pharmaceuticals 
Electric lamps 
Car bodies, trailers, caravans 
Manuf. of veg. & oils 
Soft drinks 
Leather tan & fin 
Plastic products 
Steel tubes 
Glass & glassware 
Tools, fin. metal goods 
Plant for mines, steel 
Other mach. & equipment 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Slaughtering prep, meat 
Manuf. of dairy products 
Bread & flour confectionery 
Processed paper 
Manuf. of sports goods and toys 
Structural metal products 
Elect, app., batts & accumul. 
Rolling stock 
Distilleries & alcohol 
Carpets, floor coverings 
Wooden furniture 
Total 
X/Y 
18.48 
3.78 
71.87 
10.44 
100.00 
10.03 
13.04 
28.89 
47.47 
16.67 
9.38 
41.83 
56.67 
85.77 
3.92 
25.40 
0.47 
59.00 
100.00 
14.98 
3.40 
17.07 
21.38 
50.89 
22.19 
1.18 
17.91 
12.16 
37.53 
15.11 
11.28 
37.18 
28.50 
2.67 
32.84 
5.77 
9.87 
15.84 
8.15 
8.95 
14.11 
0.27 
26.59 
24.61 
4.46. 
H/Y 
81.52 
96.22 
28.13 
89.56 
0.00 
89.97 
86.96 
71.11 
52.53 
83.33 
90.62 
58.17 
43.33 
14.23 
96.08 
74.60 
99.53 
41.00 
0.00 
85.02 
96.60 
82.93 
78.62 
49.11 
77.81 
98.82 
82.09 
87.84 
62.47 
84.89 
88.72 
62.82 
71.50 
97.33 
67.16 
94.23 
90.13 
84.16 
91.85 
91.05 
85.89 
99.73 
73.41 
75.39 
95.54 
L/LM 
0.6 
0.7 
8.1 
0.4 
4.5 
1.5 
1.0 
7.1 
2.1 
0.8 
26.80 
2.3 
0.6 
0.1 
0.4 
0.2 
1.2 
1.0 
1.9 
0.2 
1.8 
0.4 
2.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.6 
1.1 
0.4 
2.5 
0.7 
0.5 
4.1 
0.1 
1.0 
1.4 
0.8 
1.4 
1.1 
1.2 
0.3 
0.9 
0.3 
1.1 
0.4 
0.9 
0.8 
34.00 
dX/LM 
8.93 
-dH/LM 
-2.06 
-0.32 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.19 
-0.86 
-0.99 
-0.65 
0.02 
-1.50 
-0.35 
-1.10 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.28 
-1.05 
-0.21 
-1.61 
-0.21 
-0.29 
-2.72 
-0.3 
-0.39 
-1.26 
-0.27 
-1.12 
-0.76 
-0.68 
-0.22 
-0.65 
-0.18 
-1.09 
-0.16 
-0.39 
-0.67 
-22.41 
d(X/Y)* 
0.47 
0.66 
1.47 
0.10 
0.00 
0.37 
0.22 
1.26 
0.25 
0.15 
2.04 
0.32 
0.04 
0.02 
0.17 
0.78 
0.90 
0.59 
0.00 
1.22 
0.11 
0.46 
0.02 
0.03 
0.13 
0.30 
0.09 
0.60 
0.11 
0.11 
0.91 
0.02 
0.18 
0.34 
0.13 
0.33 
0.25 
0.25 
0.07 
0.18 
0.06 
0.25 
0.07 
0.15 
0.17 
16.31 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output, 1985. 
H/Y: (100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of output, 1985. 
L/LM: sectoral share of manufacturing employment, 1985. 
dX/LM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
-dH/LM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
d(X/Y)*: employment-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990. part C. Greece. 
Eurostat. Structure and Activity of Industry. Annual Enquiry - Main Results 1986/87. 
Export data: Eurostat SCE 2912 - on microfiche, 1985. 
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Table B.2 Ireland: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM 
(employment weighted) 
SI 
S2 
Sil 
S12 
S13 
S21 
S22 
S23 
NACE 
330 
344 
341 
421 
372 
251 
257 
345 
346 
351 
428 
325 
364 
413 
427 
247 
322 
323 
324 
326 
327 
432 
481 
491 
494 
Sector 
Office & data-processing 
machinery (M) 
Telecommunications equipment 
(M) 
Insulated wires and cables (M) 
Cocoa, chocolate (I) 
Medical & surgical equip. (M) 
Basic industrial chemicals (I) 
Pharmaceuticals (M) 
Radios, TVs. etc. (M) 
Domestic electrical appliances (M) 
Motor vehicles (I) 
Soft drinks (M) 
Plant for mines, steel (M) 
Aerospace equipment (I) 
Dairy products (I) 
Brewing, malting (I) 
Glass & glassware (I) 
Machine tools (M) 
Textile machinery (M) 
Food, chemical machinery (M) 
Transmission equipment (M) 
Other machinery (M) 
Cotton industry (M) 
Rubber products (M) 
Jewellery (I) 
Toys & sports goods (I) 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
D12 
D2I 
D22 
D23 
342 
361 
417 
256 
321 
493 
431 
453 
455 
248 
347 
438 
451 
Electrical machinery (M) 
Shipbuilding (I) 
Spaghetti, macaroni (I) 
Other chemical products (M) 
Agricultural machinery (M) 
Photographic labs (I) 
Wool industry (I) 
Clothing (I) 
Household textiles (I) 
Ceramic goods (I) 
Electric lamps (M) 
Carpets, floor coverings (M) 
Footwear (I) 
Total 
X/Y 
98 
87 
70 
62 
99 
43 
97 
38 
78 
33 
13 
69 
40 
29 
13 
55 
69 
69 
69 
69 
69 
84 
85 
50 
85 
90 
93 
50 
77 
69 
29 
70 
54 
74 
91 
90 
65 
42 
H/Y 
2 
13 
30 
38 
1 
57 
3 
62 
22 
67 
87 
31 
60 
71 
87 
45 
31 
31 
31 
31 
31 
16 
15 
50 
15 
10 
7 
50 
23 
31 
71 
30 
46 
26 
9 
10 
35 
58 
L/LM 
3.8 
2.6 
2.1 
1.2 
2.3 
1.2 
2.8 
1.1 
1.3 
0.4 
1.3 
0.6 
1.1 
3.8 
1.6 
1.9 
0.6 
0.05 
0.2 
0.1 
0.04 
0.4 
1 
0.9 
0.3 
32.69 
1.1 
0.3 
0.02 
0.7 
0.6 
0.1 
1.9 
6.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.1 
0.4 
0.6 
13.22 
dX/LM 
10.90 
-dH/LM 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.01 
-0.05 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.18 
-1.14 
-0.04 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.05 
-0.15 
-1.72 
d(X/Y)* 
0.00 
0.09 
0.46 
0.34 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0.19 
0.08 
0.07 
0.31 
0.05 
0.17 
0.67 
0.35 
0.19 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.03 
0.10 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
0.05 
0.02 
0.14 
0.75 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.08 
4.54 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output. 1986. 
H/Y: ( 100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of gross output, 1986. 
L/LM: sectoral share of manufacturing employment. 1987. 
dX/LM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
-dH/LM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
d(X/Y)*: employment-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions. 
Data source: European Economy, special edition 1990, part C, Ireland, pp. 247-261. 
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Table B.3. Portugal: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM 
(employment weighted) 
SI 
S2 
Si l 
S12 
S13 
S21 
S22 
S23 
NACE 
341 
428 
361 
425 
427 
248 
352 
436 
316 
453 
455 
247 
324 
415 
431/2 
438 
439 
451 
Sector 
Insulated wires and cables 
Soft drinks 
Shipbuilding 
Wine, champagne 
Brewing,malting 
Ceramic goods 
Car bodies, trailers, caravans 
Knitwear industry 
Tools, fin. metal goods 
Clothing 
Household textiles 
Glass & glassware 
Food, chemical machinery 
Proc. & cons, fish & seafood 
Wool/cotton textiles 
Carpets, floor coverings 
Misc. textiles industries 
Footwear 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
Dll 
D12 
D13 
D21 
D22 
D23 
257 
330 
342 
260 
315 
362 
372 
417 
421 
363 
251 
256 
321 
344/5 
347 
351 
353 
325 
328 
346 
371 
419 
322 
323 
343 
416 
481 
Pharmaceuticals 
Office and data-processing machinery 
Electrical machinery' 
Man-made fibres 
Boilermaking 
Rolling stock 
Medico-surgical app & Ortho, app. 
Spaghetti, macaroni 
Cocoa, chocolate 
Cycles, motorcycles & parts 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Agricultural machinery 
Radio & TV, telec equipment 
Electric lamps 
Motor vehicles 
Mot. veh. parts & ace. 
Plant for mines, steel 
Other mach. & equipment 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Measuring & precision instruments 
Bread & flour confectionery 
Machine tools 
Textile machinery 
Elect, app.. batts & accumul. 
Grain milling 
Rubber products 
Total 
X/Y 
54.9 
2.6 
81.4 
49.9 
2.3 
58.9 
20.5 
66.9 
28.1 
74.1 
95.6 
35.5 
37.3 
27.2 
15.6 
27.0 
53.6 
93.3 
28.3 
103.9 
21.2 
3.8 
23.0 
25.3 
41.1 
1.9 
5.9 
33.6 
28.3 
28.4 
10.7 
75.8 
25.9 
23.7 
98.8 
79.0 
25.2 
32.9 
24.9 
0.6 
40.1 
52.8 
8.2 
4.3 
20.8 
H/Y 
45.1 
97.4 
18.6 
50.1 
97.7 
41.1 
79.5 
33.1 
71.9 
25.9 
4.4 
64.5 
62.7 
72.8 
84.4 
73.0 
46.4 
6.7 
71.7 
-3.9 
78.8 
96.2 
77.0 
74.7 
58.9 
98.1 
94.1 
66.4 
71.7 
71.6 
89.3 
24.2 
74.1 
76.3 
1.2 
21.0 
74.8 
67.1 
75.1 
99.4 
59.9 
47.2 
91.8 
95.7 
79.2 
L/LM 
0.6 
0.5 
2.7 
0.2 
0.5 
2.3 
0.8 
4.7 
4.9 
7.6 
0.5 
1.3 
0.2 
1.4 
15.2 
0.7 
1.5 
3.9 
49.45 
1.3 
0.2 
0.9 
0.3 
0.7 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.5 
0.4 
1.2 
1.0 
0.4 
2.1 
0.5 
0.8 
0.7 
0.4 
1.3 
0.3 
0.1 
3.9 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.6 
0.9 
19.80 
dX/LM 
16.48 
-dH/LM 
-0.89 
0.03 
-0.69 
-0.29 
-0.52 
-0.14 
-0.05 
-0.10 
-0.47 
-0.25 
-0.47 
-0.39 
-0.27 
-0.16 
-0.21 
-0.36 
-0.00 
-0.02 
-0.55 
-0.10 
-0.04 
-3.81 
-0.1 II 
-0.05 
-0.15 
-0.51 
-0.44 
-11.01 
d(XA)* 
0.23 
0.48 
0.23 
0.08 
0.44 
0.64 
0.17 
0.43 
0.88 
0.49 
0.00 
0.19 
0.03 
0.23 
2.89 
0.11 
0.16 
0.00 
0.88 
0.00 
0.68 
0.26 
0.47 
0.13 
0.05 
0.09 
0.42 
0.20 
0.24 
0.20 
0.10 
0.14 
0.10 
0.17 
0.00 
0.02 
0.24 
0.05 
0.02 
0.97 
0.05 
0.03 
0.04 
0.13 
0.16 
13.53 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output, average 1985-87. 
H/Y: (100-X/Y) non-tradables as a percentage of output, average 1985-87. 
L/LM: sectoral share of manufacturing employment. 1985. 
dX/LM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
-dH/LM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
d(X/Y)*: employment-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990. part C, Portugal. 
Eurostat, Structure and Activity of Industry, Annual Enquiry - Main Results 1984/85. 
Appendix Β: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM for Greece. Ireland, Portugal and Spain 145 
Table B.4. Spain: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM (employment 
weighted) 
SI 
S2 
Sil 
SI2 
S13 
S21 
S22 
S22 
S22 
S22 
S22 
S23 
S23 
S23 
S23 
NACE 
341 
425 
494 
351 
346 
431 
453 
455 
491 
248 
432 
451 
481 
Sector 
Insulated wires and cables 
Wine, champagne 
Toys, sports goods 
Motor vehicles 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Wool/cotton textiles 
Clothing 
Household textiles 
Jewellery 
Ceramic goods 
Cotton industry 
Footwear 
Rubber products 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
Dll 
Dll 
Dll 
Dll 
Dll 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D22 
D22 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
257 
330 
342 
344 
428 
315 
361 
362 
372 
417 
421 
427 
251 
256 
321 
345 
347 
493 
325 
364 
247 
322 
323 
324 
326 
327 
438 
Pharmaceuticals 
Office and data-processing machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Radio & TV. telec equipment 
Soft drinks 
Boilermaking 
Shipbuilding 
Rolling stock 
Medico-surgical app & ortho. app. 
Spaghetti, macaroni 
Cocoa, chocolate 
Brewing, malting 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Agricultural machinery 
Radio. TV 
Electric lamps 
Photo and cine labs 
Plant for mines, steel 
Aerospace equipment 
Glass & glassware 
Machine tools 
Textile machinery 
Food, chemical machinery 
Transmission equipment 
Other machines and equipment 
Carpets, floor coverings 
Total 
X/Y 
18.33 
9.71 
32.83 
35.85 
15.41 
18.01 
7.07 
22.76 
92.20 
25.14 
10.48 
60.73 
29.08 
10.83 
69.53 
9.57 
16.62 
0.34 
4.44 
41.93 
1.48 
49.54 
0.00 
8.48 
0.40 
28.39 
5.66 
12.88 
8.28 
18.53 
6.98 
20.3! 
54.55 
12.16 
33.07 
39.13 
38.35 
39.08 
27.45 
25.92 
H/Y 
81.67 
90.29 
67.17 
64.15 
84.59 
81.99 
92.93 
77.24 
7.80 
74.86 
89.52 
39.27 
70.92 
89.17 
30.47 
90.43 
83.38 
99.66 
95.56 
58.07 
98.52 
50.46 
100.00 
91.52 
99.60 
71.61 
94.34 
87.12 
91.72 
81.47 
93.02 
79.69 
45.45 
87.84 
66.93 
60.87 
61.65 
60.92 
72.55 
74.08 
L/LM 
0.36 
1.09 
0.37 
4.93 
0.91 
0.29 
3.95 
0.65 
0.34 
1.49 
1.13 
1.88 
1.56 
18.95 
1.64 
0.13 
2.02 
1.27 
0.93 
0.66 
1.87 
0.66 
0.11 
0.05 
0.76 
0.70 
1.15 
1.28 
0.66 
0.82 
0.48 
0.13 
0.98 
0.42 
1.03 
0.70 
0.33 
0.58 
0.27 
0.38 
0.17 
20.18 
-dH/LM 
3.34 
-dH/LM 
-1.34 
0.00 
-1.70 
-0.92 
-0.92 
-0.61 
-0.56 
-0.64 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.65 
-0.70 
-0.32 
-0.91 
-0.33 
-0.51 
-0.19 
-0.09 
-0.36 
-0.05 
-0.54 
-0.16 
-0.06 
-0.11 
-0.05 
-0.11 
-0.05 
-11.96 
d(X/Y)* 
0.17 
0.55 
0.09 
0.52 
0.12 
0.04 
0.55 
0.08 
0.00 
0.15 
0.14 
0.00 
0.15 
0.89 
0.00 
1.12 
0.61 
0.61 
0.37 
0.34 
0.39 
0.01 
0.03 
0.39 
0.42 
0.14 
0.20 
0.09 
0.12 
0.06 
0.02 
0.12 
0.02 
0.12 
0.06 
0.03 
0.05 
0.02 
0.04 
0.02 
8.82 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output, 1985. 
H/Y: (100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of output, 1985. 
L/LM: sectoral share of manufacturing employment, 1985. 
dX/LM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
-dH/LM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. 
d(X/Y)*: employment-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand growth. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990, part C, Spain. 
Eurostat. Structure and Activity of Industry, Annual Enquiry - Main Results 1984/85. 
OECD STAN Database, Dec 1994 on diskettes. 
146 The cases of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
Table B.5. Greece: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM (output 
weighted) 
SI 
S2 
Sil 
Si l 
S12 
S21 
S21 
S21 
S22 
S22 
S23 
S23 
NACE 
341 
351 
453 
417 
436 
471 
431 
432 
224 
481 
Sector 
Insulated wires and cables 
Motor vehicles 
Clothing 
Spaghetti, macaroni 
Knitting mills 
Pulp and paper manuf. 
Wool industry 
Cotton industry 
Prod, of non-ferrous metal 
Rubber products 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
Dll 
Dll 
Dll 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D13 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D22 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
251 
344 
442 
256 
315 
342 
427 
451 
455 
248 
255 
257 
347 
352 
411 
428 
441 
483 
222 
247 
316 
325 
328 
346 
412 
413 
419 
472 
494 
314 
343 
362 
424 
438 
467 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Telecommunications equipment 
Leather industry 
Other chemical products 
Boilermaking 
Electrical machinery 
Brewing, malting 
Footwear 
Household textiles 
Ceramic goods 
Paints, varnishes & inks 
Pharmaceuticals 
Electric lamps 
Car bodies, trailers, caravans 
Manuf. of veg. & oils 
Soft drinks 
Leather tan & fin 
Plastic products 
Steel tubes 
Glass & glassware 
Tools, fin. metal goods 
Plant for mines, steel 
Other mach. & equipment 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Slaughtering prep, meat 
Manuf. of dairy products 
Bread & flour confectionery 
Processed paper 
Manuf. of sports goods and toys 
Structural metal products 
Elect, app., batts & accumul. 
Rolling stock 
Distilleries & alcohol 
Carpets, floor coverings 
Wooden furniture 
Total 
X/Y 
18.48 
3.78 
71.87 
10.44 
100.00 
10.03 
13.04 
28.89 
47.47 
16.67 
9.38 
41.83 
56.67 
85.77 
3.92 
25.40 
0.47 
59.00 
100.00 
14.98 
3.40 
17.07 
21.38 
50.89 
22.19 
1.18 
17.91 
12.16 
37.53 
15.11 
11.28 
37.18 
28.50 
2.67 
32.84 
5.77 
9.87 
15.84 
8.15 
8.95 
14.11 
0.27 
26.59 
24.61 
4.46 
H/Y 
81.52 
96.22 
28.13 
89.56 
0.00 
89.97 
86.96 
71.11 
52.53 
83.33 
90.62 
58.17 
43.33 
14.23 
96.08 
74.60 
99.53 
41.00 
0.00 
85.02 
96.60 
82.93 
78.62 
49.11 
77.81 
98.82 
82.09 
87.84 
62.47 
84.89 
88.72 
62.82 
71.50 
97.33 
67.16 
94.23 
90.13 
84.16 
91.85 
91.05 
85.89 
99.73 
73.41 
75.39 
95.54 
Y/YM 
1.05 
0.94 
2.17 
0.37 
1.98 
1.22 
0.56 
1.43 
3.80 
0.66 
14.19 
4.23 
0.29 
0.03 
0.47 
0.10 
0.63 
1.11 
0.72 
0.17 
0.89 
0.45 
1.49 
0.05 
0.22 
1.51 
1.00 
0.48 
1.80 
0.73 
0.28 
3.04 
0.04 
0.54 
1.08 
0.88 
1.93 
0.51 
1.23 
0.25 
0.70 
0.18 
0.25 
0.47 
0.57 
0.30 
28.61 
dX/YM 
4.73 
-dH/YM 
-3.79 
-0.15 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.09 
-0.45 
-1.11 
-0.25 
0.02 
-0.74 
-0.40 
-0.82 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.71 
-0.96 
-0.26 
-1.16 
-0.21 
-0.16 
-2.01 
-0.01 
-0.21 
-0.97 
-0.30 
-1.55 
-0.36 
-0.70 
-0.18 
-0.50 
-0.11 
-0.25 
-0.19 
-0.25 
-0.25 
-19.18 
d(XA)* 
0.82 
0.89 
0.39 
0.09 
0.00 
0.30 
0.12 
0.25 
0.45 
0.12 
3.75 
0.15 
0.01 
0.02 
0.08 
0.41 
0.99 
0.22 
0.00 
0.60 
0.12 
0.34 
0.01 
0.03 
0.32 
0.27 
0.11 
0.43 
0.11 
0.06 
0.67 
0.01 
0.10 
0.26 
0.15 
0.45 
0.12 
0.26 
0.06 
0.14 
0.03 
0.06 
0.08 
0.10 
0.06 
14.05 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output. 1985. 
H/Y: (100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of output, 1985. 
Y/YM: sectoral share of manufacturing output, 1985 
dX/YM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
-dH/YM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
d(X/Y)*: output-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990, part C. Greece. 
Eurostat. Structure and Activity of Industry, Annual Enquiry - Main Results 1986/87. 
Export data: Eurostat SCE 2912 - on microfiche, 1985. 
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Table B.6. Ireland: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM (output 
weighted) 
SI 
S2 
Sil 
S12 
S13 
S21 
S22 
S23 
NACE 
330 
344 
341 
421 
372 
251 
257 
345 
346 
351 
428 
325 
364 
413 
427 
247 
322 
323 
324 
326 
327 
432 
481 
491 
494 
Sector 
Office & data-processing mach. (M) 
Telecommunications equip. (M) 
Insulated wires and cables (M) 
Cocoa, chocolate (I) 
Medical & surgical equip. (M) 
Basic industrial chemicals (I) 
Pharmaceuticals (M) 
Radios. TVs. etc. (M) 
Domestic electrical appliances (M) 
Motor vehicles (I) 
Soft drinks (M) 
Plant for mines, steel (M) 
Aerospace equipment (I) 
Dairy products (I) 
Brewing, malting (I) 
Glass & glassware (I) 
Machine tools (M) 
Textile machinery (M) 
Food, chemical machinery (M) 
Transmission equipment (M) 
Other machinery (M) 
Cotton industry (M) 
Rubber products (M) 
Jewellery (I) 
Toys & sports goods (I) 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
D12 
D21 
D22 
D23 
342 
361 
417 
256 
321 
493 
431 
453 
455 
248 
347 
438 
451 
Electrical machinery (M) 
Shipbuilding (I) 
Spaghetti, macaroni (I) 
Other chemical products (M) 
Agricultural machinery (M) 
Photographic labs (I) 
Wool industry (I) 
Clothing (I) 
Household textiles (I) 
Ceramic goods (I) 
Electric lamps (M) 
Carpets, floor coverings (M) 
Footwear (I) 
Total 
X/Y 
98 
87 
70 
62 
99 
43 
97 
38 
78 
33 
13 
69 
40 
29 
13 
55 
69 
69 
69 
69 
69 
84 
85 
50 
85 
90 
93 
50 
77 
69 
29 
70 
54 
74 
91 
90 
65 
42 
H/Y 
2 
13 
30 
38 
1 
57 
3 
62 
22 
67 
87 
31 
60 
71 
87 
45 
31 
31 
31 
31 
31 
16 
15 
50 
15 
10 
7 
50 
23 
31 
71 
30 
46 
26 
9 
10 
35 
58 
Y/YM 
13.19 
2.72 
0.82 
2.49 
1.68 
2.28 
5.96 
2.12 
1.03 
0.19 
1.64 
0.39 
0.50 
12.01 
5.05 
0.89 
0.39 
0.03 
0.13 
0.07 
0.03 
0.78 
0.71 
0.16 
0.27 
55.53 
0.61 
0.14 
0.04 
0.78 
0.39 
0.12 
0.44 
1.43 
0.19 
0.18 
0.07 
0.30 
0.15 
4.83 
dX/YM 
18.51 
-dH/YM 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.25 
-0.02 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-0.54 
d(X/Y)* 
0.00 
0.09 
0.18 
0.70 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.36 
0.06 
0.03 
0.39 
0.03 
0.08 
2.13 
1.10 
0.09 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.05 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.16 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
6.10 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output. 1986. 
H/Y: (100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of gross output, 1986. 
Y/YM: sectoral share of manufacturing output, 1987. 
dX/YM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
-dH/YM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
d(X/Y)*: output-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990, part C, Ireland, pp. 247-261. 
Irish CSO Census of Industrial Production, 1987. 
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Table B.7. Portugal: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM (output 
weighted) 
SI 
S2 
Sil 
S12 
S13 
S21 
S22 
S23 
NACE 
341 
428 
361 
425 
427 
248 
352 
436 
316 
453 
455 
247 
324 
415 
431/2 
438 
439 
451 
Sector 
Insulated wires and cables 
Soft drinks 
Shipbuilding 
Wine, champagne 
Brewing, malting 
Ceramic goods 
Car bodies, trailers, caravans 
Knitwear industry 
Tools, fin. metal goods 
Clothing 
Household textiles 
Glass & glassware 
Food, chemical machinery 
Proc. & cons, fish & seafood 
Wool/cotton textiles 
Carpets, floor coverings 
Misc. textiles industries 
Footwear 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
Dll 
D12 
D13 
D21 
D22 
D23 
257 
330 
342 
260 
315 
362 
372 
417 
421 
363 
251 
256 
321 
344/5 
347 
351 
353 
325 
328 
346 
371 
419 
322 
323 
343 
416 
481 
Pharmaceuticals 
Office and data-processing machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Man-made fibres 
Boilermaking 
Rolling stock 
Medico-surgical app & Ortho, app. 
Spaghetti, macaroni 
Cocoa, chocolate 
Cycles, motorcycles & parts 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Agricultural machinery 
Radio & TV, telec equipment 
Electric lamps 
Motor vehicles 
Mot. veh. parts & ace. 
Plant for mines, steel 
Other mach. & equipment 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Measuring & precision instruments 
Bread & flour confectionery 
Machine tools 
Textile machinery 
Elect, app.. batts & accumul. 
Grain milling 
Rubber products 
Total 
X/Y 
54.9 
2.6 
81.4 
49.9 
2.3 
58.9 
20.5 
66.9 
28.1 
74.1 
95.6 
35.5 
37.3 
27.2 
15.6 
27.0 
53.6 
93.3 
28.3 
103.9 
21.2 
3.8 
23.0 
25.3 
41.1 
1.9 
5.9 
33.6 
28.3 
28.4 
10.7 
75.8 
25.9 
23.7 
98.8 
79.0 
25.2 
32.9 
24.9 
0.6 
40.1 
52.8 
8.2 
4.3 
20.8 
H/Y 
45.1 
97.4 
18.6 
50.1 
97.7 
41.1 
79.5 
33.1 
71.9 
25.9 
4.4 
64.5 
62.7 
72.8 
84.4 
73.0 
46.4 
6.7 
71.7 
-3.9 
78.8 
96.2 
77.0 
74.7 
58.9 
98.1 
94.1 
66.4 
71.7 
71.6 
89.3 
24.2 
74.1 
76.3 
1.2 
21.0 
74.8 
67.1 
75.1 
99.4 
59.9 
47.2 
91.8 
95.7 
79.2 
Y/YM 
0.89 
0.58 
0.97 
0.13 
0.94 
1.10 
0.38 
3.32 
2.69 
3.99 
0.25 
1.00 
0.08 
1.14 
8.71 
0.54 
0.74 
2.26 
29.69 
1.55 
0.16 
0.65 
0.74 
0.45 
0.27 
0.08 
0.28 
0.39 
0.26 
5.33 
2.62 
0.23 
2.26 
0.32 
2.44 
1.10 
0.20 
1.04 
0.41 
0.09 
1.56 
0.17 
0.19 
0.28 
2.39 
0.75 
26.20 
dX/YM 
9.90 
-dH/YM 
-1.06 
0.02 
-0.49 
-0.71 
-0.33 
-0.20 
-0.04 
-0.27 
-0.36 
-0.16 
-2.07 
-1.01 
-0.15 
-0.17 
-0.13 
-1.09 
-0.00 
-0.01 
-0.44 
-0.14 
-0.04 
-1.52 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.21 
-2.02 
-0.37 
-13.07 
d(XA')* 
0.34 
0.55 
0.08 
0.05 
0.82 
0.31 
0.08 
0.30 
0.48 
0.26 
0.00 
0.14 
0.01 
0.19 
1.65 
0.09 
0.08 
0.00 
1.05 
0.00 
0.49 
0.64 
0.30 
0.18 
0.04 
0.25 
0.33 
0.13 
1.05 
0.52 
0.06 
0.15 
0.06 
0.51 
0.00 
0.01 
0.19 
0.07 
0.02 
0.39 
0.02 
0.02 
0.06 
0.51 
0.13 
12.62 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output, average 1985-87. 
H/Y: ( 100-X/Y) non-tradables as a percentage of output, average 1985-87. 
Y/YM: sectoral share of manufacturing output. 1987. 
dX/YM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
-dH/YM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
d(X/Y)*: output-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990, part C. Portugal. 
Eurostat, Structure and Activity of Industry, Annual Enquiry - Main Results 1984/85 and 1986/87. 
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Table B.8. Spain: Classification of the sectors to be affected by the SEM (output 
weighted) 
SI 
S2 
SII 
S12 
S13 
S2I 
S22 
S22 
S22 
S22 
S22 
S23 
S23 
S23 
S23 
NACE 
341 
425 
494 
351 
346 
431 
453 
455 
491 
248 
432 
451 
481 
Sector 
Insulated wires and cables 
Wine, champagne 
Toys, sports goods 
Motor vehicles 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Wool/cotton textiles 
Clothing 
Household textiles 
Jewellery 
Ceramic goods 
Cotton industry 
Footwear 
Rubber products 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
Dll 
Dll 
Dll 
Dll 
Dll 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D12 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D21 
D22 
D22 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
D23 
257 
330 
342 
344 
428 
315 
361 
362 
372 
417 
421 
427 
251 
256 
321 
345 
347 
493 
325 
364 
247 
322 
323 
324 
326 
327 
438 
Pharmaceuticals 
Office and data-processing machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Radio & TV, telec equipment 
Soft drinks 
Boilermaking 
Shipbuilding 
Rolling stock 
Medico-surgical app. & Ortho, app. 
Spaghetti, macaroni 
Cocoa, chocolate 
Brewing, malting 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Agricultural machinery 
Radio. TV 
Electric lamps 
Photo and cine labs 
Plant for mines, steel 
Aerospace equipment 
Glass & glassware 
Machine tools 
Textile machinery 
Food, chemical machinery 
Transmission equipment 
Other machines and equipment 
Carpets, floor coverings 
Total 
X/Y 
18.33 
9.71 
32.83 
35.85 
15.41 
18.01 
7.07 
22.76 
92.20 
25.14 
10.48 
60.73 
29.08 
10.83 
69.53 
9.57 
16.62 
0.34 
4.44 
41.93 
1.48 
49.54 
0.00 
8.48 
0.40 
28.39 
5.66 
12.88 
8.28 
18.53 
6.98 
20.31 
54.55 
12.16 
33.07 
39.13 
38.35 
39.08 
27.45 
25.92 
H/V 
81.67 
90.29 
67.17 
64.15 
84.59 
81.99 
92.93 
77.24 
7.80 
74.86 
89.52 
39.27 
70.92 
89.17 
30.47 
90.43 
83.38 
99.66 
95.56 
58.07 
98.52 
50.46 
100.00 
91.52 
99.60 
71.61 
94.34 
87.12 
91.72 
81.47 
93.02 
79.69 
45.45 
87.84 
66.93 
60.87 
61.65 
60.92 
72.55 
74.08 
Y/YM 
0.46 
1.62 
0.28 
10.01 
0.96 
0.20 
1.92 
0.39 
0.15 
0.92 
0.88 
0.91 
1.34 
20.05 
1.91 
0.51 
1.45 
1.12 
1.09 
0.40 
0.73 
0.31 
0.05 
0.06 
0.69 
0.86 
3.77 
1.73 
0.39 
0.68 
0.27 
0.10 
0.87 
0.28 
0.87 
0.56 
0.31 
0.35 
0.15 
0.22 
0.16 
19.89 
dX/YM 
3.53 
-dH/YM 
-1.57 
0.00 
-1.22 
-0.81 
-1.09 
-0.37 
-0.22 
-0.30 
-0.01 
-0.06 
-0.59 
-0.85 
-1.04 
-1.24 
-0.20 
-0.42 
-0.11 
-0.06 
-0.32 
-0.03 
-0.45 
-0.13 
-0.06 
-0.07 
-0.03 
-0.06 
-0.05 
-11.35 
d(X/Y)* 
0.21 
0.82 
0.07 
1.06 
0.12 
0.02 
0.27 
0.05 
0.00 
0.09 
0.11 
0.00 
0.13 
1.03 
0.00 
0.80 
0.54 
0.72 
0.22 
0.13 
0.18 
0.01 
0.04 
0.36 
0.51 
0.45 
0.27 
0.06 
0.10 
0.04 
0.01 
0.10 
0.02 
0.10 
0.05 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
8.78 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output, 1985. 
H/Y: (100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of output, 1985. 
Y/'YM: sectoral share of manufacturing output. 1987. 
dX/YM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
-dH/YM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
d(X/Y)*: output-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand growth. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990, part C, Spain. 
Eurostat. Structure and Activity of Industry. Annual Enquiry - Main Results 1984/85 and 1986/87. 
OECD STAN Database, Dec 1994 on diskettes. 
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Table B.9. Ireland: Classification of the indigenous sectors to be affected by the SEM 
(output weighted) 
SI 
S2 
S12 
S21 
S22 
S23 
NACE 
421 
251 
351 
364 
413 
427 
247 
491 
494 
Sector 
Cocoa, chocolate (I) 
Basic industrial chemicals (I) 
Motor vehicles (I) 
Aerospace equipment (I) 
Dairy products (I) 
Brewing, malting (I) 
Glass & glassware (I) 
Jewellery (I) 
Toys & sports goods (I) 
Total 
Dl 
D2 
D12 
D21 
D22 
D23 
361 
417 
493 
431 
453 
455 
248 
451 
Shipbuilding (I) 
Spaghetti, macaroni (I) 
Photographic labs (I) 
Wool industry (I) 
Clothing (I) 
Household textiles (I) 
Ceramic goods (I) 
Footwear (I) 
Total 
X/Y 
62 
43 
33 
40 
29 
13 
55 
50 
85 
93 
50 
29 
70 
54 
74 
91 
42 
H/Y 
38 
57 
67 
60 
71 
87 
45 
50 
15 
7 
50 
71 
30 
46 
26 
9 
58 
Y/YM 
2.49 
2.28 
0.19 
0.50 
12.01 
5.05 
0.89 
0.16 
0.27 
23.84 
0.14 
0.04 
0.12 
0.44 
1.43 
0.19 
0.18 
0.15 
4.83 
dXAM 
7.95 
-dHAM 
-0.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.25 
-0.02 
-0.00 
-0.04 
-0.41 
d(XA)*. 
0.70 
0.36 
0.03 
0.08 
2.13 
1.10 
0.09 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.16 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
4.78 
Legend: X/Y: exports as a percentage of gross output, 1986. 
H/Y: (100-X/Y) home market sales as a percentage of gross output, 1986. 
YA'M: sectoral share of manufacturing output, 1987. 
dXAfM: gain in exports as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
-dH/YM: loss in home market sales as a percentage of total manufacturing output. 
d(X/Y)*: output-weighted percentage point change in export-output ratio, adjusted for demand conditions. 
Data sources: European Economy, special edition 1990, part C, Ireland, pp. 247-261. 
Irish CSO Census of Industrial Production, 1987. 
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APPENDIX C 
Assessment of the impact of the SEM on the services 
sector 
Market services play a considerable role in the European Union; they accounted for nearly 
50% of GDP and 42% of employment in 1990. From 1980 to 1990 employment in services 
rose by 23.4% while it fell by 13% in manufacturing. Therefore in employment terms services 
are also the main providers of new jobs. At the same time, labour productivity in market 
services (1.5%) has been considerably weaker than in manufacturing (2.8%) over the 20 years 
from 1970 to 1990. This is due to the high degree of regulation which has hindered 
competition and slowed down productivity growth. Another factor is that the substitutability 
of capital for labour has traditionally been more limited in services. With deregulation of 
services as part of the 1992 single market programme along with technological improvements, 
increased levels of labour productivity are likely to occur. 
Since services were more sheltered from competition due to high government regulation, this 
in turn implied higher inflation in the services sectors than that experienced in manufacturing 
sectors. 
Table C.l. Weight of services in Member States' economies (%) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
EUR-12 
GDP 
1990 
39.3 
36.9 
43.5 
44.8 
48.2 
Increase 1980-90 
1.4 
3.0 
3.5 
-0.2 
5.8 
Employment 
1990 
28.8 
38.6 
42.0' 
Increase 1980-90 
5.0 
I.I 
5.6" 
For employment. EUR-10 instead of EUR-12. 
Source: Buigues and Sapir (1993a), Table 1, p. 6. 
For the peripheral countries, services accounted for a lower share of GDP and employment 
than the Community average, as can be seen in Table C.l above. Sapir (1993) believes that the 
higher level of government regulation has hindered the scope for increased competition within 
the peripheral economies. 
Assessing the impact of the single market on services proves a harder task than for the 
manufacturing sector. Data constraints - usually the lack of consistency across countries (or 
the total lack of data for Greece, for example) - makes empirical work next to impossible. 
Trade in services is much more difficult to record than merchandise trade due to the 
intangibility aspect, and the lack of detailed international nomenclature for trade in services 
means that individual country data is not perfectly comparable. 
This problem is frequently mentioned in the literature on services. The European Economy 
(1993) special issue on market services and European integration refers to the aforementioned 
problem of data constraints and notes that this is especially true of the peripheral countries. 
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While assessing the impact of the single market on services we review two main publications, 
the European Economy Issue (1993) and Emerson et al (1988.) We discuss the implications 
of their findings for our own research and draw some general conclusions. 
C.l. European Economy (1993): Market services and European integration 
The main characteristics, noted by Buigues and Sapir (1993b), of the services sector were the 
low degree of internationalization, a high degree of government intervention and regulation, 
low levels of technological change and a relatively low growth in labour productivity. They 
found that for the peripheral countries these characteristics are more pronounced, especially in 
sectors such as distribution (low trade level) and hotels (high government regulation). They 
predicted that these economies are likely to undergo important structural changes with 
increased competition, due to the introduction of new technologies, resulting in greater 
productivity (especially labour productivity), but that the negative impact this would have on 
employment would be offset by the growth in services due to income growth. 
Buigues and Sapir stated that the main challenge with respect to services for policy-makers at 
the Community level was likely to be employment; with increased competition and 
technological change, they felt, leading to sectoral shifts and changes in skill requirements. 
This point was also emphasized in another paper in the European Economy (1993): Lebrun et 
al. stressed that restructuring in the southern Member States, given the high proportion of total 
employment in distribution (40% of services employment in 1990) would be a key factor in 
analysing the impact of 1992 on employment in Europe. 
Buigues and Sapir noted that inflation in services has generally been higher than inflation in 
manufacturing, as firms in services pass on their poorer levels of productivity through higher 
prices as compared to manufacturing. They found that the southern peripheral countries also 
experienced lower productivity and higher inflation than the northern countries, due to higher 
levels of regulation in the periphery which hindered competition. 
As regards internationalization of services, Buigues and Sapir noted that trade in services was 
on average four times smaller than trade in goods. Trade in services accounted for 20% and 
19% of total exports and imports of goods and services respectively in 1990. For the southern 
peripheral economies, the weight of exports of services was much higher (Greece 53%, Spain 
36%, 1989) and that of imports lower; according to Buigues and Sapir this was a reflection of 
the strong specialization in tourism. 
Services are generally considered as non-traded activities since production and consumption 
occur at the same time. Buigues and Sapir found that an important consequence of this feature 
was the fact that foreign direct investment had played a crucial role in international services 
transactions. FDI flows to services accounted for over half of total FDI flows in the EC during 
the early 1980s. Sapir (1993) pointed out that the FDI flows had been on the increase since 
1984 and suggested that the surge in foreign direct investment was not just particular to the EC 
nor was it related to 1992. In our analysis of FDI flows into manufacturing industries in the 
peripheral economies, we found that there was a significant increase in FDI flows to Spain and 
Portugal when they joined the European Community in 1986; we attribute this increase to their 
accession to the EC which attracted increased foreign investment (see tables in Chapter 5). 
Ilzkovitz (1993) singled out three services sectors as playing a significant role in terms of 
employment and value added for the peripheral countries: distribution, tourism and transport, 
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in particular road transport. These three sectors have a high unskilled labour content, and price 
competition is strong. They accounted for 62% to 76% of employment in services and 47% to 
57% of value added in services in 1990 within the peripheral countries. 
Ilzkovitz considered indicators such as intra-EC export market shares, coverage ratios (ratio of 
intra-EC exports to intra-EC imports) and export specialization indices (average for 1987-92) 
to assess the trade performance in services. He reminded us that services differ from 
manufacturing and therefore, although the tools of analysis are the same, they are not as 
reliable as indicators of the strengths and weaknesses of trade in services due to the difference 
in internationalization and FDI between services and manufacturing. He stressed the statistical 
problems, already mentioned, with respect to services trade data. 
Of the three service sectors, he found that productivity and trade performance were strong in 
tourism alone. In distribution, Spain and Portugal perform poorly, with Spanish firms being 
targeted by foreign competitors. He suggests that this poor performance is due to the lack of 
modernization, the small concentration and the predominance of small firms in comparison 
with northern Europe. He predicted that the impact of 1992 would lead to a dominance of 
foreign ownership in Spain and Portugal. 
The lower wages costs in the southern economies benefit road transportation. Ilzkovitz 
predicted that one of two scenarios would occur due to the SEM: either modernization would 
occur as it had in the northern economies, or else they would remain specialized in the more 
traditional segment of road transportation where price rather than quality competition 
dominated. In general, he predicted that a dualism would emerge where the southern states 
would specialize in traditional labour-intensive services with strong price competition and the 
northern Member States in high-tech and capital-intensive services where quality was 
important. 
The European Economy (1993) special edition analysed the impact of 1992 at a sectoral level. 
Below, we concentrate on those service sectors that are significant in the southern peripheral 
countries and Ireland. These include road haulage, distribution and hotel chains. The analysis 
is sector specific and not country specific; therefore, the conclusions drawn by the authors do 
not, in general, refer to specific countries. We focus on the information we see as being 
relevant to the peripheral economies. 
C.2. Road haulage 
Road haulage accounted for between 85% and 96% of all inland transport for the southern 
periphery countries and Ireland in 1987; this is higher than in Germany, for example, where it 
accounted for 63%. Sleuwaegen (1993) predicted that the impact of 1992 would reduce freight 
rates and reduce regulation which in turn would lead to greater efficiency. The author warned 
that with harmonization, rules would have to be laid down in order that increased competition 
would not encourage a reduction in quality and relaxation of road safety and environmental 
regulations. He predicted a move towards concentration, with a number of small firms being 
squeezed out of the market. Sleuwaegen did not draw any specific conclusions for the southern 
peripheral countries or Ireland. 
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C.3. Distribution 
This sector is the largest services sector both in terms of output and employment. It accounted 
for nearly 40% of employment in services in the European Community in 1990. This sector 
includes both retailing and wholesaling activities. Fitz Gerald et al (1993) noted how hard it is 
to separate out this service from the goods that were being sold, as well as the difficulty in 
deriving measures of efficiency of the sector. The distinction between wholesaling and 
retailing has also become blurred, which makes individual analysis of these subsectors 
difficult. They noted that consumer tastes are reflected in the size of distribution: for example, 
in Ireland clothing was more frequently sold in large shops, while the opposite occurred in the 
southern states and France, where the smaller shops still accounted for the bulk of trade. They 
made these distinctions in order to show that there is no optimal structure for distribution and 
also that the degree of internationalization is limited due to cultural differences in tastes. They 
found that the share of retail sales in consumer expenditure was inversely correlated with the 
standard of living, hence in the peripheral economies (lowest standard of living) retail sales 
accounted for over 50% of consumer expenditure in 1987. 
They concluded that there was likely to be a greater concentration in the distribution sector, 
particularly in the southern countries where traditional forms of retailing were still 
predominant. They also predicted that price differences would persist between Member States, 
due to differences in the competitive position of manufacturers and local distributors. 
C.4. Hotel chains 
Viceriat (1993) stated that accommodation and tourist services accounted for the largest share 
of GDP in the southern European countries (7.7% of GDP for Greece, 6.6% for Spain and 
3.2% for Portugal, 1986). In employment terms a similar pattern emerged. With regards to 
hotel chains, the author found that they were more highly developed in the UK and France, 
while in Spain the importance of independent hotels was noticeable. There were no specific 
conclusions drawn by the author for the peripheral economies. In general, he predicted that the 
trend in concentration was likely to continue and that hotel chains were likely to take 
advantage of economies of scale, with mergers and take-overs likely to increase. 
In general, the European Economy (1993) special issue on the services sectors does not carry a 
disaggregated level of analysis at country level for our needs. This may be due to data 
constraints: for example, the lack of data for Greece was often cited. The overall conclusion 
that we draw from this analysis is that the southern peripheral economies and Ireland are likely 
to be dominated by foreign affiliates as integration continues, especially in services sectors 
such as hotel chains. In most of the above-mentioned studies, economies of scale are expected 
to lead to the squeezing out of a number of small transport haulage firms to be replaced, for 
example, by large international companies which increased productivity levels. Buigues and 
Sapir predict that the loss in employment due to such factors would be outweighed by the 
overall growth in services due to income expansion. 
C.5. Emerson et ai (1988) 
In his study of the single market, Emerson outlined case studies for services sectors: financial 
services, business services, surface and air transport and telecommunications services. These 
sectors accounted for over half of total services in the economy in terms of value added and 
15% of the EC total value added in 1985. These sectors, according to Emerson, were those 
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which experienced the most international business. Spain was the only peripheral economy 
included in Emerson's analysis, notably for financial services. 
In general, Emerson suggested that the regulatory function of government not only acts as a 
prudential and safety objective but that it often tended to limit entry. He suggested that the 
objective of European integration was to provide adequate safety standards in tandem with 
increased market openness and competition and he forecasted that the potential gains would be 
quite large. 
C.6. Financial services 
For financial services Spain is close to the Community average in terms of value added as a 
percentage of GDP (6.4% for both) and employment as a percentage of total employment 
(2.8% compared to 2.9%) (data for 1985). Emerson stated that the completion of financial 
market integration was dependent on the relaxation of remaining exchange controls, which 
were more apparent in the southern peripheral economies. Possible reductions in the cost of 
financial services due to the removal of regulatory barriers and the abolition of exchange 
controls varied widely across countries; he forecasted that Spain would benefit greatly from 
reductions in prices. His analysis was based on estimates of a range of financial products, 
before and after European integration, taken from a study by Price Waterhouse (European 
Commission, 1988). For Spain the estimated potential fall in the price of financial products as 
a result of the single market was 21%; this was by far the highest fall (the EUR-8 average fall 
is 10%). The reason given was that Spain had the highest price level to begin with and was 
heavily regulated, therefore liberalization would have a major impact on financial services 
prices in Spain. 
C.7. Bradley et ai (1992) 
As mentioned in our earlier literature review of the impact of the single market (Chapter 4), 
we noted that Bradley et al (1992) had quantified the liberalization of financial services in 
Ireland and compared it to the average value calculated by Cecchini. The authors predicted 
that capital market integration would force interest rates to equalize as capital became free to 
locate wherever the rate of return was highest. They forecasted that this would lead to a 1.1% 
rise in GNP by the year 1998 and a 1% fall in consumer prices. These medium-term results 
were lower than those predicted by Cecchini both in terms of prices and growth. This 
suggested that Ireland would not gain as much from the liberalization of financial services as 
the core European economies. 
C.8. Conclusion 
The above two results on the impact of financial services liberalization for Spain and Ireland 
are the only quantitative results that we have come across in our review of the literature. 
Quantification of the impact of the single market on prices or on productivity in services in the 
peripheral economies of the EU is not available. This means that we are forced to rely largely 
on qualitative analyses, such as those of Buigues and Sapir (1993a), for our assessment of the 
overall impact of the SEM on the services sector. 
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